U.S. Preparedness and Response to Increasing Clade I Mpox Cases in the Democratic Republic of the Congo - United States, 2024.

Clade I monkeypox virus (MPXV), which can cause severe illness in more people than clade II MPXVs, is endemic in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), but the country has experienced an increase in suspected cases during 2023-2024. In light of the 2022 global outbreak of clade II mpox, the increase in suspected clade I cases in DRC raises concerns that the virus could spread to other countries and underscores the importance of coordinated, urgent global action to support DRC's efforts to contain the virus. To date, no cases of clade I mpox have been detected outside of countries in Central Africa where the virus is endemic. CDC and other partners are working to support DRC's response. In addition, CDC is enhancing U.S. preparedness by raising awareness, strengthening surveillance, expanding diagnostic testing capacity for clade I MPXV, ensuring appropriate specimen handling and waste management, emphasizing the importance of appropriate medical treatment, and communicating guidance on the recommended contact tracing, containment, behavior modification, and vaccination strategies.

Understanding Breast Cancer Surgery Through Tiktok: an Analysis of Video Content and Viewer Engagement.

BACKGROUND: Breast cancer is the most common cancer in adolescents and young adults. Social media, particularly TikTok, has emerged as a crucial platform for sharing health information in this population. This study aims to characterize breast cancer surgery information on TikTok, focusing on content reliability, viewer reception, and areas for improvement. METHODS: We queried the search terms "breast cancer surgery," "mastectomy," and "lumpectomy" on TikTok, evaluating the top 50 videos for each. After watching each video, characteristics were recorded including: creator characteristics, video metrics, viewer reception, and video content. Statistical analysis was performed using Spearman's rank correlations and t-tests. RESULTS: A total of 138 videos were analyzed (excluding 12 duplicates from the initial 150). These videos received 4,895,373 likes and 109,705 comments. The most common content types were storytelling (57%) and education (20%), and the most common creator types were patients (77.3%) and physicians (10.3%). Videos with educational content by physicians were rare (6.5%). Engagement varied on the basis of video length, search terms, and creator characteristics. Overall, viewer comments predominantly expressed support and interest. CONCLUSIONS: Our study reveals that information on breast cancer surgery is widely shared on TikTok and has high viewer engagement. Factors influencing impact include video length, creator background, and search terms. While social media has democratized information sharing, there is a relative lack of physician creators providing objective and educational content. We highlight opportunities for health professionals to engage in social media as a tool for health education and ensure diverse and reliable healthcare content on these platforms.

The National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS): From inception to widespread coverage, 2020-2022, United States.

Wastewater surveillance is a valuable tool that can be used to track infectious diseases in a community. In September 2020, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established the National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) to coordinate and build the nation's capacity to detect and quantify concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 RNA in U.S. wastewater. This is the first surveillance summary of NWSS, covering September 1, 2020 to December 31, 2022. Through partnerships with state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments, NWSS became a national surveillance platform that can be readily expanded and adapted to meet changing public health needs. Beginning with 209 sampling sites in September 2020, NWSS rapidly expanded to >1500 sites by December 2022, covering ≈47 % of the U.S. population. As of December 2022, >152,000 unique wastewater samples have been collected by NWSS partners, primarily from wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs). WWTPs participating in NWSS tend to be larger than the average U.S. WWTP and serve more populated communities. In December 2022, ≈8 % of the nearly 16,000 U.S. WWTPs were participating in NWSS. NWSS partners used a variety of methods for sampling and testing wastewater samples; however, progress is being made to standardize these methods. In July 2021, NWSS partners started submitting SARS-CoV-2 genome sequencing data to NWSS. In October 2022, NWSS expanded to monkeypox virus testing, with plans to include additional infectious disease targets in the future. Through the rapid implementation and expansion of NWSS, important lessons have been learned. Wastewater surveillance programs should consider both surge and long-term capacities when developing an implementation plan, and early standardization of sampling and testing methods is important to facilitate data comparisons across sites. NWSS has proven to be a flexible and sustainable surveillance system that will continue to be a useful complement to case-based surveillance for guiding public health action.

