Spatial uncertainty and environmental geometry in navigation.

Variations in the geometry of the environment, such as the shape and size of an enclosure, have profound effects on navigational behavior and its neural underpinning. Here, we show that these effects arise as a consequence of a single, unifying principle: to navigate efficiently, the brain must maintain and update the uncertainty about one's location. We developed an image-computable Bayesian ideal observer model of navigation, continually combining noisy visual and self-motion inputs, and a neural encoding model optimized to represent the location uncertainty computed by the ideal observer. Through mathematical analysis and numerical simulations, we show that the ideal observer accounts for a diverse range of sometimes paradoxical distortions of human homing behavior in anisotropic and deformed environments, including 'boundary tethering', and its neural encoding accounts for distortions of rodent grid cell responses under identical environmental manipulations. Our results demonstrate that spatial uncertainty plays a key role in navigation.

Multiple decisions about one object involve parallel sensory acquisition but time-multiplexed evidence incorporation.

The brain is capable of processing several streams of information that bear on different aspects of the same problem. Here, we address the problem of making two decisions about one object, by studying difficult perceptual decisions about the color and motion of a dynamic random dot display. We find that the accuracy of one decision is unaffected by the difficulty of the other decision. However, the response times reveal that the two decisions do not form simultaneously. We show that both stimulus dimensions are acquired in parallel for the initial ∼0.1 s but are then incorporated serially in time-multiplexed bouts. Thus, there is a bottleneck that precludes updating more than one decision at a time, and a buffer that stores samples of evidence while access to the decision is blocked. We suggest that this bottleneck is responsible for the long timescales of many cognitive operations framed as decisions.

The hippocampus supports deliberation during value-based decisions.

Choosing between two items involves deliberation and comparison of the features of each item and its value. Such decisions take more time when choosing between options of similar value, possibly because these decisions require more evidence, but the mechanisms involved are not clear. We propose that the hippocampus supports deliberation about value, given its well-known role in prospection and relational cognition. We assessed the role of the hippocampus in deliberation in two experiments. First, using fMRI in healthy participants, we found that BOLD activity in the hippocampus increased as a function of deliberation time. Second, we found that patients with hippocampal damage exhibited more stochastic choices and longer reaction times than controls, possibly due to their failure to construct value-based or internal evidence during deliberation. Both sets of results were stronger in value-based decisions compared to perceptual decisions.