Network Experiences from a Cross-Sector Biosafety Level-3 Laboratory Collaboration: A Swedish Forum for Biopreparedness Diagnostics.

The Swedish Forum for Biopreparedness Diagnostics (FBD) is a network that fosters collaboration among the 4 agencies with responsibility for the laboratory diagnostics of high-consequence pathogens, covering animal health and feed safety, food safety, public health and biodefense, and security. The aim of the network is to strengthen capabilities and capacities for diagnostics at the national biosafety level-3 (BSL-3) laboratories to improve Sweden's biopreparedness, in line with recommendations from the EU and WHO. Since forming in 2007, the FBD network has contributed to the harmonization of diagnostic methods, equipment, quality assurance protocols, and biosafety practices among the national BSL-3 laboratories. Lessons learned from the network include: (1) conducting joint projects with activities such as method development and validation, ring trials, exercises, and audits has helped to build trust and improve communication among participating agencies; (2) rotating the presidency of the network steering committee has fostered trust and commitment from all agencies involved; and (3) planning for the implementation of project outcomes is important to maintain gained competencies in the agencies over time. Contacts have now been established with national agencies of the other Nordic countries, with an aim to expanding the collaboration, broadening the network, finding synergies in new areas, strengthening the ability to share resources, and consolidating long-term financing in the context of harmonized European biopreparedness.

One health security: an important component of the global health security agenda.

The objectives of the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA) will require not only a "One Health" approach to counter natural disease threats against humans, animals, and the environment, but also a security focus to counter deliberate threats to human, animal, and agricultural health and to nations' economies. We have termed this merged approach "One Health Security." It will require the integration of professionals with expertise in security, law enforcement, and intelligence to join the veterinary, agricultural, environmental, and human health experts essential to One Health and the GHSA. Working across such different professions, which occasionally have conflicting aims and different professional cultures, poses multiple challenges, but a multidisciplinary and multisectoral approach is necessary to prevent disease threats; detect them as early as possible (when responses are likely to be most effective); and, in the case of deliberate threats, find who may be responsible. This article describes 2 project areas that exemplify One Health Security that were presented at a workshop in January 2014: the US government and private industry efforts to reduce vulnerabilities to foreign animal diseases, especially foot-and-mouth disease; and AniBioThreat, an EU project to counter deliberate threats to agriculture by raising awareness and implementing prevention and response policies and practices.

Metagenomic detection methods in biopreparedness outbreak scenarios.

In the field of diagnostic microbiology, rapid molecular methods are critically important for detecting pathogens. With rapid and accurate detection, preventive measures can be put in place early, thereby preventing loss of life and further spread of a disease. From a preparedness perspective, early detection and response are important in order to minimize the consequences. During the past 2 decades, advances in next-generation sequencing (NGS) technology have changed the playing field of molecular methods. Today, it is within reach to completely sequence the total microbiological content of a clinical sample, creating a metagenome, in a single week of laboratory work. As new technologies emerge, their dissemination and capacity building must be facilitated, and criteria for use, as well as guidelines on how to report results, must be established. This article focuses on the use of metagenomics, from sample collection to data analysis and to some extent NGS, for the detection of pathogens, the integration of the technique in outbreak response systems, and the risk-based evaluation of sample processing in routine diagnostics labs. The article covers recent advances in the field, current debate, gaps in research, and future directions. Examples of metagenomic detection, as well as possible applications of the methods, are described in various biopreparedness outbreak scenarios.

Historical perspective on agroterrorism: lessons learned from 1945 to 2012.

This article presents a historical perspective on agroterrorism cases from 1945 until 2012. The threat groups and perpetrators associated with bio- and agroterrorism are clustered into several groups: apocalyptic sects, lone wolves, political groups, and religious groups. We used open-source information, and 4 biological agroterrorism cases are described: (1) in 1952, Mau Mau poisoned cattle in Kenya by using a plant toxin from the African milk bush plant; (2) in 1985, the USDA claimed that Mexican contract workers were involved in deliberately spreading screwworm (Cochliomyia hominivorax) among livestock; (3) in 2000, Palestinian media reported that Israeli settlers released sewer water into Palestinian agricultural fields; and (4) in 2011, a person was sentenced to prison after threatening US and UK livestock with the deliberate spread of foot-and-mouth disease virus. All 4 cases can be assigned to political groups. These cases have not attracted much attention in literature nor in the public media, and the credibility of the sources of information varies. We concluded that agroterrorism has not been a problem during the period studied. Lessons learned from the few cases have generated awareness about the fact that nontypical biological weapons and non-high-risk agents, such as African milk bush, screwworm, and sewer water, have been used by attackers to influence local decision makers. This review will be useful in improving future preparedness planning and developing countermeasures.