Detecting Mpox Cases Through Wastewater Surveillance - United States, August 2022-May 2023.

In October 2022, CDC's National Wastewater Surveillance System began routine testing of U.S. wastewater for Monkeypox virus. Wastewater surveillance sensitivity, positive predictive value (PPV), and negative predictive value (NPV) for Monkeypox virus were evaluated by comparing wastewater detections (Monkeypox virus detected versus not detected) to numbers of persons with mpox in a county who were shedding virus. Case ascertainment was assumed to be complete, and persons with mpox were assumed to shed virus for 25 days after symptom onset. A total of 281 cases and 3,492 wastewater samples from 89 sites in 26 counties were included in the analysis. Wastewater surveillance in a single week, from samples representing thousands to millions of persons, had a sensitivity of 32% for detecting one or more persons shedding Monkeypox virus, 49% for detecting five or more persons shedding virus, and 77% for detecting 15 or more persons shedding virus. Weekly PPV and NPV for detecting persons shedding Monkeypox virus in a county were 62% and 80%, respectively. An absence of detections in counties with wastewater surveillance signified a high probability that a large number of cases were not present. Results can help to guide the public health response to Monkeypox virus wastewater detections. A single, isolated detection likely warrants a limited public health response. An absence of detections, in combination with no reported cases, can give public health officials greater confidence that no cases are present. Wastewater surveillance can serve as a useful complement to case surveillance for guiding the public health response to an mpox outbreak.

Early Detection and Surveillance of the SARS-CoV-2 Variant BA.2.86 - Worldwide, July-October 2023.

Early detection of emerging SARS-CoV-2 variants is critical to guiding rapid risk assessments, providing clear and timely communication messages, and coordinating public health action. CDC identifies and monitors novel SARS-CoV-2 variants through diverse surveillance approaches, including genomic, wastewater, traveler-based, and digital public health surveillance (e.g., global data repositories, news, and social media). The SARS-CoV-2 variant BA.2.86 was first sequenced in Israel and reported on August 13, 2023. The first U.S. COVID-19 case caused by this variant was reported on August 17, 2023, after a patient received testing for SARS-CoV-2 at a health care facility on August 3. In the following month, eight additional U.S. states detected BA.2.86 across various surveillance systems, including specimens from health care settings, wastewater surveillance, and traveler-based genomic surveillance. As of October 23, 2023, sequences have been reported from at least 32 countries. Continued variant tracking and further evidence are needed to evaluate the full public health impact of BA.2.86. Timely genomic sequence submissions to global public databases aided early detection of BA.2.86 despite the decline in the number of specimens being sequenced during the past year. This report describes how multicomponent surveillance and genomic sequencing were used in real time to track the emergence and transmission of the BA.2.86 variant. This surveillance approach provides valuable information regarding implementing and sustaining comprehensive surveillance not only for novel SARS-CoV-2 variants but also for future pathogen threats.

COVID-19 Surveillance After Expiration of the Public Health Emergency Declaration - United States, May 11, 2023.

On January 31, 2020, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) declared, under Section 319 of the Public Health Service Act, a U.S. public health emergency because of the emergence of a novel virus, SARS-CoV-2.* After 13 renewals, the public health emergency will expire on May 11, 2023. Authorizations to collect certain public health data will expire on that date as well. Monitoring the impact of COVID-19 and the effectiveness of prevention and control strategies remains a public health priority, and a number of surveillance indicators have been identified to facilitate ongoing monitoring. After expiration of the public health emergency, COVID-19-associated hospital admission levels will be the primary indicator of COVID-19 trends to help guide community and personal decisions related to risk and prevention behaviors; the percentage of COVID-19-associated deaths among all reported deaths, based on provisional death certificate data, will be the primary indicator used to monitor COVID-19 mortality. Emergency department (ED) visits with a COVID-19 diagnosis and the percentage of positive SARS-CoV-2 test results, derived from an established sentinel network, will help detect early changes in trends. National genomic surveillance will continue to be used to estimate SARS-CoV-2 variant proportions; wastewater surveillance and traveler-based genomic surveillance will also continue to be used to monitor SARS-CoV-2 variants. Disease severity and hospitalization-related outcomes are monitored via sentinel surveillance and large health care databases. Monitoring of COVID-19 vaccination coverage, vaccine effectiveness (VE), and vaccine safety will also continue. Integrated strategies for surveillance of COVID-19 and other respiratory viruses can further guide prevention efforts. COVID-19-associated hospitalizations and deaths are largely preventable through receipt of updated vaccines and timely administration of therapeutics (1-4).

