COVID-19 policies in Germany and their social, political, and psychological consequences.

Many policy analyses on COVID-19 have been focusing on what kind of policies are implemented to contain the spread of COVID-19. What seems equally important to explore are the social and political consequences of the confinement policies. Does the public support strict confinement policies? What are the social, political, and psychological consequences of the confinement policies? The question of how legitimate a policy is among the public is at the core of democratic theory. Its relevance also stems from the expected consequences of public support on behavior: The more someone supports a policy, the more someone is likely to follow the policy even if the policy is not strictly enforced. In this paper, we will focus on Germany, briefly summarize the main policies during the first 6 weeks of confinement and then explore political attitudes, risk perceptions, and the social consequences of the lockdown.

Governator vs. Hunter and Aggregator: A simulation of party competition with vote-seeking and office-seeking rules.

The policy positions parties choose are central to both attracting voters and forming coalition governments. How then should parties choose positions to best represent voters? Laver and Sergenti show that in an agent-based model with boundedly rational actors a decision rule (Aggregator) that takes the mean policy position of its supporters is the best rule to achieve high congruence between voter preferences and party positions. But this result only pertains to representation by the legislature, not representation by the government. To evaluate this we add a coalition formation procedure with boundedly rational parties to the Laver and Sergenti model of party competition. We also add two new decision rules that are sensitive to government formation outcomes rather than voter positions. We develop two simulations: a single-rule one in which parties with the same rule compete and an evolutionary simulation in which parties with different rules compete. In these simulations we analyze party behavior under a large number of different parameters that describe real-world variance in political parties' motives and party system characteristics. Our most important conclusion is that Aggregators also produce the best match between government policy and voter preferences. Moreover, even though citizens often frown upon politicians' interest in the prestige and rents that come with winning political office (office pay-offs), we find that citizens actually receive better representation by the government if politicians are motivated by these office pay-offs in contrast to politicians with ideological motivations (policy pay-offs). Finally, we show that while more parties are linked to better political representation, how parties choose policy positions affects political representation as well. Overall, we conclude that to understand variation in the quality of political representation scholars should look beyond electoral systems and take into account variation in party behavior as well.