Human infants are aroused and concerned by moral transgressions.

Humans reason and care about ethical issues, such as avoiding unnecessary harm. But what enables us to develop a moral capacity? This question dates back at least to ancient Greece and typically results in the traditional opposition between sentimentalism (the view that morality is mainly driven by socioaffective processes) and rationalism [the view that morality is mainly driven by (socio)cognitive processes or reason]. Here, we used multiple methods (eye-tracking and observations of expressive behaviors) to assess the role of both cognitive and socioaffective processes in infants' developing morality. We capitalized on the distinction between moral (e.g., harmful) and conventional (e.g., harmless) transgressions to investigate whether 18-mo-old infants understand actions as distinctively moral as opposed to merely disobedient or unexpected. All infants watched the same social scene, but based on prior verbal interactions, an actor's tearing apart of a picture (an act not intrinsically harmful) with a tool constituted either a conventional (wrong tool), a moral (producing harm), or no violation (correct tool). Infants' anticipatory looks differentiated between conventional and no violation conditions, suggesting that they processed the verbal interactions and built corresponding expectations. Importantly, infants showed a larger increase in pupil size (physiological arousal), and more expressions indicating empathic concern, in response to a moral than to a conventional violation. Thus, infants differentiated between harmful and harmless transgressions based solely on prior verbal interactions. Together, these convergent findings suggest that human infants' moral development is fostered by both sociocognitive (inferring harm) and socioaffective processes (empathic concern for others' welfare).

How to trust a perfect stranger: predicting initial trust behavior from resting-state brain-electrical connectivity.

Reciprocal exchanges can be understood as the updating of an initial belief about a partner. This initial level of trust is essential when it comes to establishing cooperation with an unknown partner, as cooperation cannot arise without a minimum of trust not justified by previous successful exchanges with this partner. Here we demonstrate the existence of a representation of the initial trust level before an exchange with a partner has occurred. Specifically, we can predict the Investor's initial investment--i.e. his initial level of trust toward the unknown trustee in Round 1 of a standard 10-round Trust Game-from resting-state functional connectivity data acquired several minutes before the start of the Trust Game. Resting-state functional connectivity is, however, not significantly associated with the level of trust in later rounds, potentially mirroring the updating of the initial belief about the partner. Our results shed light on how the initial level of trust is represented. In particular, we show that a person's initial level of trust is, at least in part, determined by brain electrical activity acquired well before the beginning of an exchange.