Norovirus acute gastroenteritis among US and European travellers to areas of moderate to high risk of travellers' diarrhoea: a prospective cohort study.

BACKGROUND: Acute gastroenteritis (AGE) is a major medical condition for travellers worldwide, particularly travellers to low- and middle-income countries. Norovirus (NoV) is the most common cause of viral AGE in older children and adults, but data on prevalence and impact among travellers is limited. METHODS: Prospective, multi-site, observational cohort study conducted 2015-2017, among adult international travellers from the US and Europe to areas of moderate to high risk of travel-acquired AGE. Participants provided self-collected pre-travel stool samples and self-reported AGE symptoms while travelling. Post-travel stool samples were requested from symptomatic subjects and a sample of asymptomatic travellers within 14days of return. Samples were tested for NoV by RT-qPCR, genotyped if positive, and tested for other common enteric pathogens by Luminex xTAG GPP. RESULTS: Of the 1109 participants included, 437 (39.4%) developed AGE symptoms resulting in an overall AGE incidence of 24.7 per 100 person-weeks (95% CI: 22.4; 27.1). Twenty NoV-positive AGE cases (5.2% of those tested) were identified at an incidence of 1.1 per 100 person-weeks (95% CI: 0.7; 1.7). NoV-positive samples belonged mostly to genogroup GII (18, 85.7%); None of the 13 samples sequenced belonged to genotype GII.4. Clinical severity of AGE was higher for NoV-positive than for NoV-negative cases (mean modified Vesikari Score 6.8 vs 4.9) with more cases classified as severe or moderate (25% vs 6.8%). Eighty percent of NoV-positive participants (vs. 38.9% in NoV-negative) reported at least moderate impact on travel plans. CONCLUSIONS: AGE is a prevalent disease among travellers with a small proportion associated with NoV. Post-travel stool sample collection timing might have influenced the low number of NoV cases detected; however, NoV infections resulted in high clinical severity and impact on travel plans. These results may contribute to targeted vaccine development and the design of future studies on NoV epidemiology.

Fecal indicators and antibiotic resistance genes exhibit diurnal trends in the Chattahoochee River: Implications for water quality monitoring.

Water bodies that serve as sources of drinking or recreational water are routinely monitored for fecal indicator bacteria (FIB) by state and local agencies. Exceedances of monitoring thresholds set by those agencies signal likely elevated human health risk from exposure, but FIB give little information about the potential source of contamination. To improve our understanding of how within-day variation could impact monitoring data interpretation, we conducted a study at two sites along the Chattahoochee River that varied in their recreational usage and adjacent land-use (natural versus urban), collecting samples every 30 min over one 24-h period. We assayed for three types of microbial indicators: FIB (total coliforms and Escherichia coli); human fecal-associated microbial source tracking (MST) markers (crAssphage and HF183/BacR287); and a suite of clinically relevant antibiotic resistance genes (ARGs; blaCTX-M, blaCMY, MCR, KPC, VIM, NDM) and a gene associated with antibiotic resistance (intl1). Mean levels of FIB and clinically relevant ARGs (blaCMY and KPC) were similar across sites, while MST markers and intI1 occurred at higher mean levels at the natural site. The human-associated MST markers positively correlated with antibiotic resistant-associated genes at both sites, but no consistent associations were detected between culturable FIB and any molecular markers. For all microbial indicators, generalized additive mixed models were used to examine diurnal variability and whether this variability was associated with environmental factors (water temperature, turbidity, pH, and sunlight). We found that FIB peaked during morning and early afternoon hours and were not associated with environmental factors. With the exception of HF183/BacR287 at the urban site, molecular MST markers and intI1 exhibited diurnal variability, and water temperature, pH, and turbidity were significantly associated with this variability. For blaCMY and KPC, diurnal variability was present but was not correlated with environmental factors. These results suggest that differences in land use (natural or urban) both adjacent and upstream may impact overall levels of microbial contamination. Monitoring agencies should consider matching sample collection times with peak levels of target microbial indicators, which would be in the morning or early afternoon for the fecal associated indicators. Measuring multiple microbial indicators can lead to clearer interpretations of human health risk associated with exposure to contaminated water.

