Regulating mirroring of emotions: A social-specific mechanism?

There is evidence that humans mirror others' emotional responses: brain responses to observed and experienced emotion overlap, and reaction time costs of observing others' pain suggest that others' emotional states interfere with our own. Such emotional mirroring requires regulation to prevent personal distress. However, currently it is unclear whether this "empathic interference effect" is uniquely social, arising only from the observation of human actors, or also from the observation of non-biological objects in "painful" states. Moreover, the degree to which this interference relates to individual differences in self-reported levels of empathy is yet to be revealed. We introduce a modified pain observation task, measuring empathic interference effects induced by observation of painful states applied to both biological and non-biological stimuli. An initial validation study (N = 50) confirmed that painful states applied to biological stimuli were rated explicitly as more painful than non-painful states applied to biological stimuli, and also than both painful and non-painful states applied to non-biological stimuli. Subsequently, across two independent discovery (N = 83) and replication (N = 80) samples, the task elicited slowing of response times during the observation of painful states when compared to non-painful states, but the magnitude of this effect did not differ between biological and non-biological stimuli. Little evidence was found for reliable relationships between empathic interference and self-reported empathy. Caution should therefore be taken in using the current task to pursue an individual differences approach to empathic interference, but the task shows promise for investigating the specificity of the mechanism involved in regulating emotional mirroring.

Imitation in one's own presence: No specific effect of self-focus on imitation.

Previous studies have reported that imitative responses may be modulated by top-down social factors such as self-focus. However, growing evidence suggests that such social factors may actually modulate domain-general processes such as spatially compatible responding, rather than specifically social processes such as imitation. In this study, we aimed to identify the cognitive processes being modulated under conditions of heightened or diminished self-focus. Participants performed a stimulus-response compatibility task which independently measures both spatial and imitative response tendencies, under two conditions: heightened self-focus, where the task was performed in the presence of two mirrors; and diminished self-focus, where the mirrors were covered. While participants were faster to respond to compatible trials than to incompatible trials, both imitatively and spatially, there was no significant modulation of either spatial or imitative compatibility by self-focus; although the magnitude of the modulation of spatial compatibility was numerically similar to the effect of self-focus on imitation found in previous studies. These results provide no evidence for an effect of self-focus on either social-specific, or domain-general, processes.