Perceived warmth and competence predict callback rates in meta-analyzed North American labor market experiments.

Extensive literature probes labor market discrimination through correspondence studies in which researchers send pairs of resumes to employers, which are closely matched except for social signals such as gender or ethnicity. Upon perceiving these signals, individuals quickly activate associated stereotypes. The Stereotype Content Model (SCM; Fiske 2002) categorizes these stereotypes into two dimensions: warmth and competence. Our research integrates findings from correspondence studies with theories of social psychology, asking: Can discrimination between social groups, measured through employer callback disparities, be predicted by warmth and competence perceptions of social signals? We collect callback rates from 21 published correspondence studies, varying for 592 social signals. On those social signals, we collected warmth and competence perceptions from an independent group of online raters. We found that social perception predicts callback disparities for studies varying race and gender, which are indirectly signaled by names on these resumes. Yet, for studies adjusting other categories like sexuality and disability, the influence of social perception on callbacks is inconsistent. For instance, a more favorable perception of signals like parenthood does not consistently lead to increased callbacks, underscoring the necessity for further research. Our research offers pivotal strategies to address labor market discrimination in practice. Leveraging the warmth and competence framework allows for the predictive identification of bias against specific groups without extensive correspondence studies. By distilling hiring discrimination into these two dimensions, we not only facilitate the development of decision support systems for hiring managers but also equip computer scientists with a foundational framework for debiasing Large Language Models and other methods that are increasingly employed in hiring processes.

Effects of a Service-Learning Neuroscience Course on Mood and Intergroup Anxiety.

"Everyday Neuroscience" is an academically based community service (ABCS) course in which college students teach basic neuroscience lab activities to high school students in an under-funded school district, working in small groups on hands-on science activities for 10 weekly sessions. The present study examined the possible psychological and social effects of this experience on the college students, in comparison with peers not enrolled in such a course, by observing and surveying the high school and college students across the 10-week course period. First, the teaching-learning sessions in the course successfully promoted science-focused discussion between the high school and college students for 45 to 60 minutes each week. Second, college students in "Everyday Neuroscience" reported higher positive affect and less intergroup anxiety at the end of the semester compared with the control group of college students who were not in the course. Finally, surveys of the high school students revealed that they found the sessions to be positive social experiences. These findings reveal that a neuroscience-based community engagement course can be both a positive experience for the community partner and a benefit for college students by promoting psychological and social wellness.

When uncertainty in social contexts increases exploration and decreases obtained rewards.

Similar decision-making situations often arise repeatedly, presenting tradeoffs between (i) acquiring new information to facilitate future-related decisions (exploration) and (ii) using existing information to secure expected outcomes (exploitation). Exploration choices have been well characterized in nonsocial contexts, however, choices to explore (or not) in social environments are less well understood. Social environments are of particular interest because a key factor that increases exploration in nonsocial contexts is environmental uncertainty, and the social world is generally appreciated to be highly uncertain. Although uncertainty sometimes must be reduced behaviorally (e.g., by trying something and seeing what happens), other times it may be reduced cognitively (e.g., by imagining possible outcomes). Across four experiments, participants searched for rewards in a series of grids that were either described as comprising real people distributing previously earned points (social context) or as the result of a computer algorithm or natural phenomenon (nonsocial context). In Experiments 1 and 2, participants explored more, and earned fewer rewards, in the social versus nonsocial context, suggesting that social uncertainty prompted behavioral exploration at the cost of task-relevant goals. In Experiments 3 and 4, we provided additional information about the people in the search space that could support social-cognitive approaches to uncertainty reduction, including relationships of the social agents distributing points (Experiment 3) and information relevant to social group membership (Experiment 4); exploration decreased in both instances. Taken together, these experiments highlight the approaches to, and tradeoffs of, uncertainty reduction in social contexts. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).

Dissociating neural sensitivity to target identity and mental state content type during inferences about other minds.

Predicting and inferring what other people think and feel (mentalizing) is central to social interaction. Since the discovery of the brain's "mentalizing network," fMRI studies have probed the lines along which the activity of different regions in this network converges and dissociates. Here, we use fMRI meta-analysis to aggregate across stimuli, paradigms, and contrasts from past studies in order to definitively test two sources of possible sensitivity among brain regions of this network with particular theoretical relevance. First, it has been proposed that mentalizing processes depend on aspects of target identity (whose mind is considered), with self-projection or simulation strategies engaging disproportionately for psychologically close targets. Second, it has been proposed that mentalizing processes depend on content type (what the inference is), with inferences about epistemic mental states (e.g., beliefs and knowledge) engaging different processes than mentalizing about other types of content (e.g., emotions or preferences). Overall, evidence supports the conclusion that different mentalizing regions are sensitive to target identity and content type, respectively, but with some points of divergence from previous claims. The results point to fruitful directions for future studies, with implications for theories of mentalizing.

