Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation.

Compassionate conservation is based on the ethical position that actions taken to protect biodiversity should be guided by compassion for all sentient beings. Critics argue that there are 3 core reasons harming animals is acceptable in conservation programs: the primary purpose of conservation is biodiversity protection; conservation is already compassionate to animals; and conservation should prioritize compassion to humans. We used argument analysis to clarify the values and logics underlying the debate around compassionate conservation. We found that objections to compassionate conservation are expressions of human exceptionalism, the view that humans are of a categorically separate and higher moral status than all other species. In contrast, compassionate conservationists believe that conservation should expand its moral community by recognizing all sentient beings as persons. Personhood, in an ethical sense, implies the individual is owed respect and should not be treated merely as a means to other ends. On scientific and ethical grounds, there are good reasons to extend personhood to sentient animals, particularly in conservation. The moral exclusion or subordination of members of other species legitimates the ongoing manipulation and exploitation of the living worlds, the very reason conservation was needed in the first place. Embracing compassion can help dismantle human exceptionalism, recognize nonhuman personhood, and navigate a more expansive moral space.

Reconocimiento de la Calidad de Persona en los Animales dentro de la Conservación Compasiva Resumen La conservación compasiva está basada en la posición ética que parte de que las acciones tomadas para proteger a la biodiversidad deberían estar dirigidas por la compasión por todos los seres sintientes. Los críticos de esta postura argumentan que hay tres razones nucleares por las que el daño a los animales es aceptable dentro de los programas de conservación: el principal motivo de la conservación es la protección de la biodiversidad; la conservación ya es compasiva con los animales; y la conservación debería priorizar la compasión hacia los humanos. Usamos un análisis de argumentos para aclarar los valores y la lógica subyacentes al debate en torno a la conservación compasiva. Encontramos que el rechazo a la conservación compasiva es una expresión de la excepcionalidad humana, la visión de que los humanos están en un nivel categóricamente separado y de mayor moral que todas las demás especies. Por el contrario, los conservacionistas compasivos creen que la conservación debería expandir su comunidad moral al reconocer a todos los seres sintientes como personas. La calidad de persona, en un sentido ético, implica que el individuo merece respeto y no debería ser tratado solamente como un medio para otros fines. Si hablamos desde fundamentos científicos y éticos, existen muy buenas razones para extender la calidad de persona a todos los animales sintientes, particularmente en la conservación. La exclusión moral o la subordinación de los miembros de otras especies justifica la continua manipulación y explotación de los seres vivos, la justa razón por la que necesitamos de la conservación desde el principio. La aceptación de la compasión nos puede ayudar a desmantelar la excepcionalidad humana, a reconocer la calidad de persona no humana y a navegar un espacio moral más expansivo.

Physiological responses to food deprivation in the house sparrow, a species not adapted to prolonged fasting.

Many wild birds fast during reproduction, molting, migration, or because of limited food availability. Species that are adapted to fasting sequentially oxidize endogenous fuels in three discrete phases. We hypothesized that species not adapted to long fasts have truncated, but otherwise similar, phases of fasting, sequential changes in fuel oxidization, and similar changes in blood metabolites to fasting-adapted species. We tested salient predictions in house sparrows (Passer domesticus biblicus), a subspecies that is unable to tolerate more than ~32 h of fasting. Our main hypothesis was that fasting sparrows sequentially oxidize substrates in the order carbohydrates, lipids, and protein. We dosed 24 house sparrows with [(13)C]glucose, palmitic acid, or glycine and measured (13)CO(2) in their breath while they fasted for 24 h. To ascertain whether blood metabolite levels reflect fasting-induced changes in metabolic fuels, we also measured glucose, triacylglycerides, and ß-hydroxybutyrate in the birds' blood. The results of both breath (13)CO(2) and plasma metabolite analyses did not support our hypothesis; i.e., that sparrows have the same metabolic responses characteristic of fasting-adapted species, but on a shorter time scale. Contrary to our main prediction, we found that recently assimilated (13)C-tracers were oxidized continuously in different patterns with no definite peaks corresponding to the three phases of fasting and also that changes in plasma metabolite levels accurately tracked the changes found by breath analysis. Notably, the rate of recently assimilated [(13)C]glycine oxidization was significantly higher (P < 0.001) than that of the other metabolic tracers at all postdosing intervals. We conclude that the inability of house sparrows to fast for longer than 32 h is likely related to their inability to accrue large lipid stores, separately oxidize different fuels, and/or spare protein during fasting.