Entertainment media as a source of relationship misinformation.

In this piece, we propose that entertainment media is an understudied source of misinformation and relationship science is an understudied domain of misinformation. We discuss two ways that relationship misinformation can appear in entertainment media - in the form of blatant claims and subtle content - and we provide an example of each from reality and entertainment television. We also propose an agenda for studying relationship misinformation and a set of questions to guide future research. We conclude by calling attention to the potential harms of such information on individuals and relationships.

Charting cognition: Mapping public understanding of COVID-19.

The COVID-19 pandemic of the last 2 years (and counting) disrupted commerce, travel, workplaces, habits, and-of course-health, the world over. This study aimed to capture snapshots of the perceptions and misperceptions of COVID-19 among 27 participants from three US municipalities. These perspectives are analyzed through thematic analyses and concept maps. Such snapshots, particularly as viewed through the lens of narrative sense-making theory, capture a sample of cognitions at this unique moment in history: a little over 1 year into the COVID-19 pandemic. Findings suggest that the (mis)perceptions captured are predominantly conveyed via narratives of participants' personal experiences, and that the themes of attitudes toward precautionary measures, uncertainty, and the muddied science communication environment are prevalent. These themes suggest several salient targets for future research and current science communication, such as a focus on basic explainers, vaccinations' safety and effectiveness and the necessity of uncertainty in the practice of science.

Influences of study design on the effectiveness of consensus messaging: The case of medicinal cannabis.

This study examines to what extent study design decisions influence the perceived efficacy of consensus messaging, using medicinal cannabis as the context. We find that researchers' decisions about study design matter. A modified Solomon Group Design was used in which participants were either assigned to a group that had a pretest (within-subjects design) or a posttest only group (between-subjects design). Furthermore, participants were exposed to one of three messages-one of two consensus messages or a control message-attributed to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine. A consensus message describing a percent (97%) of agreeing scientists was more effective at shifting public attitudes than a consensus message citing substantial evidence, but this was only true in the between-subject comparisons. Participants tested before and after exposure to a message demonstrated pre-sensitization effects that undermined the goals of the messages. Our results identify these nuances to the effectiveness of scientific consensus messaging, while serving to reinforce the importance of study design.

Knowledge about the nature of science increases public acceptance of science regardless of identity factors.

While people's views about science are related to identity factors (e.g. political orientation) and to knowledge of scientific theories, knowledge about how science works in general also plays an important role. To test this claim, we administered two detailed assessments about the practices of science to a demographically representative sample of the US public (N = 1500), along with questions about the acceptance of evolution, climate change, and vaccines. Participants' political and religious views predicted their acceptance of scientific claims, as in prior work. But a greater knowledge of the nature of science and a more mature view of how to mitigate scientific disagreements each related positively to acceptance. Importantly, the positive effect of scientific thinking on acceptance held regardless of participants' political ideology or religiosity. Increased attention to developing people's knowledge of how science works could thus help to combat resistance to scientific claims across the political and religious spectrum.

Public perceptions of who counts as a scientist for controversial science.

In an era where expertise is increasingly critiqued, this study draws from the research on expertise and scientist stereotyping to explore who the public considers to be a scientist in the context of media coverage about climate change and genetically modified organisms. Using survey data from the United States, we find that political ideology and science knowledge affect who the US public believes is a scientist in these domains. Our results suggest important differences in the role of science media attention and science media selection in the publics "scientist" labeling. In addition, we replicate previous work and find that compared to other people who work in science, those with PhDs in Biology and Chemistry are most commonly seen as scientists.

The role of conspiracy mentality in denial of science and susceptibility to viral deception about science.

Members of the public can disagree with scientists in at least two ways: people can reject well-established scientific theories and they can believe fabricated, deceptive claims about science to be true. Scholars examining the reasons for these disagreements find that some individuals are more likely than others to diverge from scientists because of individual factors such as their science literacy, political ideology, and religiosity. This study builds on this literature by examining the role of conspiracy mentality in these two phenomena. Participants were recruited from a national online panel (N = 513) and in person from the first annual Flat Earth International Conference (N = 21). We found that conspiracy mentality and science literacy both play important roles in believing viral and deceptive claims about science, but evidence for the importance of conspiracy mentality in the rejection of science is much more mixed.