Dialysis Water Supply Faucet as Reservoir for Carbapenemase-Producing Pseudomonas aeruginosa.

During June 2017-November 2019, a total 36 patients with carbapenem-resistant Pseudomonas aeruginosa harboring Verona-integron-encoded metallo-ß-lactamase were identified in a city in western Texas, USA. A faucet contaminated with the organism, identified through environmental sampling, in a specialty care room was the likely source for infection in a subset of patients.

Modeling infection from SARS-CoV-2 wastewater concentrations: promise, limitations, and future directions.

Estimating total infection levels, including unreported and asymptomatic infections, is important for understanding community disease transmission. Wastewater can provide a pooled community sample to estimate total infections that is independent of case reporting biases toward individuals with moderate to severe symptoms and by test-seeking behavior and access. We derive three mechanistic models for estimating community infection levels from wastewater measurements based on a description of the processes that generate SARS-CoV-2 RNA signals in wastewater and accounting for the fecal strength of wastewater through endogenous microbial markers, daily flow, and per-capita wastewater generation estimates. The models are illustrated through two case studies of wastewater data collected during 2020-2021 in Virginia Beach, VA, and Santa Clara County, CA. Median simulated infection levels generally were higher than reported cases, but at times, were lower, suggesting a discrepancy between the reported cases and wastewater data, or inaccurate modeling results. Daily simulated infection estimates showed large ranges, in part due to dependence on highly variable clinical viral fecal shedding data. Overall, the wastewater-based mechanistic models are useful for normalization of wastewater measurements and for understanding wastewater-based surveillance data for public health decision-making but are currently limited by lack of robust SARS-CoV-2 fecal shedding data.

Dose-Response of a Norovirus GII.2 Controlled Human Challenge Model Inoculum.

BACKGROUND: Genogroup II noroviruses are the most common cause of acute infectious gastroenteritis. We evaluated the use of a new GII.2 inoculum in a human challenge. METHODS: Forty-four healthy adults (36 secretor-positive and 8 secretor-negative for histo-blood group antigens) were challenged with ascending doses of a new safety-tested Snow Mountain virus (SMV) GII.2 norovirus inoculum (1.2 × 104 to 1.2 × 107 genome equivalent copies [GEC]; n = 38) or placebo (n = 6). Illness was defined as diarrhea and/or vomiting postchallenge in subjects with evidence of infection (defined as GII.2 norovirus RNA detection in stool and/or anti-SMV immunoglobulin G [IgG] seroconversion). RESULTS: The highest dose was associated with SMV infection in 90%, and illness in 70% of subjects with 10 of 12 secretor-positive (83%) and 4 of 8 secretor-negative (50%) becoming ill. There was no association between prechallenge anti-SMV serum IgG concentration, carbohydrate-binding blockade antibody, or salivary immunoglobulin A and infection. The median infectious dose (ID50) was 5.1 × 105 GEC. CONCLUSIONS: High rates of infection and illness were observed in both secretor-positive and secretor-negative subjects in this challenge study. However, a high dose will be required to achieve the target of 75% illness to make this an efficient model for evaluating potential norovirus vaccines and therapeutics. CLINICAL TRIALS REGISTRATION: NCT02473224.

Metagenomics indicate that public health risk may be higher from flooding following dry versus rainy periods.

