Spanish version of Multidimensional Mentalizing Questionnaire (MMQ): Translation, adaptation and psychometric properties in a Chilean population.

This paper presents the first translation and adaptation of the Multidimensional Mentalizing Questionnaire (MMQ) into Spanish for a native Spanish-speaking sample in Chile. The study examines the psychometric properties and internal consistency of the translated MMQ. The instrument undergoes modifications based on a confirmatory factor analysis of the original structure, resulting in the elimination of items with cross-loadings and improvement in model fit. The modified scale is then analyzed, demonstrating strong psychometric properties. Convergent evidence is assessed by correlating MMQ subscales with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and Empathy Quotient (EQ), while divergent evidence is assessed by correlating aggressive traits using the Buss-Perry Aggression Questionnaire (BPAQ). The study also explores gender differences and age. Results reveal positive correlations between good mentalizing and empathy, particularly cognitive empathy, supporting the significance of positive mentalization in empathy. Negative mentalization is associated with difficulties in perspective-taking and social skills, as well as aggressive traits. Gender differences in mentalizing capacities are observed, and negative aspects of mentalization decrease with age. The availability of the Spanish translation of the MMQ, the first self-reporting scale measuring mentalization adapted to Chilean population, contributes to research aiming to understand its relationship with other psychological phenomena in different cultural context and facilitating clinical interventions with different population groups. We therefore encourage further investigation into cultural, gender and age differences in mentalization.

What are delusions? Examining the typology problem.

Delusions are a heterogenous transdiagnostic phenomenon with a higher prevalence in schizophrenia. One of the most fundamental debates surrounding the philosophical understanding of delusions concerns the question about the type of mental state in which reports that we label as delusional are grounded, namely, the typology problem. The formulation of potential answers for this problem seems to have important repercussions for experimental research in clinical psychiatry and the development of psychotherapeutic tools for the treatment of delusions in clinical psychology. Problematically, such alternatives are scattered in the literature, making it difficult to follow the current development and state of the target discussion. This paper offers an updated critical examination of the alternatives to the typology problem currently available in the literature. After clarifying the two main philosophical views underlying the dominant formulation of the debate (interpretivism and functionalism), we follow the usual distinction between doxastic (the idea that delusions are a type of belief) and anti-doxastic views. We then introduce two new sub-distinctions; on the doxastic camp, we distinguish between revisionist and non-revisionist proposals; on the anti-doxastic camp, we distinguish between commonsensical and non-commonsensical anti-doxasticisms. After analyzing the main claims of each view, we conclude with some of the most fundamental challenges that remain open within the discussion. This article is categorized under: Philosophy > Foundations of Cognitive Science Philosophy > Consciousness Philosophy > Psychological Capacities Neuroscience > Cognition.

El problema etiológico de los delirios en la esquizofrenia para la neuropsiquiatría actual / The Etiological Problem of Psychotic Delusions in Current Neuropsychiatry / O problema etiológico dos delírios na esquizofrenia para a neuropsiquiatria atual

Introducción: el delirio constituye uno de los síntomas más complejos y severos de la psicosis. Uno de los problemas más fundamentales que enfrenta la investigación en el campo de la neuropsiquiatría tiene que ver con el desafío de producir teorías explicativas para la producción de este tipo de estado mental, a lo que se denomina problema etiológico de los delirios psicóticos. Desarrollo: se analizan críticamente las principales alternativas dentro de la neuropsiquiatría contemporánea al problema etiológico en el contexto de la esquizofrenia. Conclusión: el análisis indica que las tres teorías fundamentales que conviven en la actualidad poseen problemas para avanzar en el desafío de explicar la etiología de los delirios. Por lo anterior, se propone la idea de que, a la luz del estado del debate reciente, la hibridación teórica podría perfilarse como el mejor candidato metodológico para generar progreso real en la disciplina

Introduction: Delusions constitute one of the most complex and severe symptoms of psychosis. One of the most fundamental problems within current research in neuropsychiatry has to do with the challenge of producing explanatory theories of the aetiology of the phenomenon. I call this the etiological problem of psychotic delusions. Development: The main alternatives to the etiological problem in schizophrenia in current neuropsychiatry are critically assessed. Conclusion: The three current co-existing approaches possess a number of problems to make real progress in the etiological debate. For this reason, I suggest that, in light of the current state of the art, theoretical hybridization could become the best methodologi- cal candidate to make progress within the target debate

