Learning via instructions about observations: exploring similarities and differences with learning via actual observations.

Our behaviour toward stimuli can be influenced by observing how another person (a model) interacts with those stimuli. We investigated whether mere instructions about a model's interactions with stimuli (i.e. instructions about observations) are sufficient to alter evaluative and fear responses and whether these changes are similar in magnitude to those resulting from actually observing the interactions. In Experiments 1 (n = 268) and 2 (n = 260), participants either observed or read about a model reacting positively or negatively to stimuli. Evaluations of those stimuli were then assessed via ratings and a personalized implicit association test. In Experiments 3 (n = 60) and 4 (n = 190), we assessed participants' fear toward stimuli after observing or reading about a model displaying distress in the presence of those stimuli. While the results consistently indicated that instructions about observations induced behavioural changes, they were mixed with regard to whether instructions were as powerful in changing behaviour as observations. We discuss whether learning via observations and via instructions may be mediated by similar or different processes, how they might differ in their suitability for conveying certain types of information, and how their relative effectiveness may depend on the information to be transmitted.

Observational evaluative conditioning is sensitive to relational information.

Social learning represents an important avenue via which evaluations can be formed or changed. Rather than learning slowly through trial and error, we can instead observe how another person (a "model") interacts with stimuli and quickly adjust our own behaviour. We report five studies (n = 912) that focused on one subtype of social learning, observational evaluative conditioning (OEC), and how it is moderated by relational information (i.e., information indicating how a stimulus and a model's reactions are related). Participants observed a model reacting positively to one stimulus and negatively to another, and were either told that these reactions were genuine, faked, or opposite to the model's actual feelings. Stimulus evaluations were then indexed using ratings and a personalised Implicit Association Test (pIAT). When the model's reactions were said to be genuine, OEC effects emerged in the expected direction. When the model's reactions were said to be faked, the magnitude of self-reported, but not pIAT, effects was reduced. Finally, stating that the model's reactions were opposite to his actual feelings eliminated or reversed self-reported effects and eliminated pIAT effects. We consider how these findings relate to previous work as well as mental-process theories.