Constructing complex social categories under uncertainty.

Conceptual combination is the act of building complex concepts from simpler ones. Although research has examined how inferences about compound objects (e.g., fuzzy chair) are produced from their constituent concepts, little is known about the combinatorial processes that produce inferences about compound social categories (e.g., Irish musician). Using a computational approach, we investigated the relationship between ratings of 25 nationality-occupation combinations and ratings of their constituent concepts along the attribute dimensions of warmth and competence. We found that people incorporate uncertainty into their perceptions of compound social categories. Further, people are more likely to use a linear combination strategy when they are more certain about the attributes of the constituents and less familiar with the combination. Conversely, when social combinations are more familiar, their judged attributes deviate further from the predictions of a combinatorial model and are shared across participants, suggesting that stereotype-based knowledge plays a central role in the representation of complex social groups. Twenty-five non-human animal combinations (e.g., circus snake) serve as a comparison and were rated on size and ferocity. We found evidence that familiarity has different effects on the strategies used to combine person concepts and animal concepts, pointing to the possible existence of both common and distinct mechanisms for constructing social and non-social categories.

A Role for Uncertainty in the Neural Distinction Between Social and Nonsocial Thought.

Neuroimaging research has identified a network of brain regions that is consistently more engaged when people think about the minds of other people than when they engage in nonsocial tasks. Activations in this "mentalizing network" are sometimes interpreted as evidence for the domain-specificity of cognitive processes supporting social thought. Here, we examine the alternative possibility that at least some activations in the mentalizing network may be explained by uncertainty. A reconsideration of findings from existing functional MRI studies in light of new data from independent raters suggests that (a) social tasks used in past studies have higher levels of uncertainty than their nonsocial comparison tasks and (b) activation in a key brain region associated with social cognition, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC), may track with the degree of uncertainty surrounding both social and nonsocial inferences. These observations suggest that the preferential DMPFC response observed consistently in social scenarios may reflect the engagement of domain-general processes of uncertainty reduction, which points to avenues for future research into the core cognitive mechanisms supporting typical and atypical social thought.

Neural representations of others' traits predict social decisions.

To guide social interaction, people often rely on expectations about the traits of other people, based on markers of social group membership (i.e., stereotypes). Although the influence of stereotypes on social behavior is widespread, key questions remain about how traits inferred from social-group membership are instantiated in the brain and incorporated into neural computations that guide social behavior. Here, we show that the human lateral orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) represents the content of stereotypes about members of different social groups in the service of social decision-making. During functional MRI scanning, participants decided how to distribute resources across themselves and members of a variety of social groups in a modified Dictator Game. Behaviorally, we replicated our recent finding that inferences about others' traits, captured by a two-dimensional framework of stereotype content (warmth and competence), had dissociable effects on participants' monetary-allocation choices: recipients' warmth increased participants' aversion to advantageous inequity (i.e., earning more than recipients), and recipients' competence increased participants' aversion to disadvantageous inequity (i.e., earning less than recipients). Neurally, representational similarity analysis revealed that others' traits in the two-dimensional space were represented in the temporoparietal junction and superior temporal sulcus, two regions associated with mentalizing, and in the lateral OFC, known to represent inferred features of a decision context outside the social domain. Critically, only the latter predicted individual choices, suggesting that the effect of stereotypes on behavior is mediated by inference-based decision-making processes in the OFC.

Anticipating Greater Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Social Life Is Associated With Reduced Adherence to Disease-Mitigating Guidelines.

People regularly make decisions about how often and with whom to interact. During an epidemic of communicable disease, these decisions gain new weight, as individual choices exert more direct influence on collective health and wellbeing. While much attention has been paid to how people's concerns about the health impact of the COVID-19 pandemic affect their engagement in behaviors that could curb (or accelerate) the spread of the disease, less is understood about how people's concerns about the pandemic's impact on their social lives affect these outcomes. Across three studies (total N = 654), we find that individuals' estimates of the pandemic's social (vs. health) impact are associated with an unwillingness to curtail social interaction and follow other Centers for Disease Control guidelines as the pandemic spreads. First, these associations are present in self-report data of participants' own behaviors and behavior across hypothetical scenarios; second, participants' estimates of the pandemic's impact on social life in their location of residence are associated with movement data collected unobtrusively from mobile phones in those locations. We suggest that perceptions of social impact could be a potential mechanism underlying, and therefore potential intervention target for addressing, disease-preventing behavior during a pandemic.