Introdução: o delírio é um dos sintomas mais complexos e graves da psicose. Um dos problemas mais fundamentais enfrentados atualmente pelas pesquisas no campo da neuropsiquiatria diz respeito ao desafio de produzir teorias explicativas para a produção desse tipo de estado mental, que chamo de o problema etiológico dos delírios psicóticos. Desenvolvimento: são analisadas criticamente as principais alternativas da neuropsiquiatria contemporânea ao problema etiológico no contexto da esquizofrenia. Conclusão: a análise indica que as três teorias fundamentais que coexistem atualmente têm problemas para avançar no desafio de explicar a etiologia dos delírios. Portanto, propõe-se a ideia de que, à luz do estado atual do debate, a hibridação teórica poderia surgir como o melhor candidato metodológico para gerar um progresso real na disciplina.

La hipótesis de la saliencia aberrante: unificando la neurobiología y la fenomenología de la esquizofrenia / A hipótese da saliência aberrante: unificando a neurobiologia e a fenomenologia da esquizofrenia / The aberrant salience hypothesis: Unifying the neurobiology and phenomenology of schizophrenia / L'hypothèse de la saillance aberrante: unifier la neurobiologie et la phénoménologie de la schizophrénie

Introducción: La popularización del reduccionismo neurobiológico en psicopatología conlleva la idea de que la esquizofrenia puede entenderse simplemente como el producto de alteraciones en el funcionamiento cerebral. Por otro lado, y criticando esta tradición, el enfoque fenomenológico propone que la esquizofrenia debería entenderse como un trastorno del yo. Si bien ambas tradiciones son relevantes en la actualidad, creemos que una comprensión completa del fenómeno psicótico envuelve una integración de ambas. Objetivo: Este artículo plantea que la hipótesis de la saliencia aberrante es un buen candidato para unificar la tradición fenomenológica y la neuropsiquiátrica en el estudio de la esquizofrenia. Procedimiento: Luego de examinar la hipótesis en cuestión en profundidad, exploramos la forma en que podría explicar algunos de los síntomas positivos de la esquizofrenia de forma consistente con sus descripciones fenomenológicas. Conclusiones: Finalmente, se ofrecen algunas consideraciones generales respecto de las consecuencias de nuestro análisis para el campo de la psicopatología.

Introdução: A popularização do reducionismo neurobiológico na psicopatologia traz a ideia de que a esquizofrenia pode ser entendida simplesmente como o produto de alterações na função cerebral. Por outro lado, e criticando essa tradição, a abordagem fenomenológica propõe que a esquizofrenia seja entendida como uma desordem do eu. Embora ambas as tradições sejam relevantes hoje, acreditamos que uma compreensão completa do fenômeno psicótico envolve uma integração de ambas. Objetivo: Este artigo argumenta que a hipótese da saliência aberrante é uma boa candidata para unificar as tradições fenomenológica e neuropsiquiátrica no estudo da esquizofrenia. Procedimento: Depois de examinar a hipótese em questão em profundidade, exploramos como ela pode explicar alguns dos sintomas positivos da esquizofrenia de maneira consistente com suas descrições fenomenológicas. Conclusões: Por fim, são oferecidas algumas considerações gerais sobre as consequências de nossa análise para o campo da psicopatologia.

Background: The popularization of neurobiological reductionism in psychopathology involves the idea that schizophrenia can be fully understood as the mere product of brain-functioning alterations. Criticizing this tradition, the phenomenological approach proposes that schizophrenia should be understood as a self-disturbance. Although both traditions are relevant, we believe that a comprehensive understanding of schizophrenia involves the integration of these two frameworks. Aim: This article proposes that the aberrant salience hypothesis is a good candidate for unifying the phenomenological tradition with the neuropsychiatric approach to psychosis. Methods: After examining the aberrant salience hypothesis in detail, we explore the way in which it can explain the positive symptoms of schizophrenia respecting being consistent with their phenomenological descriptions. Conclusion: we conclude with some considerations about the consequences of our analysis for the field of psychopathology.