Questioning supports effective transmission of knowledge and increased exploratory learning in pre-kindergarten children.

How can education optimize transmission of knowledge while also fostering further learning? Focusing on children at the cusp of formal schooling (N = 180, age = 4.0-6.0 y), we investigate learning after direct instruction by a knowledgeable teacher, after questioning by a knowledgeable teacher, and after questioning by a naïve informant. Consistent with previous findings, instruction by a knowledgeable teacher allows effective information transmission but at the cost of exploration and further learning. Critically, we find a dual benefit for questioning by a knowledgeable teacher: Such pedagogical questioning both effectively transmits knowledge and fosters exploration and further learning, regardless of whether the question was directed to the child or directed to a third party and overheard by the child. These effects are not observed when the same question is asked by a naïve informant. We conclude that a teacher's choice of pedagogical method may differentially influence learning through their choices of how, and how not, to present evidence, with implications for transmission of knowledge and self-directed discovery. A video abstract of this article can be viewed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FJXH2b65wL8.

Processing the papal encyclical through perceptual filters: Pope Francis, identity-protective cognition, and climate change concern.

Previous research suggests that when individuals encounter new information, they interpret it through perceptual 'filters' of prior beliefs, relevant social identities, and messenger credibility. In short, evaluations are not based solely on message accuracy, but also on the extent to which the message and messenger are amenable to the values of one's social groups. Here, we use the release of Pope Francis's 2015 encyclical as the context for a natural experiment to examine the role of prior values in climate change cognition. Based on our analysis of panel data collected before and after the encyclical's release, we find that political ideology moderated views of papal credibility on climate change for those participants who were aware of the encyclical. We also find that, in some contexts, non-Catholics who were aware of the encyclical granted Pope Francis additional credibility compared to the non-Catholics who were unaware of it, yet Catholics granted the Pope high credibility regardless of encyclical awareness. Importantly, papal credibility mediated the conditional relationships between encyclical awareness and acceptance of the Pope's messages on climate change. We conclude by discussing how our results provide insight into cognitive processing of new information about controversial issues.

Engaging in Effective Science Communication: A Response to Blancke et al. on Deproblematizing GMOs.

As science communication scholars, we encourage interdisciplinary efforts such as those by Blancke, Grunewald, and De Jaeger to engage with the public on GMOs and genetic engineering broadly. We extend the advice given by these scholars with tips based on what we know from the science of science communication.

Learning Who Knows What: Children Adjust Their Inquiry to Gather Information from Others.

The current research focuses on how children's inquiry may be affected by how they learn about which sources are likely to provide accurate, helpful information. Four- and 5-year-olds (N = 188) were tasked with asking two different puppet informants - one knowledgeable and one not knowledgeable - questions to determine which of four pictures was inside of a set of boxes. Before beginning the task, children learned about the knowledge status of the two informants in one of three learning conditions: (a) by witnessing how the informants answered sample questions (i.e., show condition), (b) by being told what informants knew (i.e., tell condition), or (c) by both (i.e., show & tell condition). Five-year-olds outperformed 4-year-olds on most parts of the inquiry process. Overall, children were less certain about which informant had been most helpful when they found out that information solely via observation as compared to when they had some third-party information about the informant knowledge. However, children adjusted their questioning strategies appropriately, more frequently asking questions that served to double check the answers they were receiving in the observation only condition. In sum, children were highly resilient, adjusting their questioning strategies based on the information provided, leading to no overall differences in their accuracy of determining the contents of the boxes between the three learning conditions. Implications for learning from others are discussed.

How do children weigh competence and benevolence when deciding whom to trust?

In three experiments, we investigate how 187 3- to 5-year-olds weigh competence and benevolence when deciding whom to trust. Children were presented with two informants who provided conflicting labels for novel objects--one informant was competent, but mean, the other incompetent, but nice. Across experiments, we manipulated the order in which competence and benevolence were presented and the way in which they were described (via trait labels or descriptions of prior behavior). When competence was described via prior behavior (Experiments 1-2), children endorsed the informants' labels equally. In contrast, when competence was described via trait labels (Experiment 3), children endorsed labels provided by the competent, mean informant. When considering children's endorsement at the individual level, we found their ability to evaluate competence, not benevolence, related to their endorsements. These findings emphasize the importance of considering how children process information about informants and use this information to determine whom to trust.

