Understanding the 'blues of safety professionals'.

Something is not right in the safety profession. Many books written by professionals in the 2010s express a strong discontent. These professionals are highly critical of their situation, practice, role and identity. In these books, they express what this article describes as the 'blues of safety professionals'. Although varying in writing style, tone, theoretical inspiration, emphasis and experience, they address similar issues which relate to practices corresponding, in their eyes, to outmoded, inadequate or even perverse ideas. The aim of this article is to introduce, summarize, explain and problematize the significance of this literature. Following a methodological section, the 'safety professional blues' is introduced. It is argued in another section that the 'blues' pinpoints what these authors consider to be flawed assumptions about many of the core ingredients of the safety profession. The roots of this discontent are the topic of another section, while a final section problematizes the 'blues'.

Reflecting on Jens Rasmussen's legacy (2) behind and beyond, a 'constructivist turn'.

This article is the second part of a study on the legacy of Jens Rasmussen. The first article, subtitled 'A Strong Program for a Hard Problem', looks back on his 30 years of scientific contribution, from 1969 to 2000. This second article explores and investigates some of the intellectual roots which influenced his thinking, using them as a basis to understand some limits and move forward. Indeed, historically oriented studies such as this one are not only tributes to researchers, but a way to differentiate and contrast our present situation with the past in order to integrate contemporary trends, be they theoretical or empirical, or oriented towards research and new models. In the first section of this article, I offer a synthesis of the background covered in the previous article, but I use a tree here as a graphical complement. Branches of the tree show the many fruitful directions opened by Jens Rasmussen, directions which inspired many researchers. In the second part, I address what I believe to be behind this wealth of engineering legacy: cybernetics. I contend that cybernetics has had a profound influence on his thinking and provided him key principles for his inspiring and successful models. To develop the tree image, one might say that cybernetics is the trunk of the tree. Finally, in the third part, I take the opportunity to explore the relevance of extending and sensitising his program to constructivist discourses. After an introduction to this discourse, identifying four types of constructivisms (cognitive, social, epistemological and anthropological), I characterise this move as a 'constructivist turn'.

First lessons of the Toulouse ammonium nitrate disaster, 21st September 2001, AZF plant, France.

A terrible explosion of ammonium nitrate, killing 30 people, occurred on 21st September 2001, in Toulouse, in AZF plant belonging to Grande Paroisse Company, TotalFinaElf Group. The manufactured chemicals in the plant were mainly ammonium nitrate, ammonium nitrate-based fertilisers and other chemicals including chlorinated compounds. The origins of the accident haven't found yet an agreement among investigators (company, justice). The aim of this paper is to provide abroad an overview of some lessons learnt on that accident, from many perspectives, following the national debates and parliamentary enquiry as well as the various technical accident investigations.