Empathy affects tradeoffs between life's quality and duration.

Sharing others' emotional experience through empathy has been widely linked to prosocial behavior, i.e., behavior that aims to improve others' welfare. However, different aspects of a person's welfare do not always move in concert. The present research investigated how empathy affects tradeoffs between two different aspects of others' welfare: their experience (quality of life) and existence (duration of life). Three experiments offer evidence that empathy increases the priority people place on reducing others' suffering relative to prolonging their lives. Participants assigned to high or low empathy conditions considered scenarios in which saving a person's life was incompatible with extinguishing the person's suffering. Higher empathy for a suffering accident victim was associated with greater preference to let the person die rather than keep the person alive. Participants expressed greater preference to end the lives of friends than strangers (Experiment 1), those whose perspectives they had taken than those whom they considered from afar (Experiment 2), and those who remained alert and actively suffering than those whose injuries had rendered them unconscious (Experiment 3). These results highlight a distinction between empathy's effects on the motivation to reduce another person's suffering and its effects on the prosocial behaviors that sometimes, but do not necessarily, follow from that motivation, including saving the person's life. Results have implications for scientific understanding of the relationship between empathy and morality and for contexts in which people make decisions on behalf of others.

Rethinking Cognitive Load: A Default-Mode Network Perspective.

Typical cognitive load tasks are now known to deactivate the brain's default-mode network (DMN). This raises the possibility that apparent effects of cognitive load could arise from disruptions of DMN processes, including social cognition. Cognitive load studies are reconsidered, with reinterpretations of past research and implications for dual-process theory.

Predicting human behavior toward members of different social groups.

Disparities in outcomes across social groups pervade human societies and are of central interest to the social sciences. How people treat others is known to depend on a multitude of factors (e.g., others' gender, ethnicity, appearance) even when these should be irrelevant. However, despite substantial progress, much remains unknown regarding (i) the set of mechanisms shaping people's behavior toward members of different social groups and (ii) the extent to which these mechanisms can explain the structure of existing societal disparities. Here, we show in a set of experiments the important interplay between social perception and social valuation processes in explaining how people treat members of different social groups. Building on the idea that stereotypes can be organized onto basic, underlying dimensions, we first found using laboratory economic games that quantitative variation in stereotypes about different groups' warmth and competence translated meaningfully into resource allocation behavior toward those groups. Computational modeling further revealed that these effects operated via the interaction of social perception and social valuation processes, with warmth and competence exerting diverging effects on participants' preferences for equitable distributions of resources. This framework successfully predicted behavior toward members of a diverse set of social groups across samples and successfully generalized to predict societal disparities documented in labor and education settings with substantial precision and accuracy. Together, these results highlight a common set of mechanisms linking social group information to social treatment and show how preexisting, societally shared assumptions about different social groups can produce and reinforce societal disparities.

Dissociable Contributions of Imagination and Willpower to the Malleability of Human Patience.

The ability to exercise patience is important for human functioning. Although it is known that patience can be promoted by using top-down control, or willpower, to override impatient impulses, patience is also malleable-in particular, susceptible to framing effects-in ways that are difficult to explain using willpower alone. So far, the mechanisms underlying framing effects on patience have been elusive. We investigated the role of imagination in these effects. In a behavioral experiment (Experiment 1), a classic framing manipulation (sequence framing) increased self-reported and independently coded imagination during intertemporal choice. In an investigation of neural responses during decision making (Experiment 2), sequence framing increased the extent to which patience was related to activation in brain regions associated with imagination, relative to activation in regions associated with willpower, and increased functional connectivity of brain regions associated with imagination, but not willpower, relative to regions associated with valuation. Our results suggest that sequence framing can increase the role of imagination in decision making without increasing the exertion of willpower.

Damage to dorsolateral prefrontal cortex affects tradeoffs between honesty and self-interest.

Substantial correlational evidence suggests that prefrontal regions are critical to honest and dishonest behavior, but causal evidence specifying the nature of this involvement remains absent. We found that lesions of the human dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) decreased the effect of honesty concerns on behavior in economic games that pit honesty motives against self-interest, but did not affect decisions when honesty concerns were absent. These results point to a causal role for DLPFC in honest behavior.