Multiplex real-time PCR for detecting and typing Clostridium botulinum group III organisms and their mosaic variants.

Botulism is a neuroparalytic disease that can occur in all warm-blooded animals, birds, and fishes. The disease in animals is mainly caused by toxins produced by Clostridium botulinum strains belonging to group III, although outbreaks due to toxins produced by group I and II organisms have been recognized. Group III strains are capable of producing botulinum toxins of type C, D, and C/D and D/C mosaic variants. Definitive diagnosis of animal botulism is made by combining clinical findings with laboratory investigations. Detection of toxins in clinical specimens and feed is the gold standard for laboratory diagnosis. Since toxins may be degraded by organisms contained in the gastrointestinal tract or may be present at levels below the detection limit, the recovery of C. botulinum from sick animal specimens is consistent for laboratory confirmation. In this article we report the development and in-house validation of a new multiplex real-time PCR for detecting and typing the neurotoxin genes found in C. botulinum group III organisms. Validation procedures have been carried out according to ISO 16140, using strains and samples recovered from cases of animal botulism in Italy and France.

Development and optimization of a biopreparedness protocol for extracting and detecting avian influenza virus in broiler chicken meat.

Detection of avian influenza virus (AIV) in poultry meat is hampered by the lack of an efficient analytical method able to extract and concentrate viral RNA prior to PCR. In this study we developed a method for extracting and detecting AIV from poultry meat by a previously standardized 1-step real-time reverse transcriptase PCR (RRT-PCR) assay. In addition, a new process control, represented by feline calicivirus (FCV), was included in the original protocol, to evaluate all analytical steps from sample preparation to the detection phase. The detection limit was below 1×10(-1) TCID50 of AIV per sample, and the quantification limit corresponded to 1×10(1) TCID50 of AIV per sample. Moreover, the addition of 1×10(2) TCID50/sample of FCV did not affect the quantification and detection limit of the reaction. These results show that the developed assay is suitable for detecting small amounts of AIV in poultry meat. In addition, the developed biopreparedness protocol can be applied to detect AIV in legal or illegal imported broiler chicken meat. The availability of a rapid and sensitive diagnostic method based on molecular identification of AIV in poultry meat provides an important tool in the prevention of AIV circulation.

Agroterrorism targeting livestock: a review with a focus on early detection systems.

Agroterrorism targeting livestock can be described as the intentional introduction of an animal disease agent against livestock with the purpose of causing economic damage, disrupting socioeconomic stability of a country, and creating panic and distress. This type of terrorism can be alluring to terrorists because animal disease agents are easily available. This review addresses the vulnerabilities of the livestock industry to agroterrorism. However, we also show that early detection systems have recently been developed for agroterrorism and deliberate spread of animal pathogens in livestock, including an agroterrorism intelligence cycle, syndromic surveillance programs, and computer-based clinical decision support systems that can be used for early detection of notifiable animal diseases. The development of DIVA-vaccines in the past 10 to 15 years has created, in principle, an excellent response instrument to counter intentional animal disease outbreaks. These developments have made our animal agriculture less vulnerable to agroterrorism. But we cannot relax; there are still many challenges, in particular with respect to integration of first line of defense, law enforcement, and early detection systems for animal diseases.

Social media and its dual use in biopreparedness: communication and visualization tools in an animal bioterrorism incident.

