Pupillary dilations in a Target/Distractor visual task paradigm and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD).

ADHD is a neurocognitive disorder characterized by attention difficulties, hyperactivity, and impulsivity, often persisting into adulthood with substantial personal and societal consequences. Despite the importance of neurophysiological assessment and treatment monitoring tests, their availability outside of research settings remains limited. Cognitive neuroscience investigations have identified distinct components associated with ADHD, including deficits in sustained attention, inefficient enhancement of attended Targets, and altered suppression of ignored Distractors. In this study, we examined pupil activity in control and ADHD subjects during a sustained visual attention task specifically designed to evaluate the mechanisms underlying Target enhancement and Distractor suppression. Our findings revealed some distinguishing factors between the two groups which we discuss in light of their neurobiological implications.

Reflections on Bruce Bridgeman's insights into the Evolution of Consciousness and Cognition.

This tribute to Bruce Bridgeman has three parts, which were selected to illustrate his diverse approaches for linking consciousness and cognition. In Part 1 Bridgeman's research on eye movements is used to show how the visual system is functionally divided into two very different streams: the temporal pathway is available for cognitive aspects available to consciousness and the parietal pathway is available to the motor system and is largely unconscious. Part 2 provides links to his Psycoloquy article that connects language and consciousness. The Psycoloquy format has other scholars write a response and then the author responds to each one. Part 3 covers Bruce Bridgeman's book Psychology and Evolution, which is special because it covers many areas with examples not typically treated in introductory psychology textbooks. I decided to quote directly from Bridgeman's writings throughout this essay. I can't think of a better way to pay tribute to him and to inspire others to read his publications.

A controversy of whether the early C1 ERP is affected by attention.

This commentary raises three broad questions regarding the Baumgartner et al. (this issue) paper. Topic 1 is about how to deal with the different outcomes of Kelly, Gomez-Ramirez & Foxe and Baumgartner et al. The methodologies were almost identical yet different results were found. Topic 2 is about statistical issues regarding how to present this type of data. Topic 3 is concerned with the issue of EEG/MEG source localization and whether the C1 component is mainly V1.

Autonoetic consciousness: Reconsidering the role of episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection.

Following the seminal work of Ingvar (1985. "Memory for the future": An essay on the temporal organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4, 127-136), Suddendorf (1994. The discovery of the fourth dimension: Mental time travel and human evolution. Master's thesis. University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand), and Tulving (1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/PsychologieCanadienne, 26, 1-12), exploration of the ability to anticipate and prepare for future contingencies that cannot be known with certainty has grown into a thriving research enterprise. A fundamental tenet of this line of inquiry is that future-oriented mental time travel, in most of its presentations, is underwritten by a property or an extension of episodic recollection. However, a careful conceptual analysis of exactly how episodic memory functions in this capacity has yet to be undertaken. In this paper I conduct such an analysis. Based on conceptual, phenomenological, and empirical considerations, I conclude that the autonoetic component of episodic memory, not episodic memory per se, is the causally determinative factor enabling an individual to project him or herself into a personal future.

What memory is.

I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term 'memory' to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the 'received view', is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage, and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical, and conceptual considerations to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of reacquaintance with one's past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more circumscribed view of memory.

The nature of the semantic/episodic memory distinction: A missing piece of the "working through" process.

The relations between the semantic and episodic-autobiographical memory systems are more complex than described in the target article. We argue that understanding the noetic/autonoetic distinction provides critical insights into the foundation of the delineation between the two memory systems. Clarity with respect to the criteria for classification of these two systems, and the evolving conceptualization of episodic memory, can further neuroscientifically informed therapeutic approaches.

Vernier perceptual learning transfers to completely untrained retinal locations after double training: a "piggybacking" effect.

