Unveiling gender inequality in the US: Testing validity of a state-level measure of gender inequality and its relationship with feminist online collective action on Twitter.

The Gender Inequality Index is a country-level measure of gender inequality based on women's levels of reproductive health, social and political empowerment, and labor-market representation. In two studies, we tested the validity of the GII-S, a state-level measure of gender inequality in the USA. In Study 1, the GII-S was associated with objective and subjective measures of wellness among women, including life satisfaction, financial well-being, and perceptions of safety. GII-S was not associated with the Gini coefficient, a well-established measure of economic inequality, suggesting that gender and economic disparities represent distinct aspects of social inequality. Study 2 tested the link between GII-S scores and collective action-specifically, participation in the #MeToo movement promoting awareness of sexual harassment and violence against women. Analysis of geo-localized messages on the Twitter social media platform reveals that higher GII-S scores were associated with fewer tweets containing the #MeToo hashtag. Moreover, GII-S was associated with state-level political orientation: the more conservative a state, the higher its level of gender inequality. Results are discussed in terms of possible socio-cognitive processes underpinning the association between gender inequality and sensitivity to violence against women.

The Costs of Polarizing a Pandemic: Antecedents, Consequences, and Lessons.

Polarization has been rising in the United States of America for the past few decades and now poses a significant-and growing-public-health risk. One of the signature features of the American response to the COVID-19 pandemic has been the degree to which perceptions of risk and willingness to follow public-health recommendations have been politically polarized. Although COVID-19 has proven more lethal than any war or public-health crisis in American history, the deadly consequences of the pandemic were exacerbated by polarization. We review research detailing how every phase of the COVID-19 pandemic has been polarized, including judgments of risk, spatial distancing, mask wearing, and vaccination. We describe the role of political ideology, partisan identity, leadership, misinformation, and mass communication in this public-health crisis. We then assess the overall impact of polarization on infections, illness, and mortality during the pandemic; offer a psychological analysis of key policy questions; and identify a set of future research questions for scholars and policy experts. Our analysis suggests that the catastrophic death toll in the United States was largely preventable and due, in large part, to the polarization of the pandemic. Finally, we discuss implications for public policy to help avoid the same deadly mistakes in future public-health crises.

Something to Prove? Manhood Threats Increase Political Aggression Among Liberal Men.

Manhood is a precarious state that men seek to prove through the performance of masculine behaviors-including, at times, acts of aggression. Although correlational work has demonstrated a link between chronic masculine insecurity and political aggression (i.e., support for policies and candidates that communicate toughness and strength), experimental work on the topic is sparse. Existing studies also provide little insight into which men-liberal or conservative-are most likely to display increased political aggression after threats to their masculinity. The present work thus examines the effects of masculinity threat on liberal and conservative men's tendency toward political aggression. We exposed liberal and conservative men to various masculinity threats, providing them with feminine feedback about their personality traits (Experiment 1), having them paint their nails (Experiment 2), and leading them to believe that they were physically weak (Experiment 3). Across experiments, and contrary to our initial expectations, threat increased liberal-but not conservative-men's preference for a wide range of aggressive political policies and behaviors (e.g., the death penalty, bombing an enemy country). Integrative data analysis (IDA) reveals significant heterogeneity in the influence of different threats on liberal men's political aggression, the most effective of which was intimations of physical weakness. A multiverse analysis suggests that these findings are robust across a range of reasonable data-treatment and modeling choices. Possible sources of liberal men's heightened responsiveness to manhood threats are discussed. Supplementary Information: The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s11199-023-01349-x.

Beyond cognitive deficits: how social class shapes social cognition.

Lower social class is thought to contribute to poorer executive functioning and working memory. Nevertheless, lower social class individuals consistently outperform their higher-class counterparts on social cognitive tasks that rely on similar underlying cognitive processes (e.g., working memory and executive functioning). Why would lower social class inhibit such processes in one domain, but promote them in another? We argue that features of lower-class communities (e.g., resource scarcity) promote social cognition via cultural processes. We then argue that social cognition involves partially unique task and neural demands that are separate from nonsocial cognition. We conclude that unique task and neural demands, together with the distinctive cognitive proclivities of lower- and higher-class cultures, can explain variable associations between social class and cognitive functioning.

The psychology of colonial ideologies: Decoupling pro-egalitarian and neo-colonial sources of support for Puerto Rico statehood.