Introduction: L'idéal du réductionnisme neurobiologique en psychopathologie implique l'idée que la schizophrénie peut être comprise simplement comme le produit d'altérations du fonctionnement cérébral. D'autre part, et critiquant cette tradition, l'approche phénoménologique propose que la schizophrénie soit comprise comme un trouble de soi. Bien que les deux traditions soient pertinentes aujourd'hui, nous pensons qu'une compréhension complète du phénomène psychotique implique une intégration des deux. Objectif: Cet article soutient que l'hypothèse de la saillance aberrante est un bon candidat pour unifier les traditions phénoménologique et neuropsychiatrique dans l'étude de la schizophrénie. Procédure: Après avoir examiné en profondeur l'hypothèse en question, nous explorons comment elle pourrait expliquer certains des symptômes positifs de la schizophrénie d›une manière cohérente avec leurs descriptions phénoménologiques. Conclusions: Enfin, quelques considérations générales sont proposées concernant les conséquences de notre analyse pour le domaine de la psychopathologie.

¿Estar depresivo o tener depresión? El modelo biomédico y la diferencia entre estado de ánimo y enfermedad / Being Depressed or Having Depression. The biomedical model and the difference between mood and illness

Along with the increase in reported figures of depression in the world's population, organizations such as the WHO have begun to promote screening and pharmacological treatment of mild symptomatic cases. The problem in this context is that the manifestations of 'normal' and 'pathological' depressive mood do not differ much from each other, which creates difficulties at a diagnostic and scientific level. This article explores an approach that could facilitate the clinical and scientific task of differentiating between non-specific affective disturbances (depressive mood) and depression as an illness as such. It is proposed that various causal stressors interact with individual predispositions to trigger a transient change in mood as an adaptive response. In turn, the greater the intensity of the stressors (psychological, social, etc.), the greater the neuroinflammation, which would diminish neuronal plasticity and the possibilities of mood compensation and behavioral change of the subject. The existence of this neurobiological alteration (decreased neuronal plasticity), rather than depressive mood, would help us to categorize depression as a disease.

The phenomenology of auditory verbal hallucinations in schizophrenia and the challenge from pseudohallucinations.

In trying to make sense of the extensive phenomenological variation of first-personal reports on auditory verbal hallucinations, the concept of pseudohallucination is originally introduced to designate any hallucinatory-like phenomena not exhibiting some of the paradigmatic features of "genuine" hallucinations. After its introduction, Karl Jaspers locates the notion of pseudohallucinations into the auditory domain, appealing to a distinction between hallucinatory voices heard within the subjective inner space (pseudohallucination) and voices heard in the outer external space (real hallucinations) with differences in their sensory richness. Jaspers' characterization of the term has been the target of a number of phenomenological, conceptual and empirically-based criticisms. From this latter point of view, it has been claimed that the concept cannot capture distinct phenomena at the neurobiological level. Over the last years, the notion of pseudohallucination seems to be falling into disuse as no major diagnostic system seems to refer to it. In this paper, we propose that even if the concept of pseudohallucination is not helpful to differentiate distinct phenomena at the neurobiological level, the inner/outer distinction highlighted by Jaspers' characterization of the term still remains an open explanatory challenge for dominant theories about the neurocognitive origin of auditory verbal hallucinations. We call this, "the challenge from pseudohallucinations". After exploring this issue in detail, we propose some phenomenological, conceptual, and empirical paths for future research that might help to build up a more contextualized and dynamic view of auditory verbal hallucinatory phenomena.

'Are these my thoughts?': A 20-year prospective study of thought insertion, thought withdrawal, thought broadcasting, and their relationship to auditory verbal hallucinations.

The co-occurrence of delusions and other symptoms at the onset of psychosis is a challenge for theories about the aetiology of psychosis. This paper explores the relatedness of delusions about the experience of thinking (thought insertion, thought withdrawal, and thought broadcasting) and auditory verbal hallucinations by describing their trajectories over a 20-year period in individuals diagnosed with schizophrenia, affective and other psychosis, and unipolar depression nonpsychosis. The sample consisted of 407 participants who were recruited at index hospitalization and evaluated over six follow-ups over 20 years. The symptom structure associated with thought insertion included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusions of control, delusion of self-depreciation, depersonalization and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought withdrawal included somatic hallucinations, other hallucinations, delusions of thought dissemination, delusions of control, sexual delusions, depersonalization, negative symptoms, depression, and anxiety. The symptom constellation of thought broadcasting included auditory verbal hallucinations, somatic hallucinations, delusions of thought-dissemination, delusion of self-depreciation, fantastic delusions, sexual delusions, and depersonalization. Auditory verbal hallucinations and delusions of self-depreciation were significantly associated with both thought insertion and thought broadcasting. Thought insertion and thought withdrawal were significantly associated with other hallucinations, delusions of control, and anxiety; thought withdrawal and thought broadcasting were significantly related to sexual delusions. We hypothesize that specific symptom constellations over time might be explained as the product of pseudo-coherent realities created to give meaning to the experience of the world and the self of individuals in psychosis based on both prior top-down and ongoing bottom-up elements.

