Social diversity and social cohesion in Britain.

We use data from a large-scale and nationally representative survey to examine whether there is in Britain a trade-off between social diversity and social cohesion. Using six separate measures of social cohesion (generalised trust, volunteering, giving to charity, inter-ethnic friendship, and two neighbourhood cohesion scales) and four measures of social diversity (ethnic fractionalisation, religious fractionalisation, percentage Muslim, and percentage foreign-born), we show that, net of individual covariates, there is a negative association between social diversity and most measures of social cohesion. But these associations largely disappear when neighbourhood deprivation is taken into account. These results are robust to alternative definitions of neighbourhood. We also investigate the possibility that the diversity--cohesion trade-off is found in more segregated neighbourhoods. But we find very little evidence to support that claim. Overall, it is material deprivation, not diversity, that undermines social cohesion.

Anywheres, Somewheres, local attachment, and civic participation.

We use data from Understanding Society to evaluate several claims advanced by David Goodhart in The Road to Somewhere. We show that geographically mobile individuals are indeed more likely to support Remain in the EU referendum, as Goodhart suggests. But Remainers are no different to Leavers in how attached they are to their local community. And people reporting higher level of civic participation or those who are more trusting are actually less supportive of Brexit. Our findings suggest that the dichotomy between cosmopolitan Anywheres and communitarian Somewheres is a misleading one. Cosmopolitan Anywheres are just as communitarian as Somewheres, if not more so.

Socio-spatial stratification of housing tenure trajectories in Sweden - A longitudinal cohort study.

Individuals tend to be most mobile when they are between 20 and 40 years of age. This pattern is relatively stable across regions and over time. For geographical mobility, less is known about their transitions between different types of housing and tenure forms. In Sweden, households may select between, principally, three different types of tenure forms, each often coupled with a specific housing type. Households may rent from either public companies (municipality owned) or private landlords in multifamily dwellings, households may own their single-family house privately, or they can cooperatively own a multifamily house as a tenant-owner in an apartment. Yet we lack knowledge of which tenure trajectories individuals tend to follow during their most mobile years, and we also lack knowledge about which factors determine tenure trajectories. Our sample consist of individuals who in 1995 were aged 18-25 and who left their parental house between 1994 and 1995. This study tracks their tenure trajectories for 21 consecutive years starting in 1995 until 2015. The cohorts in our sample were the first who encountered the conditions on the deregulated housing market that are still in place in Sweden today. We followed these cohorts until they were between 39 and 46 years old and used sequence analysis to classify tenure trajectories. One result that stands out is the outstanding and increasing emphasis on home ownership in our sample, quite unlike the traditional picture of the Swedish housing market. Additionally, we found that resources in a broad sense and spatial context have a great impact on the type of trajectory individuals follow.

Understanding the social and cultural bases of Brexit.

We use data from a large scale and nationally representative survey to evaluate two narratives about the social bases of Brexit. The first narrative sees Brexit as a revolt of the economically left-behinds. The second narrative attributes Brexit to the resurgence of an English nationalism. There is some, albeit not always consistent, evidence that people in relative poverty or those living in areas that have seen greater Chinese import penetration are slightly more pro-Leave. People living in economically deprived neighborhoods are not more pro-Brexit. Using the Weberian class-status distinction, it is social status, not social class, which stratifies Brexit support. Individuals for whom being British is important are more pro-Leave. But those who see themselves as British rather than English, and those reporting omnivorous cultural consumption are less supportive of Brexit. Overall, there is empirical support for both narratives. But the weight of the evidence suggests a strong cultural dimension in Brexit support.

Impact of ancestry categorisations on residential segregation measures using Swedish register data.

AIM: Country-of-birth data contained in registers are often aggregated to create broad ancestry group categories. We examine how measures of residential segregation vary according to levels of aggregation. METHOD: We use Swedish register data to calculate pairwise dissimilarity indices from 1990 to 2012 for ancestry groups defined at four nested levels of aggregation: (1) micro-groups containing 50 categories, (2) meso-groups containing 16 categories, (3) macro-groups containing six categories and (4) a broad Western/non-Western binary. RESULTS: We find variation in segregation levels between ancestry groups that is obscured by data aggregation. CONCLUSIONS: This study demonstrates that the practice of aggregating country-of-birth statistics in register data can hinder the ability to identify highly segregated groups and therefore design effective policy to remedy both intergroup and intergenerational inequalities.