Perceptual learning, a process in which training improves visual discrimination, is often specific to the trained retinal location, and this location specificity is frequently regarded as an indication of neural plasticity in the retinotopic visual cortex. However, our previous studies have shown that "double training" enables location-specific perceptual learning, such as Vernier learning, to completely transfer to a new location where an irrelevant task is practiced. Here we show that Vernier learning can be actuated by less location-specific orientation or motion-direction learning to transfer to completely untrained retinal locations. This "piggybacking" effect occurs even if both tasks are trained at the same retinal location. However, piggybacking does not occur when the Vernier task is paired with a more location-specific contrast-discrimination task. This previously unknown complexity challenges the current understanding of perceptual learning and its specificity/transfer. Orientation and motion-direction learning, but not contrast and Vernier learning, appears to activate a global process that allows learning transfer to untrained locations. Moreover, when paired with orientation or motion-direction learning, Vernier learning may be "piggybacked" by the activated global process to transfer to other untrained retinal locations. How this task-specific global activation process is achieved is as yet unknown.

Bias-free double judgment accuracy during spatial attention cueing: performance enhancement from voluntary and involuntary attention.

Recent research has demonstrated that involuntary attention improves target identification accuracy for letters using non-predictive peripheral cues, helping to resolve some of the controversy over performance enhancement from involuntary attention. While various cueing studies have demonstrated that their reported cueing effects were not due to response bias to the cue, very few investigations have quantified the extent of any response bias or developed methods of removing bias from observed results in a double judgment accuracy task. We have devised a method to quantify and remove response bias to cued locations in a double judgment accuracy cueing task, revealing the true, unbiased performance enhancement from involuntary and voluntary attention. In a 7-alternative forced choice cueing task using backward masked stimuli to temporally constrain stimulus processing, non-predictive cueing increased target detection and discrimination at cued locations relative to uncued locations even after cue location bias had been corrected.

Bias corrected double judgment accuracy during spatial attention cueing: unmasked stimuli with non-predictive and semi-predictive cues.

The present experiments indicate that in a 7-AFC double judgment accuracy task with unmasked stimuli, cue location response bias can be quantified and removed, revealing unbiased improvements in response accuracy for valid cues compared to invalid cues. By testing for cueing effects over a range of contrast levels with unmasked stimuli, changes in the psychometric function were examined and provide insight into the mechanisms of involuntary attention which might account for the observed cueing effects. Cue validity was varied between two separate experiments showing that non-predictive (14.3%) and moderately-predictive cues (50%) equally facilitate stimulus identification and localization during transient involuntary attention capture. Observers had improved accuracy at identifying both the location and the feature identity of target letters throughout a range of contrast levels, without any dependence on backward masking. There was a leftward shift of the psychometric function threshold with valid cued data and no slope reduction suggesting that any additive hypothesis based on spatial uncertainty reduction or perceptual enhancement is not a sufficient explanation for the observed cueing effects. The interdependence of the perceptual processes of stimulus discrimination and localization were also investigated by analyzing response contingencies, showing that observers were equally skilled at making identification and localization accuracy judgments with unmasked stimuli.

Perceptual learning improves adult amblyopic vision through rule-based cognitive compensation.

PURPOSE: We investigated whether perceptual learning in adults with amblyopia could be enabled to transfer completely to an orthogonal orientation, which would suggest that amblyopic perceptual learning results mainly from high-level cognitive compensation, rather than plasticity in the amblyopic early visual brain. METHODS: Nineteen adults (mean age = 22.5 years) with anisometropic and/or strabismic amblyopia were trained following a training-plus-exposure (TPE) protocol. The amblyopic eyes practiced contrast, orientation, or Vernier discrimination at one orientation for six to eight sessions. Then the amblyopic or nonamblyopic eyes were exposed to an orthogonal orientation via practicing an irrelevant task. Training was first performed at a lower spatial frequency (SF), then at a higher SF near the cutoff frequency of the amblyopic eye. RESULTS: Perceptual learning was initially orientation specific. However, after exposure to the orthogonal orientation, learning transferred to an orthogonal orientation completely. Reversing the exposure and training order failed to produce transfer. Initial lower SF training led to broad improvement of contrast sensitivity, and later higher SF training led to more specific improvement at high SFs. Training improved visual acuity by 1.5 to 1.6 lines (P < 0.001) in the amblyopic eyes with computerized tests and a clinical E acuity chart. It also improved stereoacuity by 53% (P < 0.001). CONCLUSIONS: The complete transfer of learning suggests that perceptual learning in amblyopia may reflect high-level learning of rules for performing a visual discrimination task. These rules are applicable to new orientations to enable learning transfer. Therefore, perceptual learning may improve amblyopic vision mainly through rule-based cognitive compensation.

