People focus on optimistic scenarios and disregard pessimistic scenarios while predicting task completion times.

Task completion plans normally resemble best-case scenarios and yield overly optimistic predictions of completion times. The authors induced participants to generate more pessimistic scenarios and examined completion predictions. Participants described a pessimistic scenario of task completion either alone or with an optimistic scenario. Pessimistic scenarios did not affect predictions or accuracy and were consistently rated less plausible than optimistic scenarios (Experiments 1-3). Experiment 4 independently manipulated scenario plausibility and optimism. Plausibility moderated the impact of optimistic, but not pessimistic, scenarios. Experiment 5 supported a motivational explanation of the tendency to disregard pessimistic scenarios regardless of their plausibility. People took pessimistic scenarios into account when predicting someone else's completion times. The authors conclude that pessimistic-scenario generation may not be an effective debiasing technique for personal predictions.

Probability judgment in three-category classification learning.

People give subadditive probability judgments--in violation of probability theory--when asked to assess each in a set of 3 or more mutually exclusive hypotheses, as indicated by their sum exceeding 1. Three potential evidential influences on subadditivity--cue conflict, cue frequency, and cue redundancy--are distinguished and tested in 5 experiments using a classification-learning task. Results indicate that (a) judgments of probability and of frequency are systematically subadditive even when the judgments are based on cues learned within the experimental context, (b) cue conflict has a reliable influence on the degree of subadditivity, and (c) judgments in this context are well described by a linear-discounting model within the framework of support theory.

Illusory correlations in graphological inference.

The authors investigate the illusory correlation phenomenon as a possible contributor to the persistence of graphology's use to predict personality. Participants unfamiliar with graphology inspected handwriting samples paired with fabricated personality profiles. In Experiment 1, handwriting samples and personality profiles were randomly paired. In Experiment 2, discernible correlations near unity were set between targeted handwriting-feature-personality-trait pairs in a congruent or incongruent direction with graphologists' claims. In both experiments, participants' judgments of the correlation between designated handwriting-feature-personality-trait pairs agreed with graphologists' claims, even after controlling for their actual statistical association. Semantic association between words used to describe handwriting features and personality traits was the source of biases in perceived correlation. Results may partially account for continued use of graphology despite overwhelming evidence against its predictive validity.

Subjective probability of disjunctive hypotheses: local-weight models for decomposition of evidential support.

When the probability of a single member of a set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive possibilities is judged, its alternatives are evaluated as a composite "residual" hypothesis. Support theory (Rottenstreich & Tversky, 1997; Tversky & Koehler, 1994) implies that the process of packing alternatives together in the residual reduces the perceived evidential support for the set of alternatives and consequently inflates the judged probability of the focal hypothesis. Previous work has investigated the global weights that determine the extent to which the overall evidential support for the alternatives is discounted by this packing operation (Koehler, Brenner, & Tversky, 1997). In the present investigation, we analyze this issue in greater detail, examining the local weights that measure the specific contribution of each component hypothesis included implicitly in the residual. We describe a procedure for estimating local weights and introduce a set of plausible properties that impose systematic ordinal relationships among local weights. Results from four experiments testing these properties are reported, and a local-weight model is developed that accounts for nearly all of the variance in the probability judgments in these empirical tests. Local weights appear to be sensitive both to the individual component with which they are associated and to the residual hypothesis in which the component resides.

Confidence and accuracy in trait inference: judgment by similarity.

We examined the confidence and accuracy with which people make personality trait inferences and investigate some consequences of the hypothesis that such judgments are based on similarity or conceptual relatedness. Given information concerning a target person's standing on three global personality dimensions, American and Israeli subjects were asked to estimate the target's self-ratings of 50 trait adjectives and to express their confidence by setting a 90 percent uncertainty range around each estimate. The estimates were positively correlated with the actual ratings obtained from subjects who had evaluated themselves in terms of the 50 traits, but were far too extreme. Furthermore, confidence was negatively correlated with accuracy: People's estimates were most inaccurate and made with greatest certainty when the trait in question was highly similar to the information provided as a basic for judgment. We suggest that intuitive personality judgments overestimate the coherence of the structure underlying trait constructs.

Probability judgement in medicine: discounting unspecified possibilities.

Research in cognitive psychology has indicated that alternative descriptions of the same event can give rise to different probability judgments. This observation has led to the development of a descriptive account, called support theory, which assumes that the judged probability of an explicit description of an event (that lists specific possibilities) generally exceeds the judged probability of an implicit description of the same event (that does not mention specific possibilities). To investigate this assumption in medical judgment, the authors presented physicians with brief clinical scenarios describing individual patients and elicited diagnostic and prognostic probability judgments. The results showed that the physicians tended to discount unspecified possibilities, as predicted by support theory. The authors suggest that an awareness of the discrepancy between intuitive judgments and the laws of chance may provide opportunities for improving medical decision making.

Explanation, imagination, and confidence in judgment.

This article concerns a class of experimental manipulations that require people to generate explanations or imagine scenarios. A review of studies using such manipulations indicates that people who explain or imagine a possibility then express greater confidence in the truth of that possibility. It is argued that this effect results from the approach people take in the explanation or imagination task: They temporarily assume that the hypothesis is true and assess how plausibly it can account for the relevant evidence. From this view, any task that requires that a hypothesis be treated as if it were true is sufficient to increase confidence in the truth of that hypothesis. Such tasks cause increased confidence in the hypothesis at the expense of viable alternatives because of changes in problem representation, evidence evaluation, and information search that take place when the hypothesis is temporarily treated as if it were true.