Increased levels of autistic traits are associated with atypical moral judgments.

Despite evidence often showing differences between groups with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) and neurotypical controls in moral judgment, the precise nature of these differences has been difficult to establish. At least two reasons for this are (1) that ASD (and its associated characteristics) is difficult to define and (2) that morality, and the inclinations that undergird it, are hard to measure empirically. These challenges have made conclusive associations between ASD and particular patterns of moral judgment hard to come by. Thus, in the current study, participants levels of a traits associated with ASD were assessed by their responses to a questionnaire (i.e., the Iowa Screener) before they made moral judgments across a set of 20 moral dilemmas that independently assess utilitarian and deontological processing. Interestingly, results indicated that increased levels of autistic traits were associated with fewer moral judgments corresponding to either moral theory; that is, higher levels of autistic traits were associated with atypical patterns of moral judgment. In addition, and consistent with some prior methods (e.g., Gaeth et al., 2016), participant scores on the Iowa Screener, as well as their self-identification, were used to categorize participants between two groups (i.e., ASD and Typical) for exploratory purposes. Taken together, this research better informs the relationship between ASD and its associated traits with moral judgment and can inform certain discrepant findings in the field. Implications and ideas for future research are discussed, such as whether traits associated with ASD might relate to alternative moral inclinations, beyond deontology and utilitarianism.

Differences in moral judgment predict behavior in a Covid triage game scenario.

Moral beliefs influence decisions across many contexts, but researchers typically test how these beliefs translate into moral judgments in hypothetical dilemmas. While this is important, in this study (N = 248), we sought to extend these findings by exploring whether moral judgment (specifically utilitarian or deontological processing) predicted behavior in a commons dilemma game against other players (programmed bots) across multiple rounds in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic. Importantly, participants had to weigh short-term needs against long-term dangers of exhausting the community pool (i.e., a tragedy of the commons). As hypothesized, increased utilitarian processing predicted reduced resource extraction from the community pool. In addition to showing that differences in moral judgment predict behavior in a game situation that simulates a somewhat ecologically valid dilemma, these results also replicate previous research connecting morality to opinions about Covid-19 vaccine requirements.

Individual differences in moral judgment predict attitudes towards mandatory vaccinations.

Skepticism about the efficacy and risks related to Covid-19 vaccinations has become a politicized issue. In response, some politicians have proposed policies (such as imposing vaccine passports) aimed at increasing public vaccination rates. The response has been mixed. In the current study (N = 266), we examined the role of conservatism and moral judgments in accounting for these differences. Results from data collected between January and March 2021 showed that increased levels of conservatism and deontological processing (i.e., having a stronger D-process) were associated with less agreement to a government-imposed Covid-19 vaccine mandate. However, participants who made utilitarian responses to traditional switch and footbridge dilemmas reported greater agreement towards the same mandate. These results are consistent with prior findings showing political divides surrounding Covid-19 and indicate that individual differences in moral judgment predict opinion about a significant and current real-world issue.

Predicting interactions in handedness research: The role of integrated versus independent dual-processes.

Over the past two decades, a new way of looking at handedness has emerged (see Prichard, E., Propper, R. E., & Christman, S. D. (2013). Degree of handedness, but not direction, is a systematic predictor of cognitive performance. Frontiers in Psychology, 4, 1-6), with an emphasis on degree (strong/consistent versus mixed/inconsistent) augmenting the traditional emphasis on direction (left versus right) of handedness. Much of this work has focused on main effects: e.g., inconsistent-handers show higher (or lower) performance than consistent-handers. However, many of these "main effects" are actually nested within higher order interactions: e.g., there are no handedness differences in a baseline/control condition, with handedness differences emerging in an experimental condition. Careful examination, though, of these interactions reveals an intriguing and predictable pattern: for integrated dual processes (e.g., episodic memory encoding versus retrieval), the interactions reflect larger effects in inconsistent-, relative to consistent-, handers. For independent, mutually exclusive dual processes (e.g., approach versus withdrawal), the interactions reflect larger effects in consistent-handers. It is argued that these patterns reflect the relative inability of (i) consistent-handers to integrate dual processes, and (ii) inconsistent-handers to keep independent dual processes separate. We also use this same theory to address higher order interactions involving changes in the experimental context as well as other individual difference factors, and make suggestions for future research.

Influencing health decision-making: A study of colour and message framing.

OBJECTIVE: Previous research has provided evidence that colour associations and frame can influence behavioural intentions to engage in vaccination behaviours. In this study, the extension of these effects to sunscreen application behaviours was investigated. Additional colours and the manner in which colour primes were employed were also explored. DESIGN: Two hundred and eighty-six college students were primed with either short wavelength colours (blue/purple) or long wavelength colours (red/orange) as part of goal framed sunscreen information pamphlets. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Self-reported behavioural intentions to apply sunscreen, immediate affective reaction to stimuli material, anticipated affect towards sunscreen use, and perceived efficacy of preventing skin cancer were measured. RESULTS: Individuals with no prior intention to use sunscreen expressed greater behavioural intentions to do so after reading a positively framed sunscreen pamphlet that was designed using short wavelength colours. The negatively framed messages and those presented in long wavelength colours did not enhance persuasion. CONCLUSIONS: In accordance with the Unification Theory of Framing, a match between the representations of the target behaviour, the colour prime, and the frame resulted in the greatest amount of persuasion. Creating communications with representations that match the target behaviour could be a powerful tool to increase compliance.