Among Puerto Ricans, support for U.S. statehood (i.e. the complete annexation of Puerto Rico as the 51st state of the United States) has been linked to an internalized sense of inferiority, colonial system justification and political conservatism. However, no research has explored this question from the perspective of U.S. Americans. We analyse the role that the dual colonial ideologies of historical negation (of colonial injustices) and symbolic exclusion (of the colonial subjects) have in explaining support for Puerto Rico's statehood and other political status options for Puerto Rico among U.S. Americans, applying a decolonial adaptation of the Dark Duo Model of Post-Colonial Ideology (DDM). Confirmatory factor analyses validate the factor structure of our adaptation of the DDM scale in an MTurk sample (N = 435) and two student samples (N = 578; N = 381). Latent profile analyses uncover two distinct ideological groups that tend to support Puerto Rican statehood: a 'pro-egalitarian' group committed to both cultural inclusion and material aid for Puerto Rico and a 'neo-colonial' group equally open to cultural inclusion but opposed to material aid. We discuss how symbolic cultural politics, not an egalitarian commitment to material aid aimed at redressing colonial injustices, underlie support for the annexation of Puerto Rico among a significant group of U.S. Americans.

A Lower-Class Advantage in Face Memory.

People remember what they deem important. In line with research suggesting that lower-class (vs. higher class) individuals spontaneously appraise other people as more relevant, we show that social class is associated with the habitual use of face memory. We find that lower-class (vs. higher class) participants exhibit better incidental memory for faces (i.e., spontaneous memory for faces they had not been instructed to memorize; Studies 1 and 2). No social-class differences emerge for faces participants are instructed to learn (Study 2), suggesting that this pattern reflects class-based relevance appraisals rather than memory ability. Study 3 extends our findings to eyewitness identification. Lower-class (vs. higher-class) participants' eyewitness accuracy is less impacted by the explicit relevance of a target (clearly relevant thief vs. incidental bystander). Integrative data analysis shows a robust negative association between social class and spontaneous face memory. Preregistration (Studies 1 and 3) and cross-cultural replication (Study 2) further strengthen the results.

Neoliberalism and the Ideological Construction of Equity Beliefs.

Researchers across disciplines, including psychology, have sought to understand how people evaluate the fairness of resource distributions. Equity, defined as proportionality of rewards to merit, has dominated the conceptualization of distributive justice in psychology; some scholars have cast it as the primary basis on which distributive decisions are made. The present article acts as a corrective to this disproportionate emphasis on equity. Drawing on findings from different subfields, we argue that people possess a range of beliefs about how valued resources should be allocated-beliefs that vary systematically across developmental stages, relationship types, and societies. By reinvigorating notions of distributive justice put forth by the field's pioneers, we further argue that prescriptive beliefs concerning resource allocation are ideological formations embedded in socioeconomic and historical contexts. Fairness beliefs at the micro level are thus shaped by those beliefs' macro-level instantiations. In a novel investigation of this process, we consider neoliberalism, the globally dominant socioeconomic model of the past 40 years. Using data from more than 160 countries, we uncover evidence that neoliberal economic structures shape equity-based distributive beliefs at the individual level. We conclude by advocating an integrative approach to the study of distributive justice that bridges micro- and macro-level analyses.

Social Class Predicts Emotion Perception and Perspective-Taking Performance in Adults.

"Theory of Mind" (ToM; people's ability to infer and use information about others' mental states) varies across cultures. In four studies (N = 881), including two preregistered replications, we show that social class predicts performance on ToM tasks. In Studies 1A and 1B, we provide new evidence for a relationship between social class and emotion perception: Higher-class individuals performed more poorly than their lower-class counterparts on the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, which has participants infer the emotional states of targets from images of their eyes. In Studies 2A and 2B, we provide the first evidence that social class predicts visual perspective taking: Higher-class individuals made more errors than lower-class individuals in the Director Task, which requires participants to assume the visual perspective of another person. Potential mechanisms linking social class to performance in different ToM domains, as well as implications for deficiency-centered perspectives on low social class, are discussed.

Precarious Manhood Predicts Support for Aggressive Policies and Politicians.

Precarious manhood (PM) theory posits that males are expected to actively maintain their reputations as "real men." We propose that men's concern about failing to meet masculine standards leads them to embrace policies and politicians that signal strength and toughness-or what we term political aggression. Three correlational studies support this claim. In Study 1, men's fear of failing to meet masculine expectations predicted their support for aggressive policies (e.g., the death penalty), but not policies lacking aggressive features (e.g., affirmative action). Studies 2 and 3 utilized Google searches to assess the relationship between regional levels of PM and real-world electoral behavior. The use of search terms related to masculine anxieties correlated with Donald Trump's vote share in the 2016 general election (Study 2) and, confirming preregistered predictions, with Republican candidates' vote shares in 2018 congressional elections (Study 3). We close by discussing potential sources of variation in PM.