Learning to trust and trusting to learn: a theoretical framework.

Learning from other people requires integrating reasoning about an informant's psychological properties, such as knowledge and intent, with reasoning about the implications of the data the informant chooses to present. Here, we argue for an approach that considers these two reasoning paths as interrelated, reciprocal processes that develop over experience and guide learners when acquiring knowledge about the world.

Developing expectations regarding the boundaries of expertise.

Three experiments examined elementary school-aged children's and adults' expectations regarding what specialists (i.e., those with narrow domains of expertise) and generalists (i.e., those with broad domains of expertise) are likely to know. Experiment 1 demonstrated developmental differences in the ability to differentiate between generalists and specialists, with younger children believing generalists have more specific trivia knowledge than older children and adults believed. Experiment 2 demonstrated that children and adults expected generalists to have more underlying principles knowledge than specific trivia knowledge about unfamiliar animals. However, they believed that generalists would have more of both types of knowledge than themselves. Finally, Experiment 3 demonstrated that children and adults recognized that underlying principles knowledge can be generalized between topics closely related to the specialists' domains of expertise. However, they did not recognize when this knowledge was generalizable to topics slightly less related, expecting generalists to know only as much as they would. Importantly, this work contributes to the literature by showing how much of and what kinds of knowledge different types of experts are expected to have. In sum, this work provides insight into some of the ways children's notions of expertise change over development. The current research demonstrates that between the ages of 5 and 10, children are developing the ability to recognize how experts' knowledge is likely to be limited. That said, even older children at times struggle to determine the breadth of an experts' knowledge.

When do children trust the expert? Benevolence information influences children's trust more than expertise.

How do children use informant niceness, meanness, and expertise when choosing between informant claims and crediting informants with knowledge? In Experiment 1, preschoolers met two experts providing conflicting claims for which only one had relevant expertise. Five-year-olds endorsed the relevant expert's claim and credited him with knowledge more often than 3-year-olds. In Experiment 2, niceness/meanness information was added. Although children most strongly preferred the nice relevant expert, the children often chose the nice irrelevant expert when the relevant one was mean. In Experiment 3, a mean expert was paired with a nice non-expert. Although this nice informant had no expertise, preschoolers continued to endorse his claims and credit him with knowledge. Also noteworthy, children in all three experiments seemed to struggle more to choose the relevant expert's claim than to credit him with knowledge. Together, these experiments demonstrate that niceness/meanness information can powerfully influence how children evaluate informants.

Judging judges: How do children weigh the importance of capability and objectivity for being a good decision maker?

Two studies examined developmental differences in how children weigh capability and objectivity when evaluating potential judges. In Study 1, 84 6- to 12-year-olds and adults were told stories about pairs of judges that varied in capability (i.e., perceptual capacity) and objectivity (i.e., the relationship to a contestant) and were asked to predict which judge would be more accurate. Participants generally preferred capable over incapable judges. Additionally, 10- and 12-year-olds adjusted their preferences for the most capable judge based on objectivity information. Seventy 6- and 8-year-olds participated in Study 2, which was similar to Study 1 except that the judges could both seem incapable unless children understood how different decisions require different kinds of perceptual capabilities. While 8-year-olds chose judges based on the relevance of the perceptual capability, 6-year-olds struggled, seeming to be distracted by the valence of the judges' relationships to the contestants. Overall, these results support that there are important shifts in how children evaluate decision makers from early to middle childhood.

Determining who to question, what to ask, and how much information to ask for: the development of inquiry in young children.

To obtain reliable information, it is important to identify and effectively question knowledgeable informants. Two experiments examined how age and the ease of distinguishing between reliable and unreliable sources influence children's ability to effectively question those sources to solve problems. A sample of 3- to 5-year-olds was introduced to a knowledgeable informant contrasted with an informant who always gave inaccurate answers or one who always indicated ignorance. Children were generally better at determining which informant to question when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an ignorant informant than when a knowledgeable informant was contrasted with an inaccurate informant. In some cases, age also influenced the ability to determine who to question and what to ask. Importantly, in both experiments, the strongest predictor of accuracy was whether children had acquired sufficient information; successful problem solving required integrating knowledge of who to question, what to ask, and how much information to ask for.