A General Cognitive Ability Factor for the UK Biobank.

UK Biobank participants do not have a high-quality measure of intelligence or polygenic scores (PGSs) of intelligence to simultaneously examine the genetic and neural underpinnings of intelligence. We created a standardized measure of general intelligence (g factor) relative to the UK population and estimated its quality. After running a GWAS of g on UK Biobank participants with a g factor of good quality and without neuroimaging data (N = 187,288), we derived a g PGS for UK Biobank participants with neuroimaging data. For individuals with at least one cognitive test, the g factor from eight cognitive tests (N = 501,650) explained 29% of the variance in cognitive test performance. The PGS for British individuals with neuroimaging data (N = 27,174) explained 7.6% of the variance in g. We provided high-quality g factor estimates for most UK Biobank participants and g factor PGSs for UK Biobank participants with neuroimaging data.

High intelligence is not associated with a greater propensity for mental health disorders.

BACKGROUND: Studies reporting that highly intelligent individuals have more mental health disorders often have sampling bias, no or inadequate control groups, or insufficient sample size. We addressed these caveats by examining the difference in the prevalence of mental health disorders between individuals with high and average general intelligence (g-factor) in the UK Biobank. METHODS: Participants with g-factor scores standardized relative to the same-age UK population, were divided into two groups: a high g-factor group (g-factor 2 SD above the UK mean; N = 16,137) and an average g-factor group (g-factor within 2 SD of the UK mean; N = 236,273). Using self-report questionnaires and medical diagnoses, we examined group differences in the prevalence of 32 phenotypes, including mental health disorders, trauma, allergies, and other traits. RESULTS: High and average g-factor groups differed across 15/32 phenotypes and did not depend on sex and/or age. Individuals with high g-factors had less general anxiety (odds ratio [OR] = 0.69, 95% CI [0.64;0.74]) and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; OR = 0.67, 95 %CI [0.61;0.74]), were less neurotic (ß = -0.12, 95% CI [-0.15;-0.10]), less socially isolated (OR = 0.85, 95% CI [0.80;0.90]), and were less likely to have experienced childhood stressors and abuse, adulthood stressors, or catastrophic trauma (OR = 0.69-0.90). However, they generally had more allergies (e.g., eczema; OR = 1.13-1.33). CONCLUSIONS: The present study provides robust evidence that highly intelligent individuals do not have more mental health disorders than the average population. High intelligence even appears as a protective factor for general anxiety and PTSD.

The epidemiology of cognitive development.

The epidemiology of cognitive development is an approach essentially based on large observational studies, which examines individual differences in cognitive abilities throughout childhood and their determinants. Although different in terms of methodology and main interests from developmental psychology, cognitive epidemiology offers complementary viewpoints on cognitive development and addresses fundamental research questions of interest to developmental psychologists. The present paper depicts the contributions of the epidemiological approach to the field of cognitive development and highlights the methodological advances that have made such contributions possible. We discuss the stability and developmental trajectories of cognitive functions, their main predictors, the complex interplay between environmental and genetic predictors, and the relationships between the different domains of cognition from birth to adulthood.

Bifurcation in brain dynamics reveals a signature of conscious processing independent of report.

An outstanding challenge for consciousness research is to characterize the neural signature of conscious access independently of any decisional processes. Here we present a model-based approach that uses inter-trial variability to identify the brain dynamics associated with stimulus processing. We demonstrate that, even in the absence of any task or behavior, the electroencephalographic response to auditory stimuli shows bifurcation dynamics around 250-300 milliseconds post-stimulus. Namely, the same stimulus gives rise to late sustained activity on some trials, and not on others. This late neural activity is predictive of task-related reports, and also of reports of conscious contents that are randomly sampled during task-free listening. Source localization further suggests that task-free conscious access recruits the same neural networks as those associated with explicit report, except for frontal executive components. Studying brain dynamics through variability could thus play a key role for identifying the core signatures of conscious access, independent of report.

Core cognition in adult vision: A surprising discrepancy between the principles of object continuity and solidity.

From an early age, humans intuitively expect physical objects to obey core principles, including continuity (objects follow spatiotemporally continuous paths) and solidity (two solid objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time). These 2 principles are sometimes viewed as deriving from a single overarching "persistence" principle. Indeed, violations of solidity where one solid object seemingly passes through another could theoretically be interpreted as a violation of continuity, with an object "teleporting" to switch places rather than passing through a solid obstacle. However, it is an empirical issue whether the two principles are processed distinctly or identically to one another. Here, adult participants tracked objects during dynamic events in a novel location detection task, which sometimes involved violations of the principles of continuity or solidity. Although participants explicitly noticed both types of violations and reported being equally surprised at both, they made more errors and answered more slowly after continuity violations than after solidity violations. Our results demonstrate that the two principles show different signature patterns and are thus represented distinctly in the mind. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).