Urban floodwater could lead to significant risk for public and environmental health from mobilization of microbial pathogens and overflow of wastewater treatment systems. Here, we attempted to assess this risk by obtaining metagenomic profiles of antibiotic resistance genes (ARGs), virulence factors (VFs) and pathogens present in floodwater samples collected in urban Atlanta, GA that were categorized in two distinct groups: floods that occurred after periods of drought and those after regular (seasonal) rain events. Even though no major (known) pathogens were present at the limit of detection of our sequencing effort (~3 Gbp/sample), we observed that floodwaters after drought showed a 2.5-fold higher abundance of both ARGs and VFs compared to floodwater after rainy days. These differences were mainly derived by several novel species of the Pseudomonas genus, which were more dominant in the former versus the latter samples and carried several genes to cope with osmotic stress in addition to ARGs and VFs. These results revealed that there are previously undescribed species that become mobilized after flooding events in the Southeast US urban settings and could represent an increased public health risk, especially after periods of drought, which warrants further attention.

Simulating the effect of evaluation unit size on eligibility to stop mass drug administration for lymphatic filariasis in Haiti.

BACKGROUND: The Transmission Assessment Survey (TAS) is a decision-making tool to determine when transmission of lymphatic filariasis is presumed to have reached a level low enough that it cannot be sustained even in the absence of mass drug administration. The survey is applied over geographic areas, called evaluation units (EUs); existing World Health Organization guidelines limit EU size to a population of no more than 2 million people. METHODOLOGY/PRINCIPAL FINDINGS: In 2015, TASs were conducted in 14 small EUs in Haiti. Simulations, using the observed TAS results, were performed to understand the potential programmatic impact had Haiti chosen to form larger EUs. Nine "combination-EUs" were formed by grouping adjacent EUs, and bootstrapping was used to simulate the expected TAS results. When the combination-EUs were comprised of at least one "passing" and one "failing" EU, the majority of these combination-EU would pass the TAS 79% - 100% of the time. Even in the case when both component EUs had failed, the combination-EU was expected to "pass" 11% of the time. Simulations of mini-TAS, a strategy with smaller power and hence smaller sample size than TAS, resulted in more conservative "passing" and "failing" when implemented in original EUs. CONCLUSIONS/SIGNIFICANCE: Our results demonstrate the high potential for misclassification when the average prevalence of lymphatic filariasis in the combined areas differs with regards to the TAS threshold. Of particular concern is the risk of "passing" larger EUs that include focal areas where prevalence is high enough to be potentially self-sustaining. Our results reaffirm the approach that Haiti took in forming smaller EUs. Where baseline or monitoring data show a high or heterogeneous prevalence, programs should leverage alternative strategies like mini-TAS in smaller EUs, or consider gathering additional data through spot check sites to advise EU formation.

Rapid Implementation of High-Frequency Wastewater Surveillance of SARS-CoV-2.

There have been over 507 million cases of COVID-19, the disease caused by the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), resulting in 6 million deaths globally. Wastewater surveillance has emerged as a valuable tool in understanding SARS-CoV-2 burden in communities. The National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) partnered with the United States Geological Survey (USGS) to implement a high-frequency sampling program. This report describes basic surveillance and sampling statistics as well as a comparison of SARS-CoV-2 trends between high-frequency sampling 3-5 times per week, referred to as USGS samples, and routine sampling 1-2 times per week, referred to as NWSS samples. USGS samples provided a more nuanced impression of the changes in wastewater trends, which could be important in emergency response situations. Despite the rapid implementation time frame, USGS samples had similar data quality and testing turnaround times as NWSS samples. Ensuring there is a reliable sample collection and testing plan before an emergency arises will aid in the rapid implementation of a high-frequency sampling approach. High-frequency sampling requires a constant flow of information and supplies throughout sample collection, testing, analysis, and data sharing. High-frequency sampling may be a useful approach for increased resolution of disease trends in emergency response.

Using Wastewater Surveillance Data to Support the COVID-19 Response - United States, 2020-2021.

