Nuclear waste Educator's workshop: What and how do we teach about nuclear waste?

A workshop was held at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) on July 25th and 26th, 2022. The objective was to develop a blueprint for educating next-generation engineers and scientists about nuclear waste management and disposal, which requires knowledge from diverse disciplines, including nuclear, chemical, civil, environmental, and geological science and engineering. The 49 participants included university professors, researchers, industry experts, and government officials from different areas. First, we have developed a list of key fundamental knowledge on waste management and disposal across the nuclear fuel cycle. In addition, we discussed strategies on how to teach students with diverse backgrounds through innovative teaching strategies as well as how to attract students into this area. Through the workshop, we identified the critical needs to (1) develop community resources for nuclear waste education; (2) synthesize historical perspectives, including past contamination and the management of general hazardous waste; (3) emphasize a complete life-cycle perspective, including proper waste management as the key component for energy sustainability; (4) teach students how to communicate about the key facts and risks to technical and non-technical audiences; and (5) accelerate the use of the state-of-art-technologies to attract and retain a young workforce. Furthermore, we aim to build a diverse, inclusive community that supports students in developing their own narratives about nuclear waste, particularly in recognizing that antagonistic views have been important to improving safety and protecting public health and the environment.

The dynamic nature of risk in DOE facilities in the surveillance and maintenance program-with observations for risk communications.

We explore three case studies of facilities at two US Department of Energy (DOE) former nuclear weapons research and production sites-the Oak Ridge National Laboratory and the Hanford site-whose risk profiles have changed during their long-term management under the DOE's surveillance and maintenance (S&M) program. These case studies provide examples of the challenges faced in communicating to external stakeholders, such as federal and state regulators, local communities surrounding the site, as well as the general public, the circumstances surrounding unexpected events or the emergence/discovery of new risk-important information at historically high-risk sites. We identify common topics of importance from these case studies and suggest a taxonomy for risk communicators to use in informing the dialogues with individuals and organizations that may not be technically oriented or fully informed on the subject matter. The taxonomy is based on technical insights from the quintessential definition of risk known as the Kaplan-Garrick "risk triplet" as well as insights from regulatory guidance documents on risk communication with external stakeholders originally developed for the commercial nuclear power industry.

A structural description of the evolution of stakeholders and risk communication in the Department of Energy's defense nuclear facilities: Historical perspective, major stakeholders, and external events.

Regulators and policymakers are routinely challenged with explaining complex concepts concerning risk. Part of the challenge is helping external and internal stakeholders to understand the context behind risk-related information and decisions. This paper will describe the historical evolution of the safety and regulatory framework for an important category in the nuclear industry-defense nuclear facilities owned and operated by the US Department of Energy. In parallel with describing this evolution, three major events which occurred external to the complex of defense nuclear facilities will be summarized, and their impact on the maturation of the Department's safety and regulatory framework will be discussed. Finally, integrated with these two threads of discussion will be a chronicle of the changing set of involved organizations and the expanding set of external stakeholders involved in risk decisions-and therefore, the risk communications ecosystem surrounding defense nuclear facilities. It will be noted that this system was once describable as a classic "iron triangle," but now has progressed to a complex network of federal and state organizations, numerous congressional committees, and expanding sets of external stakeholders. It is hoped that a comprehensive discussion of the context of risk assessment in the defense nuclear facilities complex-addressing historical insights, organizational evolution, and the maturing structure of regulation-will provide enhanced opportunities for building trust and understanding in this complex environment.

Advancing Risk-Informed Decision Making in Managing Defense Nuclear Waste in the United States: Opportunities and Challenges for Risk Analysis.

An omnibus spending bill in 2014 directed the Department of Energy to analyze how effectively Department of Energy (DOE) identifies, programs, and executes its plans to address public health and safety risks that remain as part of DOE's remaining environmental cleanup liabilities. A committee identified two dozen issues and associated recommendations for the DOE, other federal agencies, and the U.S. Congress to consider, as well as other stakeholders such as states and tribal nations. In regard to risk assessment, the committee described a risk review process that uses available data, expert experience, identifies major data gaps, permits input from key stakeholders, and creates an ordered set of risks based on what is known. Probabilistic risk assessments could be a follow-up from these risk reviews. In regard to risk management, the states, in particular, have become major drivers of how resources are driven. States use different laws, different priorities, and challenge DOE's policies in different ways. Land use decisions vary, technology choices are different, and other notable variations are apparent. The cost differences associated with these differences are marked. The net result is that resources do not necessarily go to the most prominent human health and safety risks, as seen from the national level.