Social Perception Deficit as a Factor of Vulnerability to Psychosis: A Brief Proposal for a Definition.

Disturbances in social cognition are a core feature of schizophrenia. While most research in the field has focused on emotion perception, social knowledge, theory of mind, and attribution styles, the domain of social perception has received little specific attention. In this paper, we suggest that this issue can be explained by the lack of a precise and unitary definition of the concept, this leads to the existence of different competing uses of the concept and their conflation with other domains of social cognition. Relying on resources coming from the ecological approach to psychology and the phenomenological tradition in psychiatry, we propose that the concept of Social Perception should be used to refer to low-level pre-reflective processes underlying the awareness of interpersonal interactions with and between others. Clinical data suggests that people with schizophrenia have problems perceiving social situations as opportunities for social engagement, so, in order to fulfil this explanatory need, we propose that the term should be used to capture this important-yet neglected-domain of social cognition. We conclude with the discussion of some future directions for research derived from our proposal.

[Being Depressed or Having Depression. The biomedical model and the difference between mood and illness]. / ¿Estar depresivo o tener depresión? El modelo biomédico y la diferencia entre estado de ánimo y enfermedad.

Along with the increase in reported figures of depression in the world's population, organizations such as the WHO have begun to promote screening and pharmacological treatment of mild symptomatic cases. The problem in this context is that the manifestations of 'normal' and 'pathological' depressive mood do not differ much from each other, which creates difficulties at a diagnostic and scientific level. This article explores an approach that could facilitate the clinical and scientific task of differentiating between non-specific affective disturbances (depressive mood) and depression as an illness as such. It is proposed that various causal stressors interact with individual predispositions to trigger a transient change in mood as an adaptive response. In turn, the greater the intensity of the stressors (psychological, social, etc.), the greater the neuroinflammation, which would diminish neuronal plasticity and the possibilities of mood compensation and behavioral change of the subject. The existence of this neurobiological alteration (decreased neuronal plasticity), rather than depressive mood, would help us to categorize depression as a disease.

[In defense of the biomedical model in psychiatry. the case of depression]. / La depresión como enfermedad: en defensa del modelo biomédico en psiquiatría.

Defining what is meant by "mental illness" has three dimensions: (i) the ontological dimension, which attempts to answer the question of what is a mental illness in itself, (ii) the scientific dimension, which attempts to identify its causes, and (iii) the practical dimension, which will seek a treatment. This article uses depression to examine how various conceptual alternatives in contemporary literature attempted to tackle the problem of what is a mental illness. After evaluating the scope of their proposals in the three dimensions mentioned above, it is concluded that the biomedical model could become a good candidate for developing a useful framework for understanding, having a scientific explanation and treating depression.

Salto a conclusiones y formación de delirios en psicosis: un análisis crítico / Jumping to conclusions and delusion formation in psychosis: A critical analysis

Los delirios son uno de los síntomas más complejos de la psicosis en la esquizofrenia. El enfoque de los dos factores -uno de los enfoques neuropsiquiátricos más populares para la etiología de los delirios en la actualidad- propone la existencia de alteraciones experienciales (factor1) y sesgos cognitivos (factor2) que, en interacción, producirían el síntoma. Una de las alteraciones cognitivas más aludidas por este enfoque es la de «salto a conclusiones», esto es, la tendencia de ciertos sujetos a generar conclusiones apresuradas a pesar de no tener suficiente evidencia para ello. Este trabajo ofrece una revisión narrativa que, luego de clarificar la estructura explicativa del modelo de los dos factores, examina y evalúa críticamente los estudios y la evidencia utilizada por el enfoque para establecer al sesgo de salto a conclusiones como uno de los principales factores cognitivos anormales en el proceso de formación de delirios en psicosis y, por lo tanto, como una de las principales evidencias empíricas en favor del modelo. (AU)