Handedness predicts motivation to switch from the status quo.

Degree of handedness is a correlate of structural brain asymmetries and predicts individual differences in episodic memory, belief updating and various biases in decision-making. We examined whether handedness moderated the status quo bias given previous research suggests that both constructs are related to loss aversion. Participants answered hypothetical scenarios in which they decided either to stay with the status quo or to switch. Results indicated that consistent and inconsistent right-handers both exhibited status quo bias (Experiment 1; N=180), but inconsistent right-handers were more (or less) likely to stick with the status quo when informed of a positive (or negative) past experience. When provided with more equivocal information about the quality of the status quo and alternative, consistent-handers (CH) were more likely to show a status quo bias (Experiment 2; N=222). Compared to CH, we argue that inconsistent-handers (IH) more readily update their beliefs in a manner consistent with how the status quo and alternative options are presented-switching when finding a reason to favour the alternative and staying when the status quo is described more favourably. These handedness differences fit a motivational account explaining status quo bias rather than a loss aversion account.

Individual differences in information order effects: the importance of right-hemisphere access in belief updating.

The order in which information is received alters the evaluation of causal hypotheses. Specifically, research suggests that the last piece of information oftentimes has the greatest impact on the evaluation and that the difference in subjective value between two pieces of information is an important factor influencing the magnitude of this recency effect. The present paper extends this line of work by exploring individual differences in this phenomenon via one's degree of handedness. Two hundred and five participants were given two hypothetical scenarios and related causal hypotheses accompanied by two pieces of additional information and asked to revise their belief in each hypothesis as information accumulated. Results confirmed predictions that 1) inconsistent/mixed-handers (those who use their non-dominant hand for at least some activities) show a larger effect with two pieces of inconsistent weak or strong information, and 2) neither mixed-handers nor consistent/strong-handers (those who use their dominant hand for almost all activities) show an effect with strong and weak pieces of consistent information. Mixed-handers' susceptibility to persuasive arguments and Ramachandran's (1995; Ramachandran and Blakeslee, 1998) belief-updating theory centered around communication between the two halves of the brain and functional access to the right hemisphere are used to account for these data.

Responding to framed health messages: different strokes for different (handedness) folks.

Research has shown that strength of handedness - a proxy variable for the degree of interaction between the left and right brain hemispheres - predicts differences in a variety of cognitive domains. The present paper extends this work to message (or goal) framing effects in which persuasive health communications emphasise positive vs. negative outcomes. One hundred fifty-six participants read pamphlets containing statements emphasising either the gains of using or the losses of not using sunscreen. Replicating previous research, non-users of sunscreen were more affected by framed messages than users. However, we found a loss- rather than gain-framed advantage, and mixed (inconsistent)-handers seemed to drive these effects more so than strong (consistent)-handers. These results suggest that a 'one-size-fits-all' approach may be inadequate in crafting effective educational messages about health behaviours, and that theories centring around one's regulatory focus orientation as well as new methods in laterality research may be useful in reaching the widest range of individuals.

Handedness differences in information framing.

Previous research has shown that strength of handedness predicts differences in sensory illusions, Stroop interference, episodic memory, and beliefs about body image. Recent evidence also suggests handedness differences in the susceptibility to common decision biases such as anchoring and sunk cost. The present paper extends this line of work to attribute framing effects. Sixty-three undergraduates were asked to advise a friend concerning the use of a safe allergy medication during pregnancy. A third of the participants received negatively-framed information concerning the fetal risk of the drug (1-3% chance of having a malformed child); another third received positively-framed information (97-99% chance of having a normal child); and the final third received no counseling information and served as the control. Results indicated that, as predicted, inconsistent (mixed)-handers were more responsive than consistent (strong)-handers to information changes and readily update their beliefs. Although not significant, the data also suggested that only inconsistent handers were affected by information framing. Theoretical implications as well as ongoing work in holistic versus analytic processing, contextual sensitivity, and brain asymmetry will be discussed.

Enhanced activation of the left hemisphere promotes normative decision making.

Previous studies have reported that enhanced activation of the left cerebral hemisphere reduces risky-choice, attribute, and goal-framing effects relative to enhanced activation of the right cerebral hemisphere. The present study sought to extend these findings and show that enhanced activation of the left hemisphere also reduces violations of other normative principles, besides the invariance principle. Participants completed ratio bias (Experiment 1, N = 296) and base rate neglect problems (Experiment 2, N = 145) under normal (control) viewing or with the right or left hemisphere primarily activated by imposing a unidirectional gaze. In Experiment 1 we found that enhanced left hemispheric activation reduced the ratio bias relative to normal viewing and a group experiencing enhanced right hemispheric activation. In Experiment 2 enhanced left hemispheric activation resulted in using base rates more than normal viewing, but not significantly more than enhanced right hemispheric activation. Results suggest that hemispheric asymmetries can affect higher-order cognitive processes, such as decision-making biases. Possible theoretical accounts are discussed as well as implications for dual-process theories.

