Helplessness experience and intentional (un-)binding: Control deprivation disrupts the implicit sense of agency.

Prolonged deprivation of personal control induces cognitive, motivational, and affective impairments that can lead to learned helplessness syndrome. Research on cognitive mechanisms involved in responding to uncontrollable events reveals a critical role of lack of contingency between one's action and outcomes. However, the impact of experienced uncontrollability on individuals' sense of self-agency has not been explored yet. This research examined how prolonged control deprivation affects implicit sense of agency. We exposed participants to action-outcome noncontingency of varying lengths and measured implicit sense of self-agency manifested in intentional binding. In 2 studies (N = 133 and N = 354, respectively), we found that control deprivation decreased the intentional binding effect, and that the relationship appeared to be monotonic: the longer the control deprivation, the smaller the intentional binding effect. Moreover, in the condition of prolonged control deprivation, no intentional binding was observed at all: Participants evaluated the time elapsing between the action and the effect as if both occurred separately. Our finding suggests that long-term exposure to uncontrollability has detrimental effects on the ability to detect consequences of one's actions, the basis of implicit self-agency. The implications of our results for the theory of control deprivation and sense of agency are thoroughly discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Priming With Childhood Constructs Influences Distance Perception.

The aim of our study was to examine whether priming adults with childhood constructs changes distance perception. Two alternative hypotheses could be derived: (1) The fundamental reference approach in visual perception of sizes and distances predicts that priming with childhood constructs should enlarge perceived distance (the world should be larger to a small observer); (2) and, conversely, the action-specific account of perception predicts that priming with childhood constructs should make distances seem shorter (a more physically active child should underestimate distances as more attainable). The results consistently support the second theory. Experiment 1 showed that being either explicitly or implicitly primed with childhood constructs decreased perceptions of distance as compared to that evaluated in the control groups. This effect was noticeable for long distances and only marginally significant for short distances. Also, this effect was not mediated by mood. Experiment 2 replicated the result of explicit priming with an additional control condition (baseline). The effect remained significant after controlling for the participants' evaluation of their childhood memories, tendency to relive memories from their childhood, having children, having a driver's license, and the participants' height.

What breeds conspiracy antisemitism? The role of political uncontrollability and uncertainty in the belief in Jewish conspiracy.

Belief in conspiracy theories about Jews is a prototypical example of how a naïve theory can serve as a universal explanation of "all the bad things happening in society." Such a theory often arises in times of political unrest that tend to breed feelings of uncertainty in politics and a lack of control over politics. As both uncertainty (a sense-making deficit) and lack of control (an agency deficit) can relate to conspiracy-based antisemitism, this research examines which of the two processes plays a pivotal role in the belief in Jewish conspiracy. Specifically, we hypothesize that political uncontrollability, rather than political uncertainty, is a critical factor in triggering conspiracy theories about groups. In Study 1 (N = 812) we found that lack of control, but not uncertainty, in the political domain predicted belief in Jewish conspiracy, and subsequently led to increased discriminatory attitudes toward Jews. The results of longitudinal Study 2 (N = 476) revealed that only political uncontrollability led to an increase in conspiracy-related stereotypes of Jews. In Study 3 (N = 172) we found that experimental induction of political uncontrollability increased belief in Jewish, German, and Russian conspiracy, whereas induction of political uncertainty did not. Finally, Study 4 (N = 370) replicated this pattern in another cultural context with more general measures of uncontrollability and uncertainty. It was lack of personal control, rather than uncertainty, that increased belief in Jewish conspiracy-and indirectly predicted other conspiracy theories. Our findings consistently support the critical role of political uncontrollability, not uncertainty, in triggering a conspiracy theory of Jews. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Returning to the present moment: Thinking about one's childhood increases focus on the hedonistic present.

Children seem to live more in the present moment than adults. But is it possible to make the present time perspective more available among adults? Four experiments demonstrated that activating childhood selves can lead adults to be more embedded in the hedonistic present. Studies 1 and 2 showed that recalling memories from childhood, either in an open-ended or a structured form, increased participants' focus on the hedonistic present. Study 3 showed that this effect also occurred after an implicit childhood manipulation. Study 4 revealed that taking the perspective of a child significantly increased orientation to the hedonistic present, compared to taking the perspective of an adult. The effects of activation of childhood selves were not mediated by mood, nostalgia, impatience, concentration, difficulty of the task, enjoyment connected with the task, or involvement in the task. Evaluation of one's childhood and tendency to relive childhood memories did not affect the results.

My way or the highway: High narcissism and low self-esteem predict decreased support for democracy.

In two studies, we analysed the relationships between different types of self-evaluation (i.e., narcissism and self-esteem) and support for democracy. Support for democracy requires the ability to respect the views and opinions of others, even if one disagrees with them. Classic studies have linked support for democracy with high self-evaluation, which should assume psychological security and, thus, the ability to trust others. However, not all forms of high self-evaluation are secure. Narcissists have high feelings of self-worth, but tend to be defensive: They are easily threatened by criticisms or conflicting views. We then expected that while support for democracy should be positively predicted by secure, non-narcissistic self-evaluation, it should be negatively predicted by narcissistic self-evaluation. In two studies, conducted in the United States (Study 1, n = 407) and in Poland (Study 2, n = 405), support for democracy was positively predicted by self-esteem and negatively predicted by narcissism. Study 2 additionally demonstrated that interpersonal trust mediated the effects of self-esteem on support for democracy. We discuss the role of psychological predispositions in understanding support for democratic systems.