Delusions are one of the most complex symptoms of schizophrenic psychosis. The two-factor approach - one of the most popular approaches to the etiology of delusions in current neuropsychiatry - proposes the existence of experiential (factor1) and cognitive (factor2) alterations that, in interaction, would lead to the production of the symptom. One of the most referred cognitive alterations within this explanatory framework is the jumping to conclusions bias (JTC), namely, the tendency to arrive at conclusions without having sufficient evidence for them. This article offers a narrative review that, after clarifying the explanatory structure of the two-factor model, examines and critically evaluates the evidence used by the approach to stablish the JTC bias as one of the main cognitive alterations in the process of formation of delusions in psychosis and therefore, as empirical support in favor of the approach. (AU)

La depresión como enfermedad: en defensa del modelo biomédico en psiquiatría / In defense of the biomedical model in psychiatry. the case of depression

Defining what is meant by "mental illness" has three dimensions: (i) the ontological dimension, which attempts to answer the question of what is a mental illness in itself, (ii) the scientific dimension, which attempts to identify its causes, and (iii) the practical dimension, which will seek a treatment. This article uses depression to examine how various conceptual alternatives in contemporary literature attempted to tackle the problem of what is a mental illness. After evaluating the scope of their proposals in the three dimensions mentioned above, it is concluded that the biomedical model could become a good candidate for developing a useful framework for understanding, having a scientific explanation and treating depression.

Voces que No lo Son: Los Problemas del Concepto Pseudoalucinación / Voices that are not: The problems of the concept of pseudo-hallucination

Resumen El término pseudoalucinación fue introducido originalmente para designar cualquier fenómeno alucinatorio que no exhibiese todas las características paradigmáticas de las alucinaciones. En nuestro medio, y siguiendo directamente la descripción de Jaspers, se ha empleado el concepto para referirse a un tipo específico de alucinaciones auditivas presentes en personas con esquizofrenia: las voces, otorgándole un valor semiológico especial. Sin embargo, esta tradición diagnóstica no es compartida en otros contextos. El presente trabajo sugiere que la formulación Jasperiana para referirse a las voces como pseudoalucinaciones es inexacta y problemática en lo relativo al valor semiológico asignado, sus bases filosóficas y el origen biológico del fenómeno observado. Junto con esto, proponemos que la falta de claridad etiológica y nosológica que caracterizan esta conceptualización ponen en duda la utilidad de su uso dentro de la psicopatología descriptiva actual. A modo de conclusión, revisamos dos alternativas que el empleo del término podría tomar dentro del campo.

The term pseudohallucination was originally introduced to characterize hallucinatory phenomena not exhibiting the paradigmatic features of hallucinations. In our context, and directly following Jaspers ' description, the term has been used to characterize a specific type of auditory hallucination in schizophrenic patients i.e. the so-called voices. However, this formation is not shared in other contexts. This paper suggests that Jaspers ' formulation is inexact and problematic when trying to describe the semiology, philosophical foundations, and aetiology of the phenomenon. In addition, we claim that this lack of etiological and nosological clarity lead to serious doubts about the real utility of the use of the term within current descriptive psychopathology. We conclude by proposing two potential alternatives that the use of the term might have within the field.

Mapping the Psychotic Mind: a Review on the Subjective Structure of Thought Insertion.

Delusions of thought insertion involve subjects claiming that external agents of different nature had placed thoughts into their minds/heads. However, despite being regarded as one of the most severe and complex symptoms of psychotic disorders, a number of disagreements surround the description of its most fundamental phenomenology. This work has reviewed classic and current research on thought insertion in order to examine and clarify its main experiential features as reported by patients from a first-person perspective. The review shows that such features can be grouped into two categories: (i) experiential changes characterizing the period preceding the adoption of the delusion and, (ii) subjective features of full-blown delusional cases. While the discussion of the latter set of experiential features has received some attention within literature, the examination of the former set has been largely neglected. After this, the review offers a discussion of the most important conceptual disagreements surrounding the phenomenological descriptions of the symptom. Overcoming disagreements regarding the experiential structure of thought insertion is fundamental to elaborate phenomenologically and empirically coherent explanatory theories of the symptom and advance its clinical treatment.