Inaction inertia, the sunk cost effect, and handedness: avoiding the losses of past decisions.

Strength of handedness, or the degree to which an individual prefers to use a single hand to perform various tasks, is a neurological marker for brain organization and has been shown to be linked to episodic memory, attribute framing, and anchoring, as well as other domains and tasks. The present work explores the relationship of handedness to both inaction inertia (the inclination to resist an action after previously bypassing a similar action) as well as to the sunk cost effect (the tendency to continue to engage in a behavior after an initial investment of time or money has been made). In Experiment 1, mixed-handers displayed a larger inaction inertia effect than strong-handers. In Experiment 2, they displayed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers. Experiments 3 and 4 extended the sunk cost finding into a different domain and explored how mixed- and strong-handers react to additional information designed to increase the comparative advantage of terminating, rather than continuing, a failed project. Overall, we found that mixed-handers were more likely to show inertia effects because of an increased aversion to losses. The results of Experiment 4 suggest that, when provided with additional information that made it clear that continuing a project would be a greater loss than terminating it, mixed-handers no longer showed a larger sunk cost effect than strong-handers, highlighting the importance of carefully considering exactly how sunk cost scenarios are worded and providing additional information on how mixed- and strong-handers differ in belief updating.

Interhemispheric interaction and egocentrism: the role of handedness in social comparative judgement.

Previous research has shown that people are egocentrically biased when making judgements that require a self-to-peer comparison - leading to above-/below-average effects and comparative optimism/pessimism. Two experiments examined whether interhemispheric brain connectivity (assessed via strength of handedness) is associated with egocentrism in the comparative judgement process. In Experiment 1, strong handers (SH) and mixed handers (MH) made percentile rank judgements about their abilities in easy and hard domains. In Experiment 2, SH and MH judged their likelihoods of outperforming a co-participant in easy and hard tasks. Both experiments showed that SH were more egocentric than MH and thus showed (a) more above- and below-average effects when estimating their abilities (Experiment 1) and (b) generally larger optimism biases when predicting performances in a competition (Experiment 2). Taken together, these experiments provide evidence that underlying interhemispheric connectivity shapes egocentrism in comparative judgement.

Individual differences in ambiguous-figure perception: degree of handedness and interhemispheric interaction.

Research has shown that persons with strong right-hand preference (i.e., who report using their dominant hand for all manual activities) display a decreased tendency to update bodily and conceptual representations, possibly arising from decreased interaction between the left and right cerebral hemispheres. Current experiments extend these findings to the domain of perceptual representations. In experiments 1 and 2, strong right-handedness was associated with a decreased ability to update perceptual representations in response to gradually changing perceptual input. In experiment 3, strong right-handedness was associated with lower spontaneous reversal rates during the extended viewing of ambiguous figures, and experiment 4 ruled out an explanation in terms of response bias.

Individual differences in semantic switching flexibility: effects of handedness.

The semantic fluency task is a widely used assessment tool for evaluating memory-related cognitive deficits in neurological and neuropsychiatric disorders. The present study investigates individual differences in performance on this task in a normal population. The aim is to explore handedness differences in switching and clustering tendencies when performing this task. Consistent with our prediction, when asked to produce as many animal names as possible in 1 min, mixed handers demonstrated greater switching between different subcategories of animals than strong handers. These findings are interpreted in terms of the more diffuse spread of activation among conceptual representations in the right hemisphere, and greater access to right hemisphere processes in mixed handers. The findings have implications for the research communities using the semantic fluency task, irrespective of whether or not they are looking at handedness differences per se.

Individual differences in risk perception versus risk taking: handedness and interhemispheric interaction.

Research indicates that right-hemisphere mechanisms are specifically sensitive to and averse to risk. Research also indicates that mixed degree of handedness is associated with increased access to right hemisphere processing. Accordingly, it was predicted that mixed-handers would exhibit greater risk aversion. Participants were presented with various risky activities and were asked to rate (i) the perceived risk, (ii) the perceived benefit, and (iii) their likelihood to engage in each activity. No handedness differences were found for any of these ratings. Regression analyses, however, indicated that the likelihood to engage in risky activities was predicted primarily by the perceived risks in mixed-handers and by the perceived benefits in strong-handers.

Professional and public attitudes toward incentives for organ donation.

The U.S. faces a widening gap between the need for, and the supply of, transplantable organs. The waiting list for transplants increased 150% in the past decade; last year, about 6,000 people died awaiting a transplant. This need has rekindled debate about the morality and feasibility of using incentives to encourage posthumous organ donation. This Issue Brief explores attitudes of the public and health professionals in the transplant community about using financial and nonfinancial incentives to increase the supply of cadaver organs for transplant.