This article focuses on social media and interactive challenges for emergency organizations during a bioterrorism or agroterrorism incident, and it outlines the dual-use dilemma of social media. Attackers or terrorists can use social media as their modus operandi, and defenders, including emergency organizations in law enforcement and public and animal health, can use it for peaceful purposes. To get a better understanding of the uses of social media in these situations, a workshop was arranged in Stockholm, Sweden, to raise awareness about social media and animal bioterrorism threats. Fifty-six experts and crisis communicators from international and national organizations participated. As a result of the workshop, it was concluded that emergency organizations can collect valuable information and monitor social media before, during, and after an outbreak. In order to make use of interactive communication to obtain collective intelligence from the public, emergency organizations must adapt to social networking technologies, requiring multidisciplinary knowledge in the fields of information, communication, IT, and biopreparedness. Social network messaging during a disease outbreak can be visualized in stream graphs and networks showing clusters of Twitter and Facebook users. The visualization of social media can be an important preparedness tool in the response to bioterrorism and agroterrorism.

Separated by a common language: awareness of term usage differences between languages and disciplines in biopreparedness.

Preparedness for bioterrorism is based on communication between people in organizations who are educated and trained in several disciplines, including law enforcement, health, and science. Various backgrounds, cultures, and vocabularies generate difficulties in understanding and interpretating terms and concepts, which may impair communication. This is especially true in emergency situations, in which the need for clarity and consistency is vital. The EU project AniBioThreat initiated methods and made a rough estimate of the terms and concepts that are crucial for an incident, and a pilot database with key terms and definitions has been constructed. Analysis of collected terms and sources has shown that many of the participating organizations use various international standards in their area of expertise. The same term often represents different concepts in the standards from different sectors, or, alternatively, different terms were used to represent the same or similar concepts. The use of conflicting terminology can be problematic for decision makers and communicators in planning and prevention or when handling an incident. Since the CBRN area has roots in multiple disciplines, each with its own evolving terminology, it may not be realistic to achieve unequivocal communication through a standardized vocabulary and joint definitions for words from common language. We suggest that a communication strategy should include awareness of alternative definitions and ontologies and the ability to talk and write without relying on the implicit knowledge underlying specialized jargon. Consequently, cross-disciplinary communication skills should be part of training of personnel in the CBRN field. In addition, a searchable repository of terms and definitions from relevant organizations and authorities would be a valuable addition to existing glossaries for improving awareness concerning bioterrorism prevention planning.

Harmonization of European laboratory response networks by implementing CWA 15793: use of a gap analysis and an "insider" exercise as tools.

Laboratory response networks (LRNs) have been established for security reasons in several countries including the Netherlands, France, and Sweden. LRNs function in these countries as a preparedness measure for a coordinated diagnostic response capability in case of a bioterrorism incident or other biocrimes. Generally, these LRNs are organized on a national level. The EU project AniBioThreat has identified the need for an integrated European LRN to strengthen preparedness against animal bioterrorism. One task of the AniBioThreat project is to suggest a plan to implement laboratory biorisk management CWA 15793:2011 (CWA 15793), a management system built on the principle of continual improvement through the Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle. The implementation of CWA 15793 can facilitate trust and credibility in a future European LRN and is an assurance that the work done at the laboratories is performed in a structured way with continuous improvements. As a first step, a gap analysis was performed to establish the current compliance status of biosafety and laboratory biosecurity management with CWA 15793 in 5 AniBioThreat partner institutes in France (ANSES), the Netherlands (CVI and RIVM), and Sweden (SMI and SVA). All 5 partners are national and/or international laboratory reference institutes in the field of public or animal health and possess high-containment laboratories and animal facilities. The gap analysis showed that the participating institutes already have robust biorisk management programs in place, but several gaps were identified that need to be addressed. Despite differences between the participating institutes in their compliance status, these variations are not significant. Biorisk management exercises also have been identified as a useful tool to control compliance status and thereby implementation of CWA 15793. An exercise concerning an insider threat and loss of a biological agent was performed at SVA in the AniBioThreat project to evaluate implementation of the contingency plans and as an activity in the implementation process of CWA 15793. The outcome of the exercise was perceived as very useful, and improvements to enhance biorisk preparedness were identified. Gap analyses and exercises are important, useful activities to facilitate implementation of CWA 15793. The PDCA cycle will enforce a structured way to work, with continual improvements concerning biorisk management activities. Based on the activities in the AniBioThreat project, the following requirements are suggested to promote implementation: support from the top management of the organizations, knowledge about CWA 15793, a compliance audit checklist and gap analysis, training and exercises, networking in LRNs and other networks, and interinstitutional audits. Implementation of CWA 15793 at each institute would strengthen the European animal bioterrorism response capabilities by establishing a well-prepared LRN.