Clarificando el rol de la mentalización en el desarrollo de las funciones ejecutivas / Clarifying the Role of Mentalization in the Development of Executive Functions

Resumen Las funciones ejecutivas son un grupo de habilidades que permiten la generación de respuestas adaptativas a las exigencias medioambientales. A su vez, la capacidad de mentalización refiere a la forma en que los humanos son capaces de discernir los estados mentales, intenciones y creencias de otros a través de la conducta observada. Este trabajo clarifica la forma en que debiéramos entender la relación entre estos dos conceptos. Tras revisar algunos de los aspectos más fundamentales de los conceptos en cuestión, se propone que la mentalización fundamenta, organiza y potencia el desarrollo de las funciones ejecutivas, esto, en oposición a la tesis dominante de Carlson, Moses y Brenton (2002) que indica que las funciones ejecutivas son las que fundamentan el desarrollo de la habilidad de mentalización. Luego de revisar la actual evidencia empírica que apoya la alternativa propuesta, se exploran algunas aplicaciones de esta en el estudio de la naturaleza neurofisiológica de lo social, la naturaleza subjetiva de la conciencia y el dominio de la psicopatología.

Abstract Executive functions are a set of abilities that allow the production of adaptive behaviours to specific challenges from the environment. Mentalization refers to the way in which humans are able to discern mental states, intentions and beliefs of others through observed behaviour. This paper clarifies the way in which we should understand the relationship between these two concepts. After presenting some of the most fundamental aspects of these concepts, it is proposed that mentalization underlies, organizes, and enhances the development of executive functions, this, contrary to the dominant approach defended by Carlson Moses, and Brenton (2002) that suggests that executive functions underlie the development of mentalization. After reviewing empirical evidence for the defended alternative, the last section explores some of its applications in areas such as the study of the neurophysiological nature of the social, the subjective nature of consciousness, and the domain of psychopathology.

La relevancia filosófica del estudio de la esquizofrenia. Cuestiones metodológicas y conceptuales / The Philosophical Relevance of the Study of Schizophrenia. Methodological and Conceptual Issues

El estudio de las enfermedades mentales propone profundas discusiones metodológicas y filosóficas. Este artículo explora la complementariedad disciplinaria que existe, específicamente, entre filosofía de la mente, fenomenología y los estudios empíricos en psiquiatría y psicopatología en el contexto de la comprensión de la esquizofrenia. Luego de clarificar el posible rol de cada una de estas disciplinas, se explora la forma en que un síntoma específico de la esquizofrenia (delirios de inserción de pensamiento) desafía el actual enfoque fenomenológico sobre la relación entre conciencia y autoconciencia. Finalmente, se concluye que la filosofía de la mente, la fenomenología y los estudios empíricos en psicopatología y psiquiatría deben necesariamente regular conjuntamente su progreso con el fin de llegar a conclusiones plausibles respecto de la naturaleza de aquello que denominamos «esquizofrenia¼.

The study of mental illness involves profound methodological and philosophical debates. This article explores the disciplinary complementarity, particularly, between philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and empirical studies in psychiatry and psychopathology in the context of the understanding of schizophrenia. After clarifying the possible role of these disciplines, it is explored the way in which a certain symptom of schizophrenia (thought insertion) challenges the current phenomenological approach to the relationship between consciousness and self-awareness. Finally, it is concluded that philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and empirical studies in psychiatry and psychopathology should, necessarily, regulate their progress jointly in order to reach plausible conclusions about what we call 'schizophrenia'.

Consideraciones críticas sobre la propuesta de Thomas Szasz. Entre filosofía de la mente, fenomenología y psiquiatría / Considerações críticas sobre a proposta de Thomas Szasz. Entre filosofia da mente, fenomenologia e psiquiatria / Critical considerations on Thomas Szasz's proposal. Relating philosophy of mind, phenomenology and psychiatry / Considérations critiques sur la proposition de Thomas Szasz. Entre philosophie de l'esprit, la phénoménologie et la psychiatrie

El siguiente artículo discute algunos aspectos básicos de la crítica al concepto de 'enfermedad mental' elaborada por Thomas Szasz. El análisis incluye elementos provenientes desde la psiquiatría, fenomenología y filosofía de la mente. Junto con ofrecer conclusiones respecto del aporte de la propuesta de Szasz para los actuales desarrollos críticos de las comprensiones de la psicopatología, también concluimos con algunas notas clasificatorias respecto de la naturaleza interdisciplinaria de la relación entre psiquiatría, fenomenología y filosofía de la mente. .(AU)