Partisan differences in physical distancing are linked to health outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Numerous polls suggest that COVID-19 is a profoundly partisan issue in the United States. Using the geotracking data of 15 million smartphones per day, we found that US counties that voted for Donald Trump (Republican) over Hillary Clinton (Democrat) in the 2016 presidential election exhibited 14% less physical distancing between March and May 2020. Partisanship was more strongly associated with physical distancing than numerous other factors, including counties' COVID-19 cases, population density, median income, and racial and age demographics. Contrary to our predictions, the observed partisan gap strengthened over time and remained when stay-at-home orders were active. Additionally, county-level consumption of conservative media (Fox News) was related to reduced physical distancing. Finally, the observed partisan differences in distancing were associated with subsequently higher COVID-19 infection and fatality growth rates in pro-Trump counties. Taken together, these data suggest that US citizens' responses to COVID-19 are subject to a deep-and consequential-partisan divide.

Economic system justification predicts muted emotional responses to inequality.

Although humans display inequality aversion, many people appear to be untroubled by widespread economic disparities. We suggest that such indifference is partly attributable to a belief in the fairness of the capitalist system. Here we report six studies showing that economic ideology predicts self-reported and physiological responses to inequality. In Studies 1 and 2, participants who regard the economic system as justified, compared with those who do not, report feeling less negative emotion after watching videos depicting homelessness. In Studies 3-5, economic system justifiers exhibit low levels of negative affect, as indexed by activation of the corrugator supercilii muscle, and autonomic arousal, as indexed by skin conductance, while viewing people experiencing homelessness. In Study 6, which employs experience-sampling methodology, everyday exposure to rich and poor people elicits less negative emotion among system justifiers. These results provide the strongest evidence to date that system-justifying beliefs diminish aversion to inequality in economic contexts.

A Cross-Cultural Study of Punishment Beliefs and Decisions.

The current research examined cultural similarities and differences in punishment beliefs and decisions. Participants were European Americans ( N = 50), Chinese Americans ( N = 57), and Chinese in Mainland China ( N = 50). The Functions of Punishment Questionnaire was used to measure participants' beliefs about the retributive or deterrent functions of punishment and a scenario method was used to measure the extent to which punishment decisions were driven by individuals' concerns for retribution or deterrence. The results indicated that, contrary to the hypothesis that the retributive function would be emphasized by individualistic groups and the deterrent function by collectivistic groups, Mainland Chinese participants had a stronger belief in retribution and a weaker belief in deterrence than did European and Chinese Americans. The results also indicated that retribution played a bigger role in punishment decisions for Chinese than for the other two groups, but the importance of the deterrence function in punishment decisions did not differ across the three groups. Finally, the correlation between interdependence orientation and the belief in retribution was positive for Chinese but negative for European Americans. Taken together, the findings provided little evidence that collectivists are more deterrence-oriented and individualists more retribution-oriented.

Social Class and the Motivational Relevance of Other Human Beings: Evidence From Visual Attention.

We theorize that people's social class affects their appraisals of others' motivational relevance-the degree to which others are seen as potentially rewarding, threatening, or otherwise worth attending to. Supporting this account, three studies indicate that social classes differ in the amount of attention their members direct toward other human beings. In Study 1, wearable technology was used to film the visual fields of pedestrians on city streets; higher-class participants looked less at other people than did lower-class participants. In Studies 2a and 2b, participants' eye movements were tracked while they viewed street scenes; higher class was associated with reduced attention to people in the images. In Study 3, a change-detection procedure assessed the degree to which human faces spontaneously attract visual attention; faces proved less effective at drawing the attention of high-class than low-class participants, which implies that class affects spontaneous relevance appraisals. The measurement and conceptualization of social class are discussed.

Taking Race Off the Table: Agenda Setting and Support for Color-Blind Public Policy.

Whites are theorized to support color-blind policies as an act of racial agenda setting-an attempt to defend the existing hierarchy by excluding race from public and institutional discourse. The present analysis leverages work distinguishing between two forms of social dominance orientation (SDO): passive opposition to equality (SDO-E) and active desire for dominance (SDO-D). We hypothesized that agenda setting, as a subtle hierarchy-maintenance strategy, would be uniquely tied to high levels of SDO-E. When made to believe that the hierarchy was under threat, Whites high in SDO-E increased their endorsement of color-blind policy (Study 1), particularly when the racial hierarchy was framed as ingroup advantage (Study 2), and became less willing to include race as a topic in a hypothetical presidential debate (Study 3). Across studies, Whites high in SDO-D showed no affinity for agenda setting as a hierarchy-maintenance strategy.

Entitativity and intergroup bias: How belonging to a cohesive group allows people to express their prejudices.