Wastewater surveillance, the measurement of pathogen levels in wastewater, is used to evaluate community-level infection trends, augment traditional surveillance that leverages clinical tests and services (e.g., case reporting), and monitor public health interventions (1). Approximately 40% of persons infected with SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, shed virus RNA in their stool (2); therefore, community-level trends in SARS-CoV-2 infections, both symptomatic and asymptomatic (2) can be tracked through wastewater testing (3-6). CDC launched the National Wastewater Surveillance System (NWSS) in September 2020 to coordinate wastewater surveillance programs implemented by state, tribal, local, and territorial health departments to support the COVID-19 pandemic response. In the United States, wastewater surveillance was not previously implemented at the national level. As of August 2021, NWSS includes 37 states, four cities, and two territories. This report summarizes NWSS activities and describes innovative applications of wastewater surveillance data by two states, which have included generating alerts to local jurisdictions, allocating mobile testing resources, evaluating irregularities in traditional surveillance, refining health messaging, and forecasting clinical resource needs. NWSS complements traditional surveillance and enables health departments to intervene earlier with focused support in communities experiencing increasing concentrations of SARS-CoV-2 in wastewater. The ability to conduct wastewater surveillance is not affected by access to health care or the clinical testing capacity in the community. Robust, sustainable implementation of wastewater surveillance requires public health capacity for wastewater testing, analysis, and interpretation. Partnerships between wastewater utilities and public health departments are needed to leverage wastewater surveillance data for the COVID-19 response for rapid assessment of emerging threats and preparedness for future pandemics.

The CDC response to antibiotic and antifungal resistance in the environment.

Antibiotic resistance challenges public health on many fronts, and it is increasingly clear that it must be addressed in the environment to control emerging resistance and infections in humans and animals. Here, we outline how the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention is addressing antibiotic resistance in the environment.

Updated research agenda for water, sanitation and antimicrobial resistance.

The emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance (AMR), including clinically relevant antimicrobial-resistant bacteria, genetic resistance elements, and antibiotic residues, presents a significant threat to human health. Reducing the incidence of infection by improving water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) is one of five objectives in the World Health Organization's (WHO) Global Action Plan on AMR. In September 2019, WHO and the Health-Related Water Microbiology specialist group (HRWM-SG) of the International Water Association (IWA) organized its third workshop on AMR, focusing on the following three main issues: environmental pathways of AMR transmission, environmental surveillance, and removal from human waste. The workshop concluded that despite an increase in scientific evidence that the environment may play a significant role, especially in low-resource settings, the exact relative role of the environment is still unclear. Given many antibiotic-resistant bacteria (ARB) can be part of the normal gut flora, it can be assumed that for environmental transmission, the burden of fecal-oral transmission of AMR in a geographical area follows that of WASH-related infections. There are some uncertainties as to the potential for the propagation of particular resistance genes within wastewater treatment plants (WWTPs), but there is no doubt that the reduction in viable microbes (with or without resistance genes) available for transmission via the environment is one of the goals of human waste management. Although progress has been made in the past years with respect to quantifying environmental AMR transmission potential, still more data on the spread of environmental AMR within human communities is needed. Even though evidence on AMR in WWTPs has increased, the reduction in the emergence and spread of AMR by basic sanitation methods is yet unresolved. In order to contribute to the generation of harmonized One Health surveillance data, WHO has initiated an integrated One Health surveillance strategy that includes the environment. The main challenge lies in rolling it out globally including to the poorest regions.

Adoption of Strategies to Mitigate Transmission of COVID-19 During a Statewide Primary Election - Delaware, September 2020.