Actionable knowledge and strategic decision making for bio- and agroterrorism threats: building a collaborative early warning culture.

Current trends in biosecurity and cybersecurity include (1) the wide availability of technology and specialized knowledge that previously were available only to governments; (2) the global economic recession, which may increase the spread of radical non-state actors; and (3) recent US and EU commission reports that reflect concerns about non-state actors in asymmetric threats. The intersectoral and international nature of bioterrorism and agroterrorism threats requires collaboration across several sectors including intelligence, police, forensics, customs, and other law enforcement organizations who must work together with public and animal health organizations as well as environmental and social science organizations. This requires coordinated decision making among these organizations, based on actionable knowledge and information sharing. The risk of not sharing information among organizations compared to the benefit of sharing information can be considered in an "information sharing risk-benefit analysis" to prevent a terrorism incident from occurring and to build a rapid response capability. In the EU project AniBioThreat, early warning is the main topic in work package 3 (WP 3). A strategy has been generated based on an iterative approach to bring law enforcement agencies and human and animal health institutes together. Workshops and exercises have taken place during the first half of the project, and spin-off activities include new preparedness plans for institutes and the formation of a legal adviser network for decision making. In addition, a seminar on actionable knowledge was held in Stockholm, Sweden, in 2012, which identified the need to bring various agency cultures together to work on developing a resilient capability to identify early signs of bio- and agroterrorism threats. The seminar concluded that there are a number of challenges in building a collaborative culture, including developing an education program that supports collaboration and shared situational awareness.

The need for high-quality whole-genome sequence databases in microbial forensics.

Microbial forensics is an important part of a strengthened capability to respond to biocrime and bioterrorism incidents to aid in the complex task of distinguishing between natural outbreaks and deliberate acts. The goal of a microbial forensic investigation is to identify and criminally prosecute those responsible for a biological attack, and it involves a detailed analysis of the weapon--that is, the pathogen. The recent development of next-generation sequencing (NGS) technologies has greatly increased the resolution that can be achieved in microbial forensic analyses. It is now possible to identify, quickly and in an unbiased manner, previously undetectable genome differences between closely related isolates. This development is particularly relevant for the most deadly bacterial diseases that are caused by bacterial lineages with extremely low levels of genetic diversity. Whole-genome analysis of pathogens is envisaged to be increasingly essential for this purpose. In a microbial forensic context, whole-genome sequence analysis is the ultimate method for strain comparisons as it is informative during identification, characterization, and attribution--all 3 major stages of the investigation--and at all levels of microbial strain identity resolution (ie, it resolves the full spectrum from family to isolate). Given these capabilities, one bottleneck in microbial forensics investigations is the availability of high-quality reference databases of bacterial whole-genome sequences. To be of high quality, databases need to be curated and accurate in terms of sequences, metadata, and genetic diversity coverage. The development of whole-genome sequence databases will be instrumental in successfully tracing pathogens in the future.

Pre-PCR processing in bioterrorism preparedness: improved diagnostic capabilities for laboratory response networks.

