The effect of delay and social distance in the dictator and ultimatum games.

The previous research shows that delaying a reward in the dictator game contributes to less generous offers. If the reason for such results is temporal discounting, it can be expected that the effect of delay would be stronger for persons with a higher discounting rate, as well as the analogous pattern should occur in the ultimatum game. The participants of our study took decisions in the dictator and ultimatum game as proposers and responders. We manipulated delay of a reward (from immediate to in 5 years) and social distance (from the closest person to known only by sight). We observed the expected but weak interaction effect between delay and temporal discounting. However, the correlational analyses did not confirm the significant relationship between temporal discounting and decisions taken in dictator and ultimatum games. Moreover, the offers decline with the social distance, both in the dictator and ultimatum game. However, the social distance does not affect the value of the accepted offer in the ultimatum game. Such a discrepancy between donors' behaviour and beneficiaries' expectations may form a subtle but significant failure of the real-world donation markets.

Imagine-Self Perspective-Taking and Rational Self-Interested Behavior in a Simple Experimental Normal-Form Game.

The purpose of this study is to explore the link between imagine-self perspective-taking and rational self-interested behavior in experimental normal-form games. Drawing on the concept of sympathy developed by Adam Smith and further literature on perspective-taking in games, we hypothesize that introduction of imagine-self perspective-taking by decision-makers promotes rational self-interested behavior in a simple experimental normal-form game. In our study, we examined behavior of 404 undergraduate students in the two-person game, in which the participant can suffer a monetary loss only if she plays her Nash equilibrium strategy and the opponent plays her dominated strategy. Results suggest that the threat of suffering monetary losses effectively discourages the participants from choosing Nash equilibrium strategy. In general, players may take into account that opponents choose dominated strategies due to specific not self-interested motivations or errors. However, adopting imagine-self perspective by the participants leads to more Nash equilibrium choices, perhaps by alleviating participants' attributions of susceptibility to errors or non-self-interested motivation to the opponents.

Delaying rewards has greater effect on altruism when the beneficiary is socially distant.

Based on the assumption that social distance and time are dimensions of psychological distance important for altruistic choices it was predicted that enhancement of altruism due to delaying rewards when choosing between a reward for oneself and for another person would be more pronounced the greater the social distance between the subject and another person. In order to test this hypothesis, social discounting using hypothetical monetary rewards and manipulation of social distance and reward delay was measured in a group of 161 college students. The results indicate that delaying rewards increasingly enhances preference for altruistic choices as the social distance between subject and beneficiary grows.

Social discounting: Choice between rewards for other people.

The purpose of the present study was to test the prediction that when two rewards, a smaller but "socially closer" one and a larger but "socially more distant" one, are moved away from the subject by the same social distance, subjective value of the socially more distant reward will increase (i.e. the rate of social discounting will be shallower). The effect was absent when the recipients were moved back 10 places, but emerged when they were moved back 20 places. In addition, the hyperbolic model was found to correctly describe choices between two socially distant rewards. The results confirm similarities between social and temporal discounting.