Autonoetic consciousness: Reconsidering the role of episodic memory in future-oriented self-projection.

Following the seminal work of Ingvar (1985. "Memory for the future": An essay on the temporal organization of conscious awareness. Human Neurobiology, 4, 127-136), Suddendorf (1994. The discovery of the fourth dimension: Mental time travel and human evolution. Master's thesis. University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand), and Tulving (1985. Memory and consciousness. Canadian Psychology/PsychologieCanadienne, 26, 1-12), exploration of the ability to anticipate and prepare for future contingencies that cannot be known with certainty has grown into a thriving research enterprise. A fundamental tenet of this line of inquiry is that future-oriented mental time travel, in most of its presentations, is underwritten by a property or an extension of episodic recollection. However, a careful conceptual analysis of exactly how episodic memory functions in this capacity has yet to be undertaken. In this paper I conduct such an analysis. Based on conceptual, phenomenological, and empirical considerations, I conclude that the autonoetic component of episodic memory, not episodic memory per se, is the causally determinative factor enabling an individual to project him or herself into a personal future.

What memory is.

I argue that our current practice of ascribing the term 'memory' to mental states and processes lacks epistemic warrant. Memory, according to the 'received view', is any state or process that results from the sequential stages of encoding, storage, and retrieval. By these criteria, memory, or its footprint, can be seen in virtually every mental state we are capable of having. This, I argue, stretches the term to the breaking point. I draw on phenomenological, historical, and conceptual considerations to make the case that an act of memory entails a direct, non-inferential feeling of reacquaintance with one's past. It does so by linking content retrieved from storage with autonoetic awareness during retrieval. On this view, memory is not the content of experience, but the manner in which that content is experienced. I discuss some theoretical and practical implications and advantages of adopting this more circumscribed view of memory.

The nature of the semantic/episodic memory distinction: A missing piece of the "working through" process.

The relations between the semantic and episodic-autobiographical memory systems are more complex than described in the target article. We argue that understanding the noetic/autonoetic distinction provides critical insights into the foundation of the delineation between the two memory systems. Clarity with respect to the criteria for classification of these two systems, and the evolving conceptualization of episodic memory, can further neuroscientifically informed therapeutic approaches.

Sameness and the self: philosophical and psychological considerations.

In this paper I examine the concept of cross-temporal personal identity (diachronicity). This particular form of identity has vexed theorists for centuries-e.g., how can a person maintain a belief in the sameness of self over time in the face of continual psychological and physical change? I first discuss various forms of the sameness relation and the criteria that justify their application. I then examine philosophical and psychological treatments of personal diachronicity (for example, Locke's psychological connectedness theory; the role of episodic memory) and find each lacking on logical grounds, empirical grounds or both. I conclude that to achieve a successful resolution of the issue of the self as a temporal continuant we need to draw a sharp distinction between the feeling of the sameness of one's self and the evidence marshaled in support of that feeling.

The effects of thoughts of survival and thoughts of death on recall in the adaptive memory paradigm.

In a recent paper Hart and Burns (2012) presented evidence that conditions that prime thoughts of one's mortality benefit recall. Drawing on the conceptual relation between thoughts of death and thoughts of survival, Hart and Burns interpret their findings as suggestive of the possibility that death-related thoughts function in manner similar to survival-related thoughts in enhancing recall. In the present study I draw on evolutionary arguments to question whether a conceptual relation between thoughts of death and thoughts of survival translates into a functional relation. I then present data showing that while death-related thoughts can promote high levels of recall, (a) the level achieved does not match that produced by survival processing and (b) survival and death cognition likely rely on different mechanisms to achieve their effects.

Making the case that episodic recollection is attributable to operations occurring at retrieval rather than to content stored in a dedicated subsystem of long-term memory.

Episodic memory often is conceptualized as a uniquely human system of long-term memory that makes available knowledge accompanied by the temporal and spatial context in which that knowledge was acquired. Retrieval from episodic memory entails a form of first-person subjectivity called autonoetic consciousness that provides a sense that a recollection was something that took place in the experiencer's personal past. In this paper I expand on this definition of episodic memory. Specifically, I suggest that (1) the core features assumed unique to episodic memory are shared by semantic memory, (2) episodic memory cannot be fully understood unless one appreciates that episodic recollection requires the coordinated function of a number of distinct, yet interacting, "enabling" systems. Although these systems-ownership, self, subjective temporality, and agency-are not traditionally viewed as memorial in nature, each is necessary for episodic recollection and jointly they may be sufficient, and (3) the type of subjective awareness provided by episodic recollection (autonoetic) is relational rather than intrinsic-i.e., it can be lost in certain patient populations, thus rendering episodic memory content indistinguishable from the content of semantic long-term memory.