Diagnostic DNA analysis using polymerase chain reaction (PCR) has become a valuable tool for rapid detection of biothreat agents. However, analysis is often challenging because of the limited size, quality, and purity of the biological target. Pre-PCR processing is an integrated concept in which the issues of analytical limit of detection and simplicity for automation are addressed in all steps leading up to PCR amplification--that is, sampling, sample treatment, and the chemical composition of PCR. The sampling method should maximize target uptake and minimize uptake of extraneous substances that could impair the analysis--so-called PCR inhibitors. In sample treatment, there is a trade-off between yield and purity, as extensive purification leads to DNA loss. A cornerstone of pre-PCR processing is to apply DNA polymerase-buffer systems that are tolerant to specific sample impurities, thereby lowering the need for expensive purification steps and maximizing DNA recovery. Improved awareness among Laboratory Response Networks (LRNs) regarding pre-PCR processing is important, as ineffective sample processing leads to increased cost and possibly false-negative or ambiguous results, hindering the decision-making process in a bioterrorism crisis. This article covers the nature and mechanisms of PCR-inhibitory substances relevant for agroterrorism and bioterrorism preparedness, methods for quality control of PCR reactions, and applications of pre-PCR processing to optimize and simplify the analysis of various biothreat agents. Knowledge about pre-PCR processing will improve diagnostic capabilities of LRNs involved in the response to bioterrorism incidents.

Towards an international standard for detection and typing botulinum neurotoxin-producing Clostridia types A, B, E and F in food, feed and environmental samples: a European ring trial study to evaluate a real-time PCR assay.

A real-time PCR method for detection and typing of BoNT-producing Clostridia types A, B, E, and F was developed on the framework of the European Research Project "Biotracer". A primary evaluation was carried out using 104 strains and 17 clinical and food samples linked to botulism cases. Results showed 100% relative accuracy, 100% relative sensitivity, 100% relative specificity, and 100% selectivity (inclusivity on 73 strains and exclusivity on 31 strains) of the real-time PCR against the reference cultural method combined with the standard mouse bioassay. Furthermore, a ring trial study performed at four different European laboratories in Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden was carried out using 47 strains, and 30 clinical and food samples linked to botulism cases. Results showed a concordance of 95.7% among the four laboratories. The reproducibility generated a relative standard deviation in the range of 2.18% to 13.61%. Considering the high level of agreement achieved between the laboratories, this real-time PCR is a suitable method for rapid detection and typing of BoNT-producing Clostridia in clinical, food and environmental samples and thus support the use of it as an international standard method.

Evaluation of Bacillus strains as model systems for the work on Bacillus anthracis spores.

Available strain collections of Bacillus anthracis and Bacillus cereus were screened for B. cereus strains sharing major genotypic characteristics with B. anthracis. Based on the comparison of partial spoIIIAB sequences, whole genome sequences and MLST, a strain set representing different lineages including candidate model strains for B. anthracis was compiled. Spores from the selected strain set and two B. anthracis strains were prepared according to a newly optimized protocol transferable to biosafety level-3 (BSL3) conditions and phenotypic characteristics including scanning electron microscopy (SEM), heat inactivation, and germination were evaluated. Two B. cereus isolates were identified that were genetically related to B. anthracis and showed high similarity to B. anthracis spores in their heat inactivation profile and their response to the germinants l-alanine and inosine. In addition, these isolates were also mimicking B. anthracis on modified PLET, a selective plating medium for B. anthracis, and shared various other biochemical characteristics with B. anthracis. Therefore these two strains are not only appropriate models for B. anthracis in experiments based on spore characteristics but also in trials working with plating media. These two strains are now used within the BIOTRACER consortium as validated models for B. anthracis and will facilitate the development and optimization of tracing and detection systems for B. anthracis in the food and feed chain.

Bioinformatic tools for using whole genome sequencing as a rapid high resolution diagnostic typing tool when tracing bioterror organisms in the food and feed chain.

The rapid technological development in the field of parallel sequencing offers new opportunities when tracing and tracking microorganisms in the food and feed chain. If a bioterror organism is deliberately spread it is of crucial importance to get as much information as possible regarding the strain as fast as possible to aid the decision process and select suitable controls, tracing and tracking tools. A lot of efforts have been made to sequence multiple strains of potential bioterror organisms so there is a relatively large set of reference genomes available. This study is focused on how to use parallel sequencing for rapid phylogenomic analysis and screen for genetic modifications. A bioinformatic methodology has been developed to rapidly analyze sequence data with minimal post-processing. Instead of assembling the genome, defining genes, defining orthologous relations and calculating distances, the present method can achieve a similar high resolution directly from the raw sequence data. The method defines orthologous sequence reads instead of orthologous genes and the average similarity of the core genome (ASC) is calculated. The sequence reads from the core and from the non-conserved genomic regions can also be separated for further analysis. Finally, the comparison algorithm is used to visualize the phylogenomic diversity of the bacterial bioterror organisms Bacillus anthracis and Clostridium botulinum using heat plot diagrams.