Sameness and the self: philosophical and psychological considerations.

In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries-e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.

The effects of thoughts of survival and thoughts of death on recall in the adaptive memory paradigm.

In a recent paper Hart and Burns (2012) presented evidence that conditions that prime thoughts of one's mortality benefit recall. Drawing on the conceptual relation between thoughts of death and thoughts of survival, Hart and Burns interpret their findings as suggestive of the possibility that death-related thoughts function in manner similar to survival-related thoughts in enhancing recall. In the present study I draw on evolutionary arguments to question whether a conceptual relation between thoughts of death and thoughts of survival translates into a functional relation. I then present data showing that while death-related thoughts can promote high levels of recall, (a) the level achieved does not match that produced by survival processing and (b) survival and death cognition likely rely on different mechanisms to achieve their effects.

Analysis of microsaccades and pupil dilation reveals a common decisional origin during visual search.

During free viewing visual search, observers often refixate the same locations several times before and after target detection is reported with a button press. We analyzed the rate of microsaccades in the sequence of refixations made during visual search and found two important components. One related to the visual content of the region being fixated; fixations on targets generate more microsaccades and more microsaccades are generated for those targets that are more difficult to disambiguate. The other empathizes non-visual decisional processes; fixations containing the button press generate more microsaccades than those made on the same target but without the button press. Pupil dilation during the same refixations reveals a similar modulation. We inferred that generic sympathetic arousal mechanisms are part of the articulated complex of perceptual processes governing fixational eye movements.

Involuntary attention enhances identification accuracy for unmasked low contrast letters using non-predictive peripheral cues.

There is controversy regarding whether or not involuntary attention improves response accuracy at a cued location when the cue is non-predictive and if these cueing effects are dependent on backward masking. Various perceptual and decisional mechanisms of performance enhancement have been proposed, such as signal enhancement, noise reduction, spatial uncertainty reduction, and decisional processes. Herein we review a recent report of mask-dependent accuracy improvements with low contrast stimuli and demonstrate that the experiments contained stimulus artifacts whereby the cue impaired perception of low contrast stimuli, leading to an absence of improved response accuracy with unmasked stimuli. Our experiments corrected these artifacts by implementing an isoluminant cue and increasing its distance relative to the targets. The results demonstrate that cueing effects are robust for unmasked stimuli presented in the periphery, resolving some of the controversy concerning cueing enhancement effects from involuntary attention and mask dependency. Unmasked low contrast and/or short duration stimuli as implemented in these experiments may have a short enough iconic decay that the visual system functions similarly as if a mask were present leading to improved accuracy with a valid cue.

Binocular combination of phase and contrast explained by a gain-control and gain-enhancement model.

We investigated suprathreshold binocular combination, measuring both the perceived phase and perceived contrast of a cyclopean sine wave. We used a paradigm adapted from Ding and Sperling (2006, 2007) to measure the perceived phase by indicating the apparent location (phase) of the dark trough in the horizontal cyclopean sine wave relative to a black horizontal reference line, and we used the same stimuli to measure perceived contrast by matching the binocular combined contrast to a standard contrast presented to one eye. We found that under normal viewing conditions (high contrast and long stimulus duration), perceived contrast is constant, independent of the interocular contrast ratio and the interocular phase difference, while the perceived phase shifts smoothly from one eye to the other eye depending on the contrast ratios. However, at low contrasts and short stimulus durations, binocular combination is more linear and contrast summation is phase-dependent. To account for phase-dependent contrast summation, we incorporated a fusion remapping mechanism into our model, using disparity energy to shift the monocular phases towards the cyclopean phase in order to align the two eyes' images through motor/sensory fusion. The Ding-Sperling model with motor/sensory fusion mechanism gives a reasonable account of the phase dependence of binocular contrast combination and can account for either the perceived phase or the perceived contrast of a cyclopean sine wave separately; however it requires different model parameters for the two. However, when fit to both phase and contrast data simultaneously, the Ding-Sperling model fails. Incorporating interocular gain enhancement into the model results in a significant improvement in fitting both phase and contrast data simultaneously, successfully accounting for both linear summation at low contrast energy and strong nonlinearity at high contrast energy.