Does optimal recall performance in the adaptive memory paradigm require the encoding context to encourage thoughts about the environment of evolutionary adaptation?

This study examined whether encoding conditions that encourage thoughts about the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) are necessary to produce optimal recall in the adaptive memory paradigm. Participants were asked to judge a list of words for their relevance to personal survival under two survival-based scenarios. In one condition, the EEA-relevant context was specified (i.e., you are trying to survive on the savannah/grasslands). In the other condition, no context was specified (i.e., you are simply trying to stay alive). The two tasks produced virtually identical recall despite participants in the former condition reporting significantly more EEA context-relevant thoughts (i.e., the savannah) than did participants in the latter condition (who reported virtually no EEA-related thoughts). The findings are discussed in terms of (1) survival as a target of natural selection and (2) the role of evolutionary theory in understanding memory in modern humans.

The complex act of projecting oneself into the future.

Research on future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT) is highly active yet somewhat unruly. I believe this is due, in large part, to the complexity of both the tasks used to test FMTT and the concepts involved. Extraordinary care is a necessity when grappling with such complex and perplexing metaphysical constructs as self and time and their co-instantiation in memory. In this review, I first discuss the relation between future mental time travel and types of memory (episodic and semantic). I then examine the nature of both the types of self-knowledge assumed to be projected into the future and the types of temporalities that constitute projective temporal experience. Finally, I argue that a person lacking episodic memory should nonetheless be able to imagine a personal future by virtue of (1) the fact that semantic, as well as episodic, memory can be self-referential, (2) autonoetic awareness is not a prerequisite for FMTT, and (3) semantic memory does, in fact, enable certain forms of personally oriented FMTT. WIREs Cogn Sci 2013, 4:63-79. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1210 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

A role for self-referential processing in tasks requiring participants to imagine survival on the savannah.

This paper examines the role of self-reference as a possible mechanism underlying the superior recall found with survival processing. I suggest that previous failures to find comparable recall with self-referential encoding may be due to neglecting to ensure that task instructions require episodic retrieval. The studies reported herein show that when instructions explicitly request episodic retrieval, self-referential processing promotes recall that is statistically equivalent to that found with survival processing tasks. I conclude that the role of self-referential processing remains a viable component of the excellent memory produced by survival encoding instructions.

Self, memory, and the self-reference effect: an examination of conceptual and methodological issues.

The author argues that the self is a multifaceted entity that does not easily submit to clear and precise description. The aspect of self studied by most investigators is actually a subset of the cognitive and neural underpinnings of "self" and not the "self" of first-person subjectivity. The author then looks at the dominant theoretical treatment of human long-term memory-the systems approach-and examines how the construct of "self" is situated in this framework. Finally, he reviews the best-known paradigm for exploring the role of self in memory-the self-reference effect (SRE) manipulation. He argues that there is not one SRE but rather a family of related SREs that are influenced by a variety of variables and contexts. Accordingly, researchers must exercise caution when attempting to draw conclusions about the self from the results of SRE memory performance.

Familiarity and personal experience as mediators of recall when planning for future contingencies.

In this article, we demonstrate that planning tasks enhance recall when the context of planning (a) is self-referential and (b) draws on familiar scenarios represented in episodic memory. Specifically, we show that when planning tasks are sorted according to the degree to which they evoke memories of personally familiar scenarios (e.g., planning a picnic), recall is reliably superior to tasks that fail to do so (e.g., planning an Arctic trek). We discuss the implications of these findings for planning tasks and their relation to episodic memory.

The future-orientation of memory: planning as a key component mediating the high levels of recall found with survival processing.

In a series of papers, Nairne and colleagues have demonstrated that tasks encouraging participants to judge words for relevance to survival led to better recall than did tasks lacking survival relevance. Klein, Robertson, and Delton (2010) presented data suggesting that the future-directed temporal orientation of the survival task (e.g., planning), rather than survival per se, accounts for the good recall found with the task. In the present studies we manipulated the amount of survival and planning processing encouraged by a set of encoding tasks. Participants performed tasks that encouraged processing stimuli for their relevance to (a) both survival and planning, (b) planning, but not survival, or (c) survival but not planning. We predicted, and found, that recall performance associated with tasks encouraging planning (i.e., survival with planning and planning without survival) should exceed tasks that encouraged survival but not planning (i.e., survival without planning). We draw several conclusions. First, planning is a necessary component of the superior recall found in the survival paradigm. Second, memory, from an evolutionary perspective, is inherently prospective--tailored by natural selection to support future decisions and judgements that cannot be known in advance with certainty.

The unanticipated resilience of trait self-knowledge in the face of neural damage.

