Does Insect Aversion Lead to Increased Household Pesticide Use?

In many human societies, domestic insect pests often evoke feelings of disgust, fear and aversion. These common feelings may translate to increased use of household pesticides. No study has ever explored this possibility and consequently, efforts to mitigate public exposure to domestic pesticides typically focus on addressing knowledge gaps. We tested the hypothesis that negative emotions toward insects may motivate people to use pesticides, by interviewing 70 participants and assessing their insect aversion levels using a computerized test. Contrary to our hypothesis, we found no effect of insect aversion on pesticide use. However, we did find that personal attributes and preferences such as wishing to avoid exposure to toxic chemicals, being vegetarian and taking frequent nature walks reduced pesticide use, in addition to low infestation levels and physical attributes of the housing unit. We emphasize the importance of conducting future studies in various societies, where insect aversion and other factors may have different effects on household pesticide use. Such studies may provide culture-specific insights that could foster the development of next-generation urban IPM (Integrated Pest Management) public education programs, which will address not only knowledge gaps, but also emotional aspects and personal attributes that lead to unnecessary or excessive use of household pesticides.

Number symbols are processed more automatically than nonsymbolic numerical magnitudes: Findings from a Symbolic-Nonsymbolic Stroop task.

Are number symbols (e.g., 3) and numerically equivalent quantities (e.g., •••) processed similarly or distinctly? If symbols and quantities are processed similarly then processing one format should activate the processing of the other. To experimentally probe this prediction, we assessed the processing of symbols and quantities using a Stroop-like paradigm. Participants (NStudy1 = 80, NStudy2 = 63) compared adjacent arrays of symbols (e.g., 4444 vs 333) and were instructed to indicate the side containing either the greater quantity of symbols (nonsymbolic task) or the numerically larger symbol (symbolic task). The tasks included congruent trials, where the greater symbol and quantity appeared on the same side (e.g. 333 vs. 4444), incongruent trials, where the greater symbol and quantity appeared on opposite sides (e.g. 3333 vs. 444), and neutral trials, where the irrelevant dimension was the same across both sides (e.g. 3333 vs. 333 for nonsymbolic; 333 vs. 444 for symbolic). The numerical distance between stimuli was systematically varied, and quantities in the subitizing and counting range were analyzed together and independently. Participants were more efficient comparing symbols and ignoring quantities, than comparing quantities and ignoring symbols. Similarly, while both symbols and quantities influenced each other as the irrelevant dimension, symbols influenced the processing of quantities more than quantities influenced the processing of symbols, especially for quantities in the counting rage. Additionally, symbols were less influenced by numerical distance than quantities, when acting as the relevant and irrelevant dimension. These findings suggest that symbols are processed differently and more automatically than quantities.

Sub-cortical areas process physical size but not numerical value.

A robust finding in the numerical cognition literature is that the physical size and the numerical value of two to-be-compared digits interact, resulting in a size congruity effect (SiCE). The current study focuses on the possible role of prestriate areas in a digit comparison Stroop-like task. In the visual pathway, prestriate areas refer to regions from the retina up to the primary visual cortex (V1). I hypothesized that processing of physical size, but not numerical value, begins already in prestriate areas. This is because physical size is a basic visual feature while the numerical value of a symbol is a learned convention that should be retrieved from long-term memory. Adult participants compared the size or the numerical value of two digits. Without participants' awareness, I projected the digits either to the same eye, or each digit to a different eye. The latter type of presentation prevents prestriate areas from taking part in comparing the digits. Therefore, slower a response time under this condition hints at the involvement of prestriate areas. Evidence confirmed the initial hypothesis, demonstrating slower performance when the stimuli are segregated between the eyes but only for physical size comparisons. This finding suggests that at least the initial processing of physical size, when relevant, is done before, and by different neural substrate than numerical value. The implications of the study and future directions are discussed.

The link between emotion regulation and size estimation of spiders pictures among women with fear of spiders.

Introduction: Fear is associated with perceptual biases. People who are afraid of spiders perceive spiders as larger than people without this fear. It is yet unclear, however, whether this effect can be influenced by using implicit (non-deliberate) emotion regulation (ER) processes and explicit (deliberate) ER strategies, such as reappraisal and suppression. Method: This study examined the link between implicit and explicit ER and size estimation among women afraid of spiders. After performing an implicit ER (cognitive control) task, participants rated the size and valence of spiders, wasps and butterflies shown in pictures. Participants' tendency to use reappraisal and suppression was assessed using the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. Results: Results showed no effect of implicit ER on size and valence ratings. A greater tendency to use reappraisal was linked to reduced negative feelings on seeing the pictures of spiders. Greater use of suppression, however, was linked to increased size estimation of the spider stimuli. Discussion: These results highlight the role of ER in perceptual biases and offer avenues for future ER-based treatments for specific phobias.

Magnitude integration in the Archerfish.

We make magnitude-related decisions every day, for example, to choose the shortest queue at the grocery store. When making such decisions, which magnitudes do we consider? The dominant theory suggests that our focus is on numerical quantity, i.e., the number of items in a set. This theory leads to quantity-focused research suggesting that discriminating quantities is automatic, innate, and is the basis for mathematical abilities in humans. Another theory suggests, instead, that non-numerical magnitudes, such as the total area of the compared items, are usually what humans rely on, and numerical quantity is used only when required. Since wild animals must make quick magnitude-related decisions to eat, seek shelter, survive, and procreate, studying which magnitudes animals spontaneously use in magnitude-related decisions is a good way to study the relative primacy of numerical quantity versus non-numerical magnitudes. We asked whether, in an animal model, the influence of non-numerical magnitudes on performance in a spontaneous magnitude comparison task is modulated by the number of non-numerical magnitudes that positively correlate with numerical quantity. Our animal model was the Archerfish, a fish that, in the wild, hunts insects by shooting a jet of water at them. These fish were trained to shoot water at artificial targets presented on a computer screen above the water tank. We tested the Archerfish's performance in spontaneous, untrained two-choice magnitude decisions. We found that the fish tended to select the group containing larger non-numerical magnitudes and smaller quantities of dots. The fish selected the group containing more dots mostly when the quantity of the dots was positively correlated with all five different non-numerical magnitudes. The current study adds to the body of studies providing direct evidence that in some cases animals' magnitude-related decisions are more affected by non-numerical magnitudes than by numerical quantity, putting doubt on the claims that numerical quantity perception is the most basic building block of mathematical abilities.

Number and Continuous Magnitude Processing Depends on Task Goals and Numerosity Ratio.

A large body of evidence shows that when comparing non-symbolic numerosities, performance is influenced by irrelevant continuous magnitudes, such as total surface area, density, etc. In the current work, we ask whether the weights given to numerosity and continuous magnitudes are modulated by top-down and bottom-up factors. With that aim in mind, we asked adult participants to compare two groups of dots. To manipulate task demands, participants reported after every trial either (1) how accurate their response was (emphasizing accuracy) or (2) how fast their response was (emphasizing speed). To manipulate bottom-up factors, the stimuli were presented for 50 ms, 100 ms or 200 ms. Our results revealed (a) that the weights given to numerosity and continuous magnitude ratios were affected by the interaction of top-down and bottom-up manipulations and (b) that under some conditions, using numerosity ratio can reduce efficiency. Accordingly, we suggest that processing magnitudes is not rigid and static but a flexible and adaptive process that allows us to deal with the ever-changing demands of the environment. We also argue that there is not just one answer to the question 'what do we process when we process magnitudes?', and future studies should take this flexibility under consideration.