The neural bases of directed and spontaneous mental state attributions to group agents.

In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the 'mind' of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals--i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus--does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets' mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves.

Medial prefrontal cortex subserves diverse forms of self-reflection.

The ability to think about oneself--to self--reflect--is one of the defining features of the human mind. Recent research has suggested that this ability may be subserved by a particular brain region: the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC). However, although humans can contemplate a variety of different aspects of themselves, including their stable personality traits, current feelings, and physical attributes, no research has directly examined the extent to which these different forms of self-reflection are subserved by common mechanisms. To address this question, participants were scanned using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while making judgments about their own personality traits, current mental states, and physical attributes as well as those of another person. Whereas some brain regions responded preferentially during only one form of self-reflection, a robust region of MPFC was engaged preferentially during self-reflection across all three types of judgment. These results suggest that--although dissociable--diverse forms of self-referential thought draw on a shared cognitive process subserved by MPFC.

Distortions of mind perception in psychopathology.

It has long been known that psychopathology can influence social perception, but a 2D framework of mind perception provides the opportunity for an integrative understanding of some disorders. We examined the covariation of mind perception with three subclinical syndromes--autism-spectrum disorder, schizotypy, and psychopathy--and found that each presents a unique mind-perception profile. Autism-spectrum disorder involves reduced perception of agency in adult humans. Schizotypy involves increased perception of both agency and experience in entities generally thought to lack minds. Psychopathy involves reduced perception of experience in adult humans, children, and animals. Disorders are differentially linked with the over- or underperception of agency and experience in a way that helps explain their real-world consequences.

Mentalizing under uncertainty: dissociated neural responses to ambiguous and unambiguous mental state inferences.

The ability to read the minds of others (i.e., to mentalize) requires that perceivers understand a wide range of different kinds of mental states, including not only others' beliefs and knowledge but also their feelings, desires, and preferences. Moreover, although such inferences may occasionally rely on observable features of a situation, perceivers more typically mentalize under conditions of "uncertainty," in which they must generate plausible hypotheses about a target's mental state from ambiguous or otherwise underspecified information. Here, we use functional neuroimaging to dissociate the neural bases of these 2 distinct social-cognitive challenges: 1) mentalizing about different types of mental states (beliefs vs. preferences) and 2) mentalizing under conditions of varying ambiguity. Although these 2 aspects of mentalizing have typically been confounded in earlier research, we observed a double dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental state and ambiguity. Whereas ventral and dorsal aspects of medial prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of the type of mental state, the right temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty. These results underscore the emerging consensus that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, social cognition makes flexible use of different processes as a function of the particular demands of the social context.

Exploring the neural correlates of social stereotyping.

Judging people on the basis of cultural stereotypes is a ubiquitous facet of daily life, yet little is known about how this fundamental inferential strategy is implemented in the brain. Using fMRI, we measured neural activity while participants made judgments about the likely actor (i.e., person-focus) and location (i.e., place-focus) of a series of activities, some of which were associated with prevailing gender stereotypes. Results revealed that stereotyping was underpinned by activity in areas associated with evaluative processing (e.g., ventral medial prefrontal cortex, amygdala) and the representation of action knowledge (e.g., supramarginal gyrus, middle temporal gyrus). In addition, activity accompanying stereotypic judgments was correlated with the strength of participants' explicit and implicit gender stereotypes. These findings elucidate how stereotyping fits within the neuroscience of person understanding.

Neural correlates of stereotype application.

Recent research has focused on the disparate mechanisms that support the human ability to "mentalize" about the thoughts and feelings of others. One such process may rely on precompiled, semantic beliefs about the characteristics common to members of a social group, that is, on stereotypes; for example, judging that a woman may be more likely than a man to have certain interests or opinions. In the current study, we identified a pattern of neural activity associated with the use of stereotypes to judge another person's psychological characteristics. During fMRI scanning, participants mentalized about the likely responses of a female and male target to a series of questions, some of which were related to gender stereotypes (e.g., "enjoys shopping for new clothes"). Trials on which participants applied a stereotype were segregated from those on which participants avoided stereotype use. The BOLD response in an extensive region of the right frontal cortex differentiated stereotype-applied from -unapplied trials. Moreover, this neural difference was correlated with a behavioral index of gender associations-the Implicit Association Test-administered after scanning. Results suggest that stereotype application may draw on cognitive processes that more generally subserve semantic knowledge about categories.