This paper explores the question of what the self is by reviewing research conducted with both normal and neuropsychological participants. Findings converge on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than some previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects-for instance, semantic trait summaries-appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. In the process of reviewing neuropsychological findings, an unexpected result emerges: trait self-knowledge appears unusually robust with respect to neural and cognitive damage that render other aspects of self-knowledge dysfunctional in varying degrees.

The multiplicity of self: neuropsychological evidence and its implications for the self as a construct in psychological research.

This paper examines the issue of what the self is by reviewing neuropsychological research, which converges on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than previous treatments of the topic have suggested. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised in individuals, other aspects-for instance, semantic trait summaries-appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the self is not a single, unified entity. Rather, it is a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. Implications for understanding the self in various areas of psychological research-e.g., neuroimaging, autism, amnesia, Alzheimer's disease, and mirror self-recognition-are discussed in brief.

Facing the future: memory as an evolved system for planning future acts.

All organisms capable of long-term memory are necessarily oriented toward the future. We propose that one of the most important adaptive functions of long-term episodic memory is to store information about the past in the service of planning for the personal future. Because a system should have especially efficient performance when engaged in a task that makes maximal use of its evolved machinery, we predicted that future-oriented planning would result in especially good memory relative to other memory tasks. We tested recall performance of a word list, using encoding tasks with different temporal perspectives (e.g., past, future) but a similar context. Consistent with our hypothesis, future-oriented encoding produced superior recall. We discuss these findings in light of their implications for the thesis that memory evolved to enable its possessor to anticipate and respond to future contingencies that cannot be known with certainty.

The self: as a construct in psychology and neuropsychological evidence for its multiplicity.

What is the self? Philosophers and psychologists pursuing an answer to this question immediately find themselves immersed in a host of questions about mind and body, subject and object, object and process, the homunculus, free will, self-awareness, and a variety of other puzzling matters that largely have eluded satisfying theoretical explication. In this paper I argue that some of this difficulty is attributable to our implicit, phenomenologically-based belief that the self is unitary entity-i.e., a singular "I" that remembers, chooses, thinks, plans, and feels. In this article I address the question of what the self is by reviewing research, conducted primarily with neuropsychological participants, that converges on the idea that the self may be more complex and differentiated than many previous treatments of the topic have assumed. Although some aspects of self-knowledge such as episodic recollection may be compromised by cognitive and neurological disorders, other aspects-for instance, semantic trait summaries-appear largely intact. Taken together, these findings support the idea that there is no single, unified "I" to be found. Rather, I argue "the" self may best be construed as a set of interrelated, functionally independent systems. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

EVOLUTION AND EPISODIC MEMORY: AN ANALYSIS AND DEMONSTRATION OF A SOCIAL FUNCTION OF EPISODIC RECOLLECTION.

Over the past two decades, an abundance of evidence has shown that individuals typically rely on semantic summary knowledge when making trait judgments about self and others (for reviews, see Klein, 2004; Klein, Robertson, Gangi, & Loftus, 2008). But why form trait summaries if one can consult the original episodes on which the summary was based? Conversely, why retain episodes after having abstracted a summary representation from them? Are there functional reasons to have trait information represented in two different, independently retrievable databases? Evolution does not produce new phenotypic systems that are complex and functionally organized by chance. Such systems acquire their functional organization because they solved some evolutionarily recurrent problems for the organism. In this article we explore some of the functional properties of episodic memory. Specifically, in a series of studies we demonstrate that maintaining a database of episodic memories enables its owner to reevaluate an individual's past behavior in light of new information, sometimes drastically changing one's impression in the process. We conclude that some of the most important functions of episodic memory have to do with its role in human social interaction.

The functional independence of trait self-knowledge: commentary on Sakaki (2007).

In a recent paper, Sakaki (2007) proposed that Klein and Loftus's conclusion that semantic and episodic trait self-knowledge are functionally independent (e.g., Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992b) was based on questionable assumptions and not supported by the available evidence. In this paper we show that Sakaki (2007) has misinterpreted our position on the independence of self-knowledge, omitted mention of large portions of the relevant research at odds with her contention, and conducted her studies with procedures we explicitly warned against due to interpretive ambiguities associated with their use.

Decisions and the evolution of memory: multiple systems, multiple functions.

Memory evolved to supply useful, timely information to the organism's decision-making systems. Therefore, decision rules, multiple memory systems, and the search engines that link them should have coevolved to mesh in a coadapted, functionally interlocking way. This adaptationist perspective suggested the scope hypothesis: When a generalization is retrieved from semantic memory, episodic memories that are inconsistent with it should be retrieved in tandem to place boundary conditions on the scope of the generalization. Using a priming paradigm and a decision task involving person memory, the authors tested and confirmed this hypothesis. The results support the view that priming is an evolved adaptation. They further show that dissociations between memory systems are not--and should not be--absolute: Independence exists for some tasks but not others.