ABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: The human parainfluenza virus 3 (HPIV-3) outbreak at the haemato-oncology ward of the Maastricht University Medical Centre in the summer of 2016. AIM: To describe an effective strategy to control the largest reported HPIV-3 outbreak at an adult haematology-oncology ward in the Netherlands by implementing infection control measures and molecular epidemiology investigation. METHODS: Clinical, patient and diagnostic data were both pro- and retrospectively collected. HPIV-3 real-time polymerase chain reaction (HPIV-3 RT-PCR) was validated using oropharyngeal rinse samples. Screening of all new and admitted patients was implemented to identify asymptomatic infection or prolonged shedding of HPIV-3 allowing cohort isolation. FINDINGS: The HPIV-3 outbreak occurred between 9 July and 28 September 2016 and affected 53 patients. HPIV-3 RT-PCR on oropharyngeal rinse samples demonstrated an up to 10-fold higher sensitivity compared with pharyngeal swabs. Monitoring showed that at first positive PCR, 20 patients (38%) were asymptomatic (of which 11 remained asymptomatic) and the average duration of shedding was 14 days (range 1-58). Asymptomatic patients had lower viral load, shorter period of viral shedding (≤14 days) and were mostly immune-competent oncology patients. The outbreak was under control five weeks after implementation of screening of asymptomatic patients. CONCLUSION: Implementation of a sensitive screening method identified both symptomatic and asymptomatic patients which had lower viral loads and allowed early cohort isolation. This is especially important in a ward that combines patients with varying immune status, because both immunocompromised and immune-competent patients are likely to spread the HPIV-3 virus, either through prolonged shedding or through asymptomatic course of disease.
Subject(s)
Hematology , Paramyxoviridae Infections , Adult , Disease Outbreaks , Humans , Parainfluenza Virus 3, Human/genetics , Paramyxoviridae Infections/diagnosis , Paramyxoviridae Infections/epidemiology , Pathology, Molecular , Retrospective Studies , Tertiary Care CentersABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Healthcare workers (HCWs) are at risk for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and for spreading severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus-2 (SARS-CoV-2) amongst colleagues and patients. AIM: To study the presence of SARS-CoV-2 RNA and possible onward transmission by HCWs upon return to work after COVID-19, and association with disease severity and development of antibodies over time. METHODS: Unvaccinated HCWs with positive SARS-CoV-2 reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) were recruited prospectively. Data on symptoms were collected via telephone questionnaires on days 2, 7, 14 and 21 after a positive test. Upon return to work, repeat SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR was performed and serum was collected. Repeat serum samples were collected at weeks 4, 8, 12 and 16 to determine antibody dynamics over time. Phylogenetic analysis was conducted to investigate possible transmission events originating from HCWs with a positive repeat RT-PCR. FINDINGS: Sixty-one (84.7%) participants with mild/moderate COVID-19 had a repeat SARS-CoV-2 RT-PCR performed upon return to work (median 13 days after symptom onset), of which 30 (49.1%) were positive with a median cycle threshold (Ct) value of 29.2 (IQR 26.9-29.9). All HCWs developed antibodies against SARS-CoV-2. No significant differences in symptomatology and presence of antibodies were found between repeat RT-PCR-positive and -negative HCWs. Eleven direct colleagues of six participants with a repeat RT-PCR Ct value <30 tested positive after the HCW returned to work. Phylogenetic and epidemiologic analysis did not indicate onward transmission through HCWs who were SARS-CoV-2 RNA positive upon return to work. CONCLUSIONS: HCWs regularly return to work with substantial SARS-CoV-2 RNA loads. However, this study found no evidence for subsequent in-hospital transmission.
Subject(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , Health Personnel , Humans , Phylogeny , RNA, Viral , Return to WorkABSTRACT
Antibodies to Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) were detected in serum and milk collected according to local customs from 33 camels in Qatar, April 2014. At one location, evidence for active virus shedding in nasal secretions and/or faeces was observed for 7/12 camels; viral RNA was detected in milk of five of these seven camels. The presence of MERS-CoV RNA in milk of camels actively shedding the virus warrants measures to prevent putative food-borne transmission of MERS-CoV.
Subject(s)
Antibodies, Neutralizing/blood , Antibodies, Viral/blood , Camelus/blood , Coronavirus/genetics , Coronavirus/immunology , Milk/virology , RNA, Viral/genetics , Animals , Antibodies, Neutralizing/genetics , Antibodies, Viral/genetics , Cultural Characteristics , Foodborne Diseases/prevention & control , Qatar , Real-Time Polymerase Chain ReactionABSTRACT
Two patients, returning to the Netherlands from pilgrimage in Medina and Mecca, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, were diagnosed with Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV) infection in May 2014. The source and mode of transmission have not yet been determined. Hospital-acquired infection and community-acquired infection are both possible.
Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections/diagnosis , Coronavirus/genetics , Respiratory Tract Infections/diagnosis , Travel , Aged , Coronavirus/isolation & purification , Coronavirus Infections/transmission , Coronavirus Infections/virology , Cross Infection/transmission , Cross Infection/virology , Female , Humans , Male , Middle East , Netherlands , Real-Time Polymerase Chain Reaction , Respiratory Tract Infections/virology , Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction , Saudi Arabia , SyndromeABSTRACT
The 2003 outbreak of Highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H7N7) in the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany resulted in significant genetic diversification that proved informative for tracing transmission events. Building on previous investigations on the Dutch outbreak, we focused on the potential transnational transmissions between the Netherlands and Belgium. Although no clear epidemiological links could be identified from the tracing data, the transmission network based on concatenated HA-NA-PB2 sequences supports at least three independent introductions from the Netherlands to Belgium and suggests one possible introduction form Belgium back to the Netherlands. Two introductions in the Belgian province of Limburg occurred from nearby farms in the Dutch province of Limburg. One introduction resulted in three secondary infected farms, while a second introduction did not cause secondary infections. The third introduction into Belgium occurred in the north of the Antwerp province, very close to the national border, and originated from the North of the Dutch province Brabant (long distance transmission, >65 km). The virus spread to two additional Belgian farms, one of which may be the source of a secondarily infected farm in the Netherlands. One infected turkey farm in the province of Antwerp (Westmalle) was geographically close to the latter introduction, but genetically clustered with the first introduction event in the Limburg province. Epidemiological tracing data could neither confirm nor exclude whether this outbreak was a result from long distance contacts within Belgium or whether this farm presented a fourth independent transboundary introduction. These multiple transnational transmissions of HPAI in spite of reinforced biosecurity measures and trade restrictions illustrate the importance of international cooperation, legislation and standardization of tools to combat transboundary diseases.
Subject(s)
Animal Husbandry/standards , Disease Outbreaks/veterinary , Influenza A Virus, H7N7 Subtype/pathogenicity , Influenza in Birds/transmission , Molecular Epidemiology/methods , Animals , Belgium/epidemiology , Genetic Variation , Germany/epidemiology , Influenza A Virus, H7N7 Subtype/genetics , Influenza in Birds/epidemiology , Influenza in Birds/virology , Netherlands/epidemiology , Population Control/methods , Poultry/virology , Risk Factors , Sequence Analysis , Turkeys/virologyABSTRACT
The recently identified human infections with avian influenza A(H7N9) viruses in China raise important questions regarding possible source and risk to humans. Sequence comparison with an influenza A(H7N7) outbreak in the Netherlands in 2003 and an A(H7N1) epidemic in Italy in 19992000 suggests that widespread circulation of A(H7N9) viruses must have occurred in China. The emergence of human adaptation marker PB2 E627K in human A(H7N9) cases parallels that of the fatal A(H7N7) human case in the Netherlands.
Subject(s)
Disease Outbreaks , Influenza A virus/genetics , Influenza in Birds/virology , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Influenza, Human/virology , Sequence Analysis/methods , Animals , China/epidemiology , Humans , Influenza A Virus, H7N1 Subtype/genetics , Influenza A Virus, H7N1 Subtype/isolation & purification , Influenza A Virus, H7N7 Subtype/genetics , Influenza A Virus, H7N7 Subtype/isolation & purification , Influenza A virus/classification , Influenza A virus/isolation & purification , Influenza, Human/diagnosis , Italy/epidemiology , Netherlands/epidemiology , PoultryABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Highly transmissible viruses such as influenza are a potential source of nosocomial infections and thereby cause increased patient morbidity and mortality. AIM: To assess whether influenza virus sequence data can be used to link nosocomial influenza transmission between individuals. METHODS: Dutch A(H1N1)pdm09-positive specimens from one hospital (N = 107) were compared with samples from community cases (N = 685). Gene fragments of haemagglutinin, neuraminidase and PB2 were sequenced and subsequently clustered to detect patients infected with identical influenza viruses. The probability of detecting a second patient was calculated for each hospital cluster against the background diversity observed in hospital and community strains. All clusters were further analysed for possible links between patients. FINDINGS: Seventeen A(H1N1)pdm09 hospital clusters were detected of which eight had a low probability of occurrence compared with background diversity (P < 0.01). Epidemiological analysis confirmed a total of eight nosocomial infections in four of these eight clusters, and a mother-child combination in a fifth cluster. The nine clusters with a high probability of occurrence involved community cases of influenza without a known epidemiological link. CONCLUSION: If a background sequence dataset is available, the detection of hospital sequence clusters that differ from dominant community strains can be used to select clusters requiring further investigation by hospital hygienists before a nosocomial influenza outbreak is epidemiologically suspected.
