Perceptually walking in another's shoes: goals and memories constrain spatial perception.

Perceptual variables such as perceived distance contain information about future actions. Often our goals involve the integration of another's goals, such as lifting heavy objects together. The purpose of this study was to investigate how another's actions might influence one's own goal-oriented perceptions (i.e., verbal distance estimates). Using a within-subject paradigm, we replicated a well-known finding that carrying a weighted backpack results in larger distance estimates relative to not carrying a backpack. In a crucial second condition, this effect was reversed: distance estimates were significantly greater when not carrying a weighted backpack than when carrying a backpack. In this condition, participants provided distance estimates while wearing a weighted backpack during the first phase and then gave estimates while not wearing a backpack, but following an experimenter wearing a weighted backpack in the second phase. Three additional conditions systematically documented how the observation of another's actions influenced distance estimates.

Perception, as you make it.

The main question that Firestone & Scholl (F&S) pose is whether "what and how we see is functionally independent from what and how we think, know, desire, act, and so forth" (sect. 2, para. 1). We synthesize a collection of concerns from an interdisciplinary set of coauthors regarding F&S's assumptions and appeals to intuition, resulting in their treatment of visual perception as context-free.

The wild ways of conscious will: what we do, how we do it, and why it has meaning.

It is becoming increasingly mainstream to claim that conscious will is an illusion. This assertion is based on a host of findings that indicate conscious will does not share an efficient-cause relationship with actions. As an alternative, the present paper will propose that conscious will is not about causing actions, but rather, about constraining action systems toward producing outcomes. In addition, it will be proposed that we generate and sustain multiple outcomes simultaneously because the multi-scale dynamics by which we do so are, themselves, self-sustaining. Finally, it will be proposed that self-sustaining dynamics entail meaning (i.e., conscious content) because they naturally and necessarily constitute embodiments of context.

Learned patterns of action-effect anticipation contribute to the spatial displacement of continuously moving stimuli.

When participants control the horizontal movements of a stimulus and indicate its vanishing point after it unexpectedly vanishes, the perceived vanishing point is displaced beyond the actual vanishing point, and the size of the displacement is directly related to the action-effect anticipation one has to generate to successfully control the stimulus. The present experiments examined whether learning a pattern of action-effect anticipation would later impact one's perception of moving stimuli. While 1 participant (the controller) controlled a dot's movements across a computer screen, another (the observer), who could neither see nor hear the controller, watched the dot's movements on a separate monitor. When the dot unexpectedly vanished, the observer indicated the vanishing point. After 40 trials, participants switched roles. While serving as observers, all participants generated forward displacements, but those who did so after acquiring control experience produced larger displacement. Subsequent experiments indicated the larger displacement was due to action-effect anticipation the participants learned while either controlling the dot or observing another do so.

Wild agency: nested intentionalities in cognitive neuroscience and archaeology.

The present paper addresses the tensions between internalist and radical-interactionist approaches to cognitive neuroscience, and the conflicting conclusions these positions lead to as regards the issue of whether archaeological artefacts constitute 'results' or 'components' of cognition. Wild systems theory (WST) and the notion of wild agency are presented as a potential resolution. Specifically, WST conceptualizes organisms (i.e. wild agents) as open, multi-scale self-sustaining systems. It is thus able to address the causal properties of wild systems in a manner that is consistent with radical-interactionist concerns regarding multi-scale contingent interactions. Furthermore, by conceptualizing wild agents as self-sustaining embodiments of the persistent, multi-scale contexts that afforded their emergence and in which they sustain themselves, WST is able to address the semantic properties of wild agents in a way that acknowledges the internalist concerns regarding meaningful (i.e. semantic) internal states (i.e. causal content). In conclusion, WST agrees with radical interactionism and asserts that archaeological artefacts constitute components of cognition. In addition, given its ability to resolve tensions between the internalist and the radical interactionist approaches to cognition, WST is presented as potentially integrative for cognitive science in general.

False memory in a short-term memory task.

The Deese/Roediger-McDermott (DRM; Roediger & McDermott, 1995) paradigm reliably elicits false memories for critical nonpresented words in recognition tasks. The present studies used a Sternberg (1966) task with DRM lists to determine whether false memories occur in short-term memory tasks and to assess the contribution of latency data in the measurement of false memories. Subjects studied three, five, or seven items from DRM lists and responded to a single probe (studied or nonstudied). In both experiments, critical lures were falsely recognized more often than nonpresented weak associates. Latency data indicated that correct rejections of critical lures were slower than correct rejections of weakly related items at all set sizes. False alarms to critical lures were slower than hits to list items. Latency data can distinguish veridical and false memories in a short-term memory task. Results are discussed in terms of activation-monitoring models of false memory.

Spatial perception and control.

We investigated whether the perceived vanishing point of a moving stimulus becomes more accurate as one's degree of control over the stimulus increases. Either alone or as a member of a pair, participants controlled the progression of a dot stimulus back and forth across a computer monitor. They did so via right and left buttonpresses that incremented the dot's velocity rightward and leftward, respectively. The participants in the individual condition had control of both buttons. Those in the group condition had control of only one. As the participants slowed the dot to change its direction of travel, it unexpectedly disappeared. Localizations of the vanishing point became more accurate as the participants' control over the dot increased. The data bridge a gap between accounts of localization error that rely solely on stimulus and cognitive factors, and accounts derived from research on action and spatial perception, which tend to rely on action-planning factors.

Emergence of self and other in perception and action: an event-control approach.

The present paper analyzes the regularities referred to via the concept 'self.' This is important, for cognitive science traditionally models the self as a cognitive mediator between perceptual inputs and behavioral outputs. This leads to the assertion that the self causes action. Recent findings in social psychology indicate this is not the case and, as a consequence, certain cognitive scientists model the self as being epiphenomenal. In contrast, the present paper proposes an alternative approach (i.e., the event-control approach) that is based on recently discovered regularities between perception and action. Specifically, these regularities indicate that perception and action planning utilize common neural resources. This leads to a coupling of perception, planning, and action in which the first two constitute aspects of a single system (i.e., the distal-event system) that is able to pre-specify and detect distal events. This distal-event system is then coupled with action (i.e., effector-control systems) in a constraining, as opposed to 'causal' manner. This model has implications for how we conceptualize the manner in which one infers the intentions of another, anticipates the intentions of another, and possibly even experiences another. In conclusion, it is argued that it may be possible to map the concept 'self' onto the regularities referred to in the event-control model, not in order to reify 'the self' as a causal mechanism, but to demonstrate its status as a useful concept that refers to regularities that are part of the natural order.