Binocular combination in abnormal binocular vision.

We investigated suprathreshold binocular combination in humans with abnormal binocular visual experience early in life. In the first experiment we presented the two eyes with equal but opposite phase shifted sine waves and measured the perceived phase of the cyclopean sine wave. Normal observers have balanced vision between the two eyes when the two eyes' images have equal contrast (i.e., both eyes contribute equally to the perceived image and perceived phase = 0°). However, in observers with strabismus and/or amblyopia, balanced vision requires a higher contrast image in the nondominant eye (NDE) than the dominant eye (DE). This asymmetry between the two eyes is larger than predicted from the contrast sensitivities or monocular perceived contrast of the two eyes and is dependent on contrast and spatial frequency: more asymmetric with higher contrast and/or spatial frequency. Our results also revealed a surprising NDE-to-DE enhancement in some of our abnormal observers. This enhancement is not evident in normal vision because it is normally masked by interocular suppression. However, in these abnormal observers the NDE-to-DE suppression was weak or absent. In the second experiment, we used the identical stimuli to measure the perceived contrast of a cyclopean grating by matching the binocular combined contrast to a standard contrast presented to the DE. These measures provide strong constraints for model fitting. We found asymmetric interocular interactions in binocular contrast perception, which was dependent on both contrast and spatial frequency in the same way as in phase perception. By introducing asymmetric parameters to the modified Ding-Sperling model including interocular contrast gain enhancement, we succeeded in accounting for both binocular combined phase and contrast simultaneously. Adding binocular contrast gain control to the modified Ding-Sperling model enabled us to predict the results of dichoptic and binocular contrast discrimination experiments and provides new insights into the mechanisms of abnormal binocular vision.

Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory.

Episodic memory often is conceptualized as a uniquely human system of long-term memory that makes available knowledge accompanied by the temporal and spatial context in which that knowledge was acquired. Retrieval from episodic memory entails a form of first-person subjectivity called autonoetic consciousness that provides a sense that a recollection was something that took place in the experiencer's personal past. In this paper I expand on this definition of episodic memory. Specifically, I suggest that (1) the core features assumed unique to episodic memory are shared by semantic memory, (2) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet interacting, "enabling" systems. Although these systems-ownership, self, subjective temporality, and agency-are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (3) the type of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection (autonoetic) is relational rather than intrinsic-i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, thus rendering episodic memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory.

Does optimal recall performance in the adaptive memory paradigm require the encoding context to encourage thoughts about the environment of evolutionary adaptation?

This study examined whether encoding conditions that encourage thoughts about the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) are necessary to produce optimal recall in the adaptive memory paradigm. Participants were asked to judge a list of words for their relevance to personal survival under two survival-based scenarios. In one condition, the EEA-relevant context was specified (i.e., you are trying to survive on the savannah/grasslands). In the other condition, no context was specified (i.e., you are simply trying to stay alive). The two tasks produced virtually identical recall despite participants in the former condition reporting significantly more EEA context-relevant thoughts (i.e., the savannah) than did participants in the latter condition (who reported virtually no EEA-related thoughts). The findings are discussed in terms of (1) survival as a target of natural selection and (2) the role of evolutionary theory in understanding memory in modern humans.

The complex act of projecting oneself into the future.

Research on future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) is highly active yet somewhat unruly. I believe this is due, in large part, to the complexity of both the tasks used to test FMTT and the concepts involved. Extraordinary care is a necessity when grappling with such complex and perplexing metaphysical constructs as self and time and their co-instantiation in memory. In this review, I first discuss the relation between future mental time travel and types of memory (episodic and semantic). I then examine the nature of both the types of self-knowledge assumed to be projected into the future and the types of temporalities that constitute projective temporal experience. Finally, I argue that a person lacking episodic memory should nonetheless be able to imagine a personal future by virtue of (1) the fact that semantic, as well as episodic, memory can be self-referential, (2) autonoetic awareness is not a prerequisite for FMTT, and (3) semantic memory does, in fact, enable certain forms of personally oriented FMTT. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:63-79. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1210 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.