Subject(s)
Cross Infection/epidemiology , Cross Infection/virology , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/isolation & purification , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Influenza, Human/virology , RNA, Viral/genetics , Cluster Analysis , Genotype , Hemagglutinin Glycoproteins, Influenza Virus/genetics , Humans , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/genetics , Molecular Epidemiology , Neuraminidase/genetics , RNA-Dependent RNA Polymerase/genetics , Sequence Analysis, DNA , Viral Proteins/geneticsABSTRACT
Two Dutch travellers were infected with oseltamivir-resistant influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses with an H275Y neuraminidase substitution in early August 2012. Both cases were probably infected during separate holidays at the Catalonian coast (Spain). No epidemiological connection between the two cases was found, and neither of them was treated with oseltamivir before specimen collection. Genetic analysis of the neuraminidase gene revealed the presence of previously described permissive mutations that may increase the likelihood of such strains emerging and spreading widely.
Subject(s)
Antiviral Agents/pharmacology , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/drug effects , Influenza, Human/virology , Oseltamivir/pharmacology , Travel , Adolescent , Drug Resistance, Viral/genetics , Humans , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/genetics , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/isolation & purification , Influenza, Human/diagnosis , Influenza, Human/drug therapy , Molecular Sequence Data , Mutation , Netherlands , Neuraminidase/genetics , Sentinel Surveillance , Spain , Treatment Outcome , Young AdultABSTRACT
BACKGROUND: Rapid and specific molecular tests for identification of the recently identified pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 virus as well as rapid molecular tests to identify antiviral resistant strains are urgently needed. OBJECTIVES: We have evaluated the performance of two novel reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reactions (RT-PCRs) targeting specifically hemagglutinin and neuraminidase of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 virus in combination with a conserved matrix PCR. In addition, we investigated the performance of a novel discrimination RT-PCR for detection of the H275Y resistance mutation in the neuraminidase gene. STUDY DESIGN: Clinical performance of both subtype specific RT-PCR assays was evaluated through analysis of 684 throat swaps collected from individuals meeting the WHO case definition for the novel pandemic influenza virus. Analytical performance was analyzed through testing of 10-fold serial dilutions of RNA derived from the first Dutch sequenced and cultured confirmed case of novel pandemic influenza infection. Specificity and discriminative capacities of the H275Y discrimination assay were performed by testing wild type and recombinant H275Y pandemic influenza. RESULTS: 121 throat swaps collected from April 2009 to July 2009 were positive by at least two out of three RT-PCRs, and negative for the seasonal H3/H1 subtype specific RT-PCR assays. 117 of these were tested positive for all three (Ct-values from 15.1 to 36.8). No oseltamivir resistance was detected. CONCLUSIONS: We present a sensitive and specific approach for detection of pandemic influenza A/H1N1 2009 and a rapid RT-PCR assay detecting a primary oseltamivir resistance mutation which can be incorporated easily into clinical virology algorithms.
Subject(s)
Disease Outbreaks , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/genetics , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Influenza, Human/virology , Neuraminidase/genetics , Oseltamivir/pharmacology , Reverse Transcriptase Polymerase Chain Reaction/methods , Algorithms , Antiviral Agents/pharmacology , Antiviral Agents/therapeutic use , Drug Resistance, Viral , Hemagglutinin Glycoproteins, Influenza Virus/genetics , Humans , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/drug effects , Influenza A Virus, H1N1 Subtype/isolation & purification , Influenza, Human/drug therapy , Linear Models , Oseltamivir/therapeutic use , Point Mutation , Reproducibility of Results , Sensitivity and Specificity , Viral Proteins/geneticsABSTRACT
In the Netherlands, influenza specific antivirals are used for the therapy of influenza in nursing homes and hospitals, for prophylaxis in high risk groups and neuraminidase inhibitors are stockpiled as part of pandemic preparedness plans. To monitor the antiviral susceptibility profile, human influenza virus isolates derived from the Dutch influenza surveillance in 2005-2006 (n=87), 2006-2007 (n=58) and 2007-2008 (n=128) were analyzed with phenotypic assays and sequencing. For adamantanes, a high proportion (>74%) of A(H3N2) viruses had the S31N mutation in M2 protein, while variation in the HA(1) region of adamantane-sensitive viruses suggested that adamantane-sensitive variants were reseeded into the Dutch population and re-emerged as drug-sensitive due to M-segment reassortment. For neuraminidase inhibitors oseltamivir and zanamivir, 98% of types A and B influenza viruses prior to 2007-2008 were sensitive for both, whereas 24% of the A(H1N1) viruses obtained in 2007-2008 were oseltamivir-resistant while retaining sensitivity to zanamivir and adamantanes. Furthermore, oseltamivir-resistant A(H1N1) or adamantane-resistant A(H3N2) virus infections were not associated with differences in clinical symptoms compared to infections with sensitive variants. Our data show the dynamic nature of emergence of drug-resistant influenza viruses, stressing the need for surveillance of resistance trends as part of influenza monitoring programs.