Este artigo discute alguns dos aspectos básicos das críticas de Thomas Szasz ao conceito de 'doença mental'. Esta análise inclui elementos das áreas da psiquiatria, fenomenologia e filosofia da mente. Além de oferecer uma introspecção da proposta de Szasz sobre o desenvolvimento de uma visão crítica sobre a psicopatologia, este artigo também inclui algumas notas que explicam a natureza da interdisciplinaridade das relações entre a psicoterapia, fenomenologia e a filosofia da mente.(AU)

This paper discusses basic aspects of Thomas Szasz's criticisms of the concept of "mental illness," including considerations from psychiatry, phenomenology and philosophy of mind. The article provides not only insights into Szasz's proposal for the development of a critical understanding of psychopathology, but also presents clarifications on the interdisciplinary nature of the relationship between psychiatry, phenomenology and philosophy of mind.(AU)

L'article suivant discute certains aspects de base de la critique du concept de la 'maladie mentale', élaborée par Thomas Szasz. Cette analyse inclut des éléments provenant de la psychiatrie, de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie de l'esprit. L'article ne fournit non seulement des conclusions sur la contribution de la proposition de Szasz au développement de la compréhension critique de la psychopathologie, mais aussi quelques commentaires explicatifs sur la nature interdisciplinaire du rapport entre la psychiatrie, la phénoménologie et la philosophie de l'esprit.(AU)

Consideraciones críticas sobre la propuesta de Thomas Szasz. Entre filosofía de la mente, fenomenología y psiquiatría / Considerações críticas sobre a proposta de Thomas Szasz. entre filosofia da mente, fenomenologia e psiquiatria / Critical considerations on Thomas Szasz's proposal. relating philosophy of mind, phenomenology and psychiatry / Considérations critiques sur la proposition de Thomas Szasz. entre philosophie de l'esprit, la phénoménologie et la psychiatrie

El siguiente artículo discute algunos aspectos básicos de la crítica al concepto de 'enfermedad mental' elaborada por Thomas Szasz. El análisis incluye elementos provenientes desde la psiquiatría, fenomenología y filosofía de la mente. Junto con ofrecer conclusiones respecto del aporte de la propuesta de Szasz para los actuales desarrollos críticos de las comprensiones de la psicopatología, también concluimos con algunas notas clasificatorias respecto de la naturaleza interdisciplinaria de la relación entre psiquiatría, fenomenología y filosofía de la mente.

Este artigo discute alguns dos aspectos básicos das críticas de Thomas Szasz ao conceito de 'doença mental'. Esta análise inclui elementos das áreas da psiquiatria, fenomenologia e filosofia da mente. Além de oferecer uma introspecção da proposta de Szasz sobre o desenvolvimento de uma visão crítica sobre a psicopatologia, este artigo também inclui algumas notas que explicam a natureza da interdisciplinaridade das relações entre a psicoterapia, fenomenologia e a filosofia da mente.

This paper discusses basic aspects of Thomas Szasz's criticisms of the concept of "mental illness," including considerations from psychiatry, phenomenology and philosophy of mind. The article provides not only insights into Szasz's proposal for the development of a critical understanding of psychopathology, but also presents clarifications on the interdisciplinary nature of the relationship between psychiatry, phenomenology and philosophy of mind.

L'article suivant discute certains aspects de base de la critique du concept de la 'maladie mentale', élaborée par Thomas Szasz. Cette analyse inclut des éléments provenant de la psychiatrie, de la phénoménologie et de la philosophie de l'esprit. L'article ne fournit non seulement des conclusions sur la contribution de la proposition de Szasz au développement de la compréhension critique de la psychopathologie, mais aussi quelques commentaires explicatifs sur la nature interdisciplinaire du rapport entre la psychiatrie, la phénoménologie et la philosophie de l'esprit.

[The Philosophical Relevance of the Study of Schizophrenia. Methodological and Conceptual Issues]. / La relevancia filosófica del estudio de la esquizofrenia. Cuestiones metodológicas y conceptuales.

The study of mental illness involves profound methodological and philosophical debates. This article explores the disciplinary complementarity, particularly, between philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and empirical studies in psychiatry and psychopathology in the context of the understanding of schizophrenia. After clarifying the possible role of these disciplines, it is explored the way in which a certain symptom of schizophrenia (thought insertion) challenges the current phenomenological approach to the relationship between consciousness and self-awareness. Finally, it is concluded that philosophy of mind, phenomenology, and empirical studies in psychiatry and psychopathology should, necessarily, regulate their progress jointly in order to reach plausible conclusions about what we call 'schizophrenia'.