Attention and gaze shifting in dual-task and go/no-go performance with vocal responding.

Evidence from go/no-go performance on the Eriksen flanker task with manual responding suggests that individuals gaze at stimuli just as long as needed to identify them (e.g., Sanders, 1998). In contrast, evidence from dual-task performance with vocal responding suggests that gaze shifts occur after response selection (e.g., Roelofs, 2008a). This difference in results may be due to the nature of the task situation (go/no-go vs. dual task) or the response modality (manual vs. vocal). We examined this by having participants vocally respond to congruent and incongruent flanker stimuli and shift gaze to left- or right-pointing arrows. The arrows required a manual response (dual task) or determined whether the vocal response to the flanker stimuli had to be given or not (go/no-go). Vocal response and gaze shift latencies were longer on incongruent than congruent trials in both dual-task and go/no-go performance. The flanker effect was also present in the manual response latencies in dual-task performance. Ex-Gaussian analyses revealed that the flanker effect on the gaze shifts consisted of a shift of the entire latency distribution. These results suggest that gaze shifts occur after response selection in both dual-task and go/no-go performance with vocal responding.

Attentional control adjustments in Eriksen and Stroop task performance can be independent of response conflict.

In the Eriksen flanker and colour-word Stroop tasks, the response time (RT) difference between incongruent and congruent trials is smaller following incongruent trials than following congruent trials: the "Gratton effect" (Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). According to the prevailing conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), the Gratton effect reflects attentional control adjustment following response conflict on incongruent trials. However, because previous studies compared incongruent and congruent trials, it remains unclear to what extent the Gratton effect is driven by incongruent rather than congruent trials. To resolve this issue, we included neutral trials in addition to incongruent and congruent trials in the Eriksen (Experiment 1) and Stroop (Experiment 2) tasks. Participants responded manually and vocally in both tasks. Moreover, we assessed responding to Stroop stimuli that were preceded by neutral cues or by incongruent- or congruent-predicting cues (Experiment 3). In all three experiments, the RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials was larger for postcongruent trials than for postincongruent and postneutral trials. These findings suggest that control adjustments can be independent of response conflict, challenging conflict-monitoring theory.

Selective attention and response set in the Stroop task.

Response set membership contributes much to the interference in the color-word Stroop task. This may be due to selective allocation of attention to eligible responses or, alternatively, to greater inhibition of distractors that are not responses. In the present article, we report two experiments that were designed to adjudicate between these accounts. In Experiment 1, membership was manipulated on a trial-by-trial basis by cuing the possible responses for each trial. Response time (RT) was longer for distractors that corresponded to a cued, eligible response than to an ineligible one. This cuing effect was independent of the number of different responses. In Experiment 2, the distractor was cued on half the trials. Cuing the distractor decreased RTs on both incongruent and congruent trials. Vincentile analyses in both experiments revealed that the effects were constant throughout the entire RT distributions. These results suggest that response set effects arise because of selective allocation of attention to eligible responses.

Role of Gestalt grouping in selective attention: evidence from the Stroop task.

Selective attention has been intensively studied using the Stroop task. Evidence suggests that Stroop interference in a color-naming task arises partly because of visual attention sharing between color and word: Removing the target color after 150 msec reduces interference (Neumann, 1986). Moreover, removing both the color and the word simultaneously reduces interference less than does removing the color only (La Heij, van der Heijden, & Plooij, 2001). These findings could also be attributed to Gestalt grouping principles, such as common fate. We report three experiments in which the role of Gestalt grouping was further investigated. Experiment I replicated the reduced interference, using words and color patches. In Experiment 2, the color patch was not removed but only repositioned (<2 degrees) after 100 msec, which also reduced interference. In Experiment 3, the distractor was repositioned while the target remained stationary, again reducing interference. These results indicate a role for Gestalt grouping in selective attention.