A multiplex real-time PCR for identifying and differentiating B. anthracis virulent types.

Bacillus anthracis is closely related to the endospore forming bacteria Bacillus cereus and Bacillus thuringiensis. For accurate detection of the life threatening pathogen B. anthracis, it is essential to distinguish between these three species. Here we present a novel multiplex real-time PCR for simultaneous specific identification of B. anthracis and discrimination of different B. anthracis virulence types. Specific B. anthracis markers were selected by whole genome comparison and different sets of primers and probes with optimal characteristic for multiplex detection of the B. anthracis chromosome, the B. anthracis pXO1 and pXO2 plasmids and an internal control (IC) were designed. The primer sets were evaluated using a panel of B. anthracis strains and exclusivity was tested using genetically closely related B. cereus strains. The robustness of final primer design was evaluated by laboratories in three different countries using five different real-time PCR thermocyclers. Testing of a panel of more than 20 anthrax strains originating from different locations around the globe, including the recent Swedish anthrax outbreak strain, showed that all strains were detected correctly.

Accidental and deliberate microbiological contamination in the feed and food chains--how biotraceability may improve the response to bioterrorism.

A next frontier of the global food safety agenda has to consider a broad spectrum of bio-risks, such as accidental and intentional contaminations in the food and feed chain. In this article, the background for the research needs related to biotraceability and response to bioterrorism incidents are outlined. Given the current scale of international trade any response need to be considered in an international context. Biotraceability (e.g. the ability to use downstream information to point to processes or within a particular food chain that can be identified as the source of undesirable agents) is crucial in any food-born outbreak and particular in the response to bioterrorism events. In the later case, tested and proven biotraceability improves the following: (i) international collaboration of validated tracing tools and detection methods, (ii) multi-disciplinary expertise and collaboration in the field of food microbiology and conceptual modeling of the food chain, (iii) sampling as a key step in biotracing (iv) optimized sample preparation procedures, including laboratory work in Biosafety level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories, (v) biomarker discovery for relevant tracing and tracking applications, and (vi) high-throughput sequencing using bio-informatic platforms to speed up the characterization of the biological agent. By applying biotraceability, the response phase during a bioterrorism event may be shortened and is facilitated for tracing the origin of biological agent contamination.

Anthrax outbreak in a Swedish beef cattle herd--1st case in 27 years: Case report.

After 27 years with no detected cases, an outbreak of anthrax occurred in a beef cattle herd in the south of Sweden. The outbreak was unusual as it occurred in winter, in animals not exposed to meat-and-bone meal, in a non-endemic country. The affected herd consisted of 90 animals, including calves and young stock. The animals were kept in a barn on deep straw bedding and fed only roughage. Seven animals died during 10 days, with no typical previous clinical signs except fever. The carcasses were reportedly normal in appearance, particularly as regards rigor mortis, bleeding and coagulation of the blood. Subsequently, three more animals died and anthrax was suspected at necropsy and confirmed by culture and PCR on blood samples. The isolated strain was susceptible to tetracycline, ciprofloxacin and ampicillin. Subtyping by MLVA showed the strain to cluster with isolates in the A lineage of Bacillus anthracis. Environmental samples from the holding were all negative except for two soil samples taken from a spot where infected carcasses had been kept until they were picked up for transport. The most likely source of the infection was concluded to be contaminated roughage, although this could not be substantiated by laboratory analysis. The suspected feed was mixed with soil and dust and originated from fields where flooding occurred the previous year, followed by a dry summer with a very low water level in the river allowing for the harvesting on soil usually not exposed. In the early 1900s, animal carcasses are said to have been dumped in this river during anthrax outbreaks and it is most likely that some anthrax spores could remain in the area. The case indicates that untypical cases in non-endemic areas may be missed to a larger extent than previously thought. Field tests allowing a preliminary risk assessment of animal carcasses would be helpful for increased sensitivity of detection and prevention of further exposure to the causative agent.