Coevolution of nutrigenomics and society: ethical considerations.

To optimize the coevolution of nutrigenomics and society (ie, the reciprocal stimulation of both developments), I analyzed chances for a fruitful match between normative concepts and strategies of both developments. Nutrigenomics embodies ≥ 3 normative concepts. First, food is exclusively interpreted in terms of disease prevention. Second, striving for health is interpreted as the quantification of risks and prevention of diseases through positive food-gene interactions. The third normative idea is that disease prevention by the minimization of risks is an individual's task. My thesis was that these concepts of nutrigenomics would not easily match with concepts of food and health of various food styles in Western societies, which, for instance, parents in the case of metabolic programming endorse and with a philosophical view of the relation between food, health, and the meaning of life. Next, I reflected on the nonsynchronized coevolution of nutrigenomics and society because of this mismatch and introduced the concept of the fair representation of food styles in nutrigenomic developments. To synchronize and optimize the coevolution of nutrigenomics and society, I propose that the research policy of nutrigenomics should change to a research partnership with society on the basis of fair representation.

The good life: living for health and a life without risks? On a prominent script of nutrigenomics.

Like all scientific innovations, nutrigenomics develops through a constant interplay with society. Normative assumptions, embedded in the way researchers formulate strands of nutrigenomics research, affect this interplay. These assumptions may influence norms and values on food and health in our society. To discuss the possible pros and cons of a society with nutrigenomics, we need to reflect ethically on assumptions rooted in nutrigenomics research. To begin with, we analysed a set of scientific journal articles and explicated three normative assumptions embedded in the present nutrigenomics research. First, values regarding food are exclusively explained in terms of disease prevention. Health is therefore a state preceding a sum of possible diseases. Second, it is assumed that health should be explained as an interaction between food and genes. Health is minimised to quantifiable health risks and disease prevention through food-gene interactions. The third assumption is that disease prevention by minimisation of risks is in the hands of the individual and that personal risks, revealed either through tests or belonging to a risk group, will play a large role in disease prevention. Together, these assumptions suggest that the good life (a life worth living, with the means to flourish and thrive) is equated with a healthy life. Our thesis is that these three normative assumptions of nutrigenomics may strengthen the concerns related to healthism, health anxiety, time frames and individual responsibilities for health. We reflect on these ethical issues by confronting them in a thought experiment with alternative, philosophical, views of the good life.

Vicissitudes of benefit sharing of crop genetic resources: downstream and upstream.

In this article, we will first give a historic overview of the concept of benefit sharing and its appearance in official agreements, particularly with respect to crop genetic resources. It will become clear that, at present, benefit sharing is primarily considered as an instrument of compensation or exchange, and thus refers to commutative justice. However, we believe that such a narrow interpretation of benefit sharing disregards, and even undermines, much of its (historical) content and potency, especially where crop genetic resources are concerned. We argue that benefit sharing should not be based merely on commutative justice but rather on a broader model that is also grounded in the concept of distributive justice. This has repercussions for the application of benefit sharing, which we try to clarify by distinguishing between downstream and upstream benefit sharing. Upstream benefit sharing is not so much inspired by compensation for actions done, or the distribution downstream of benefits developed, but by the idea of shared decision-making on the research and development of resources fundamental to human welfare. Going upstream in the research process of crop genetic resources, and determining research agendas and improving crops according to the needs of the poor, benefit sharing may well be a tool to contribute to world food security and global justice. We concretize our ideas on upstream benefit sharing by introducing a set of criteria that determine the success of consultations on agricultural research agenda setting.

Ethics in technological culture: a programmatic proposal for a pragmatist approach.

Neither traditional philosophy nor current applied ethics seem able to cope adequately with the highly dynamic character of our modern technological culture. This is because they have insufficient insight into the moral significance of technological artifacts and systems. Here, much can be learned from recent science and technology studies (STS). They have opened up the black box of technological developments and have revealed the intimate intertwinement of technology and society in minute detail. However, while applied ethics is characterized by a certain "technology blindness," the most influential approaches within STS show a "normative deficit" and display on agnostic or even antagonistic attitude toward ethics. To repair the blind spots of both applied ethics and STS, the authors sketch the contours of a pragmatist approach. They will explore the tasks and tools of a pragmatist ethics and pay special attention to the exploration of future worlds disclosed and shaped by technology and the management of deep value conflicts inherent in a pluralistic society.