We propose that people treat prejudice as more legitimate when it seems rationalistic-that is, linked to a group's pursuit of collective interests. Groups that appear to be coherent and unified wholes (entitative groups) are most likely to have such interests. We thus predicted that belonging to an entitative group licenses people to express prejudice against outgroups. Support for this idea came from 3 correlational studies and 5 experiments examining racial, national, and religious prejudice. The first 4 studies found that prejudice and discrimination seemed more socially acceptable to third parties when committed by members of highly entitative groups, because people could more easily explain entitative groups' biases as a defense of collective interests. Moreover, ingroup entitativity only lent legitimacy to outgroup prejudice when an interests-based explanation was plausible-namely, when the outgroup could possibly threaten the ingroup's interests. The last 4 studies found that people were more willing to express private prejudices when they perceived themselves as belonging to an entitative group. Participants' perceptions of their own race's entitativity were associated with a greater tendency to give explicit voice to their implicit prejudice against other races. Furthermore, experimentally raising participants' perceptions of ingroup entitativity increased explicit expressions of outgroup prejudice, particularly among people most likely to privately harbor such prejudices (i.e., highly identified group members). Together, these findings demonstrate that entitativity can lend a veneer of legitimacy to prejudice and disinhibit its expression. We discuss implications for intergroup relations and shifting national demographics. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).

Deny, Distance, or Dismantle? How White Americans Manage a Privileged Identity.

Social scientists have traditionally argued that whiteness-the attribute of being recognized and treated as a White person in society-is powerful because it is invisible. On this view, members of the racially dominant group have the unique luxury of rarely noticing their race or the privileges it confers. This article challenges this "invisibility thesis," arguing that Whites frequently regard themselves as racial actors. We further argue that whiteness defines a problematic social identity that confronts Whites with 2 psychological threats: the possibility that their accomplishments in life were not fully earned (meritocratic threat) and the association with a group that benefits from unfair social advantages (group-image threat). We theorize that Whites manage their racial identity to dispel these threats. According to our deny, distance, or dismantle (3D) model of White identity management, dominant-group members have three strategies at their disposal: deny the existence of privilege, distance their own self-concepts from the White category, or strive to dismantle systems of privilege. Whereas denial and distancing promote insensitivity and inaction with respect to racial inequality, dismantling reduces threat by relinquishing privileges. We suggest that interventions aimed at reducing inequality should attempt to leverage dismantling as a strategy of White identity management.

Race, ideology, and the tea party: a longitudinal study.

The Tea Party movement, which rose to prominence in the United States after the election of President Barack Obama, provides an ideal context in which to examine the roles of racial concerns and ideology in politics. A three-wave longitudinal study tracked changes in White Americans' self-identification with the Tea Party, racial concerns (prejudice and racial identification), and ideologies (libertarianism and social conservatism) over nine months. Latent Growth Modeling (LGM) was used to evaluate potential causal relationships between Tea Party identification and these factors. Across time points, racial prejudice was indirectly associated with movement identification through Whites' assertions of national decline. Although initial levels of White identity did not predict change in Tea Party identification, initial levels of Tea Party identification predicted increases in White identity over the study period. Across the three assessments, support for the Tea Party fell among libertarians, but rose among social conservatives. Results are discussed in terms of legitimation theories of prejudice, the "racializing" power of political judgments, and the ideological dynamics of the Tea Party.

Incentivizing wellness in the workplace: sticks (not carrots) send stigmatizing signals.

Companies often provide incentives for employees to maintain healthy lifestyles. These incentives can take the form of either discounted premiums for healthy-weight employees ("carrot" policies) or increased premiums for overweight employees ("stick" policies). In the three studies reported here, we demonstrated that even when stick and carrot policies are formally equivalent, they do not necessarily convey the same information to employees. Stick but not carrot policies were viewed as reflecting negative company attitudes toward overweight employees (Study 1a) and were evaluated especially negatively by overweight participants (Study 1b). This was true even when overweight employees paid less money under the stick than under the carrot policy. When acting as policymakers (Study 2), participants with high levels of implicit overweight bias were especially likely to choose stick policies-often on the grounds that such policies were cost-effective-even when doing so was more costly to the company. Policymakers should realize that the framing of incentive programs can convey tacit, and sometimes stigmatizing, messages.

I'm like you and you're like me: social projection and self-stereotyping both help explain self-other correspondence.

Social projection and self-stereotyping are rival explanations for self-other correspondence, in which people tend to perceive a high degree of similarity between themselves and others. The present research shows that both accounts are correct-that is, that knowledge of the self and knowledge of others are mutually constraining. In Study 1, participants whose self-views were experimentally manipulated revised their judgments of an immediate ingroup. In Study 2, an analogous manipulation of ingroup traits altered participants' self-views. In Study 3, participants who were ascribed a trait readily projected to and stereotyped from their relevant ingroup, but not to or from an outgroup. Finally, Study 4 provides reaction-latency evidence for social projection and self-stereotyping as judgmental processes leading to self-other correspondence. In this task, participants referenced self-knowledge when reaching ingroup-descriptiveness judgments (evidence for social projection) and ingroup knowledge when judging the self (evidence for self-stereotyping). Implications for the debate between protocentric and egocentric accounts of person perception are discussed.