Your browser doesn't support javascript.
loading
Show: 20 | 50 | 100
Results 1 - 6 de 6
Filter
Add more filters










Database
Language
Publication year range
2.
Sci Adv ; 8(12): eabj1927, 2022 Mar 25.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-35319979

ABSTRACT

This study provides a global assessment of the linkages between observed fisheries-related offenses across the world's oceans between 2000 and 2020. We analyze data from the largest existing repository with 6853 events reporting offenses across 18 fishing-related categories, including illegal fishing, human rights abuses, and smuggling. We find that at least 33% of all recorded offenses are associated with 450 industrial vessels and 20 companies originating from China, the EU, and tax haven jurisdictions. We observe links between various types of offenses for 779 vessels, with such "transversal criminality" involving 2000 offenses and crimes globally. This study demonstrates the ability to identify offenders and patterns of behaviors threatening fisheries sustainability at a global level and countries most vulnerable to transversal criminality. In light of concerns for widespread underreporting and impunity, we call for greater information sharing, interagency cooperation, and stringent enforcement to bring to account major offenders.

4.
Nat Ecol Evol ; 2(11): 1679, 2018 11.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-30323208
5.
PLoS One ; 10(3): e0118351, 2015.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-25793775

ABSTRACT

We compare the performance of European Union (EU) and Chinese fisheries access agreements with West African countries in terms of illegal and unreported fishing, economic equity, and patterns of exploitation. Bottom-up re-estimations of catch reveal that the EU (1.6 million t•year(-1)) and China (2.3 million t•year(-1)) report only 29% and 8%, respectively, of their estimated total catches (including estimated discards whenever possible) from West African countries between 2000 and 2010. EU catches are declining, while Chinese catches are increasing and are yet to reach the historic maximum level of EU catches (3 million t•year(-1) on average in the 1970s-1980s). The monetary value of EU fishing agreements, correlated in theory with reported catches, is straightforward to access, in contrast to Chinese agreements. However, once quantified, the value of Chinese agreements is readily traceable within the African economy through the different projects they directly cover, in contrast to the funds disbursed [to host governments] by the EU. Overall, China provides resources equivalent to about 4% of the ex-vessel value [value at landing] of the catch taken by Chinese distant-water fleets from West African waters, while the EU pays 8%. We address the difficulties of separating fees directly related to fishing from other economic or political motivations for Chinese fees, which could introduce a bias to the present findings as this operation is not performed for EU access fees officially related to fishing. Our study reveals that the EU and China perform similarly in terms of illegal fishing, patterns of exploitation and sustainability of resource use, while under-reporting by the EU increases and that by China decreases. The EU agreements provide, in theory, room for improving scientific research, monitoring and surveillance, suggesting a better performance than for Chinese agreements, but the end-use of the EU funds are more difficult, and sometime impossible to ascertain.


Subject(s)
Costs and Cost Analysis , Fisheries/economics , Fishes , Africa, Western , Animals , China , European Union , Geography
6.
Disasters ; 29(1): 1-25, 2005 Mar.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: mdl-15720378

ABSTRACT

This paper examines advocacy initiatives by humanitarian and human rights organisations to address problems of governance in resource-rich and conflict-affected countries, focussing on the case of Angola. Humanitarian principles preclude the use of indiscriminate conditionality and point towards a cautious approach to advocacy aimed at assisting vulnerable populations. Furthermore, the relatively insignificant amount of aid supplied to resource-rich local authorities means that individual agencies have precious little leverage, especially when commercial interests rather than humanitarian or 'good governance' principles influence the priorities of bilateral donors. A context of resource wealth calls for: high levels of coordination and cooperation between human rights groups, aid agencies and donors; balanced use of conditionality, based on the drawing, by donors, of a clear distinction between emergency and development-oriented assistance; and a sustained effort to highlight the responsibilities of local authorities, foreign governments and businesses in meeting humanitarian and development objectives.


Subject(s)
Human Rights Abuses/prevention & control , International Cooperation , Petroleum , Relief Work/organization & administration , Warfare , Angola , Humans , Organizations , Politics , Vulnerable Populations
SELECTION OF CITATIONS
SEARCH DETAIL
...