Performance-Based Financing to Strengthen the Health System in Benin: Challenging the Mainstream Approach.

BACKGROUND: Performance-based financing (PBF) is often proposed as a way to improve health system performance. In Benin, PBF was launched in 2012 through a World Bank-supported project. The Belgian Development Agency (BTC) followed suit through a health system strengthening (HSS) project. This paper analyses and draws lessons from the experience of BTC-supported PBF alternative approach - especially with regards to institutional aspects, the role of demand-side actors, ownership, and cost-effectiveness - and explores the mechanisms at stake so as to better understand how the "PBF package" functions and produces effects. METHODS: An exploratory, theory-driven evaluation approach was adopted. Causal mechanisms through which PBF is hypothesised to impact on results were singled out and explored. This paper stems from the co-authors' capitalisation of experiences; mixed methods were used to collect, triangulate and analyse information. Results are structured along Witter et al framework. RESULTS: Influence of context is strong over PBF in Benin; the policy is donor-driven. BTC did not adopt the World Bank's mainstream PBF model, but developed an alternative approach in line with its HSS support programme, which is grounded on existing domestic institutions. The main features of this approach are described (decentralised governance, peer review verification, counter-verification entrusted to health service users' platforms), as well as its adaptive process. PBF has contributed to strengthen various aspects of the health system and led to modest progress in utilisation of health services, but noticeable improvements in healthcare quality. Three mechanisms explaining observed outcomes within the context are described: comprehensive HSS at district level; acting on health workers' motivation through a complex package of incentives; and increased accountability by reinforcing dialogue with demand-side actors. Cost-effectiveness and sustainability issues are also discussed. CONCLUSION: BTC's alternative PBF approach is both promising in terms of effects, ownership and sustainability, and less resource consuming. This experience testifies that PBF is not a uniform or rigid model, and opens the policy ground for recipient governments to put their own emphasis and priorities and design ad hoc models adapted to their context specificities. However, integrating PBF within the normal functioning of local health systems, in line with other reforms, is a big challenge.

Output-based payment to boost staff productivity in public health centres: contracting in Kabutare district, Rwanda.

OBJECTIVE: In many low-income countries, public health systems do not meet the needs and demands of the population. We aimed to assess the extent to which output-based payment could boost staff productivity at health care facilities. METHODS: We assessed the performance of 15 health care centres in Kabutare, Rwanda, comparing productivity in 2001, when fixed annual bonuses were paid to staff, with that in 2003, when an output-based payment incentive scheme was implemented. FINDINGS: Changes to the structure of contracts were associated with improvements in health centre performance: specifically, output-based performance contracts induced sharp increases in the productivity of health staff. CONCLUSION: Institutional configurations of health care organizations deserve more attention. Those currently in place in the public sector may not the most suitable to meet current challenges in health care. More experiments are needed to confirm these early results from Rwanda and elsewhere, since risks associated with output-based incentive schemes should not be ignored.

Reviewing institutions of rural health centres: the Performance Initiative in Butare, Rwanda.

In many low-income countries, performance of pyramidal health systems with a public purpose is not meeting the expectations and needs of the populations they serve. A question that has not been studied and tested sufficiently is, 'What is the right package of institutional mechanisms required for organisations and individuals working in these health systems?' This paper presents the experience of the Performance Initiative, an innovative contractual approach that has reshaped the incentive structure in place in two rural districts of Rwanda. It describes the general background, the initial analysis, the institutional arrangement and the results after 3 years of operations. At this stage of the experience, it shows that 'output-based payment + greater autonomy' is a feasible and effective strategy for improving the performance of public health centres. As part of a more global package of strategies, contracting-in approaches could be an interesting option for governments, donors and non-governmental organisations in their effort to achieve some of the Millennium Development Goals.