Elections occurring during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic have been affected by notable changes in the methods of voting, the number and type of polling locations, and in-person voting procedures (1). To mitigate transmission of COVID-19 at polling locations, jurisdictions have adopted changes to protocols and procedures, informed by CDC's interim guidance, developed in collaboration with the Election Assistance Commission (2). The driving principle for this guidance is that voting practices with lower infection risk will be those which reduce the number of voters who congregate indoors in polling locations by offering a variety of methods for voting and longer voting periods. The guidance for in-person voting includes considerations for election officials, poll workers, and voters to maintain healthy environments and operations. To assess knowledge and adoption of mitigation strategies, CDC collaborated with the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services and the Delaware State Election Commission on a survey of poll workers who served during the statewide primary election on September 15, 2020. Among 522 eligible poll workers, 93% correctly answered all three survey questions about COVID-19 transmission. Respondents noted that most voters and poll workers wore masks. However, masks were not always worn correctly (i.e., covering both the nose and mouth). Responses suggest that mitigation measures recommended for both poll workers and voters were widely adopted and feasible, but also highlighted gaps in infection prevention control efforts. Strengthening of measures intended to minimize the risk of poll workers acquiring COVID-19 from ill voters, such as additional training and necessary personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as support for alternative voting options for ill voters, are needed. Adherence to mitigation measures is important not only to protect voters but also to protect poll workers, many of whom are older adults, and thus at higher risk for severe COVID-19-associated illness. Enhanced attention to reducing congregation in polling locations, correct mask use, and providing safe voting options for ill voters are critical considerations to minimize risk to voters and poll workers. Evidence from the Delaware election supports the feasibility and acceptability of implementing current CDC guidance for election officials, poll workers, and voters for mitigating COVID-19 transmission at polling locations (2).

Human faeces-associated extended-spectrum ß-lactamase-producing Escherichia coli discharge into sanitation systems in 2015 and 2030: a global and regional analysis.

BACKGROUND: Improving management of and treatment within sanitation waste streams could slow the development and transmission of antimicrobial-resistant organisms, but the magnitude of impact has not been quantified. Extended-spectrum ß-lactamase (ESBL)-producing Escherichia coli are a major cause of antimicrobial-resistant infections and are frequently detected in faecal waste streams, making them model indicators of the distribution of antimicrobial-resistant organisms that are transmitted through the faecal-oral route. We aimed to estimate the mass of faeces containing ESBL-producing E coli entering different levels of the sanitation ladder globally and by WHO region to determine the global scale at which sanitation infrastructure serves as a vehicle for dissemination of antimicrobial-resistant organisms. METHODS: In this global and regional analysis, we used publicly available sanitation coverage data from the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme and most recent available scientific literature on human faecal production (2018) and carriage of ESBL-producing E coli by healthy individuals (2016) to estimate the quantity of faeces that has been discharged that contains ESBL-producing E coli for 2015 and projected for 2030. We estimated the mass of faeces containing ESBL-producing E coli by WHO region and at different levels of the Sustainable Development Goal sanitation ladder-ie, into at-least basic (ie, safely managed or basic) systems, limited systems, and unimproved systems, and via open defecation. We modelled three scenarios in which the proportion of ESBL-producing E coli among all E coli that was excreted by carriers varied on the basis of the scientific literature: 100% (scenario A), 10% (scenario B), or 1% (scenario C). FINDINGS: Under scenario B, we estimated that approximately 19 billion kg of faeces carrying ESBL-producing E coli was excreted in 2015 globally. Approximately 65·8% (1·2-120 billion kg depending on modelled scenario) of this faecal biomass was managed in at-least basic sanitation systems, 8·4% (160 million-16 billion kg) in limited sanitation systems, 14·4% (270 million-27 billion kg) in unimproved sanitation systems, and 11·4% (220 million-22 billion kg) was openly defecated. The regions with the highest proportion of openly defecated faeces containing ESBL-producing E coli were the South-East Asia (29·4%) and African (21·8%) regions. The South-East Asia, Western Pacific, and African regions produced 524 billion kg (63%) of the total global human faecal biomass, but 16·9 billion kg (90%) of faeces containing ESBL-producing E coli under scenario B. By 2030, estimates under scenario B will have approximately doubled to 37·6 billion kg of faeces carrying ESBL-producing E coli under the most conservative projections. INTERPRETATION: At-least basic sanitation does not guarantee effective removal or inactivation of antimicrobial-resistant organisms from faecal biomass. However, our findings indicate the need for mitigating transport of antimicrobial-resistant organisms via sanitation systems that are not safely managed, including open defecation, which might result in direct environmental discharge and subsequent risk of transmission back to humans. FUNDING: None.