Point of Care Testing for Infectious Disease in Europe: A Scoping Review and Survey Study.

Background: Point of care testing (POCT) for infectious diseases is testing conducted near the patient. It allows clinicians to offer the most appropriate treatment more quickly. As POCT devices have increased in accuracy and become more cost-effective, their use has grown, but a systematic assessment of their use for clinical and public health management of infectious diseases in EU/EEA countries has not been previously undertaken. Methods: A scoping review of the literature on POCT in EU/ EEA countries as at November 2019, and a survey of key stakeholders. Results: 350 relevant articles were identified and 54 survey responses from 26 EU/EEA countries were analysed. POCT is available for a range of infectious diseases and in all countries responding to the survey (for at least one disease). POCT is commonly available for influenza, HIV/AIDS, Legionnaires' disease and malaria, where it is used in at least half of EU/EEA countries. While POCT has the potential to support many improvements to clinical care of infectious diseases (e.g., faster diagnosis, more appropriate use of antimicrobials), the results suggest POCT is infrequently used to support public health functions (e.g., disease surveillance and reporting). Conclusion: Although POCT is in use to some extent in all EU/EEA countries, the full benefits of POCT in wider public health functions have yet to be realised. Further research on barriers and facilitators to implementation is warranted.

Investing in Public Health Microbiology Laboratories in Western Balkan Countries Enhances Health Security From Communicable Disease Threats in Europe.

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC), under the EU enlargement policy, has supported national efforts of Western Balkan countries to strengthen their communicable disease prevention and control systems. The new EU strategy "A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans" advocates transformation processes that will build the foundation of EU-oriented national reforms. Well-functioning public health microbiology laboratories are key for early detection and control of infectious diseases, and thus maintaining and enhancing health security in Europe. In order to help Western Balkan countries to improve their national capacities, ECDC facilitated needs assessments and identified key areas for advancement toward effective public health microbiology systems. Countries identified gaps in their laboratory data reporting and exchange systems. Harmonized and effective procedures for handling of highly contagious agents and cross-border transportation of biological samples were often lacking, as well as the systematic use of diagnostic testing at the primary care level or referral of patients, in particular for detection of antimicrobial resistance. There is a clear need to address the financial investment required for sustaining sufficient numbers of skilled laboratory workforce, laboratory supplies, and the development of new methods and techniques, including investment in emerging laboratory technologies, such as molecular typing by whole genome sequencing. This article highlights the key areas for investing in public health microbiology laboratories in Western Balkan countries needed to strengthen health security in Europe.

Factors associated with nosocomial SARS-CoV transmission among healthcare workers in Hanoi, Vietnam, 2003.

BACKGROUND: In March of 2003, an outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) occurred in Northern Vietnam. This outbreak began when a traveler arriving from Hong Kong sought medical care at a small hospital (Hospital A) in Hanoi, initiating a serious and substantial transmission event within the hospital, and subsequent limited spread within the community. METHODS: We surveyed Hospital A personnel for exposure to the index patient and for symptoms of disease during the outbreak. Additionally, serum specimens were collected and assayed for antibody to SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV) antibody and job-specific attack rates were calculated. A nested case-control analysis was performed to assess risk factors for acquiring SARS-CoV infection. RESULTS: One hundred and fifty-three of 193 (79.3%) clinical and non-clinical staff consented to participate. Excluding job categories with < 3 workers, the highest SARS attack rates occurred among nurses who worked in the outpatient and inpatient general wards (57.1, 47.4%, respectively). Nurses assigned to the operating room/intensive care unit, experienced the lowest attack rates (7.1%) among all clinical staff. Serologic evidence of SARS-CoV infection was detected in 4 individuals, including 2 non-clinical workers, who had not previously been identified as SARS cases; none reported having had fever or cough. Entering the index patient's room and having seen (viewed) the patient were the behaviors associated with highest risk for infection by univariate analysis (odds ratios 20.0, 14.0; 95% confidence intervals 4.1-97.1, 3.6-55.3, respectively). CONCLUSION: This study highlights job categories and activities associated with increased risk for SARS-CoV infection and demonstrates that a broad diversity of hospital workers may be vulnerable during an outbreak. These findings may help guide recommendations for the protection of vulnerable occupational groups and may have implications for other respiratory infections such as influenza.

Lack of SARS transmission among public hospital workers, Vietnam.

The severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak in Vietnam was amplified by nosocomial spread within hospital A, but no transmission was reported in hospital B, the second of two designated SARS hospitals. Our study documents lack of SARS-associated coronavirus transmission to hospital B workers, despite variable infection control measures and the use of personal protective equipment.

Clinical description of a completed outbreak of SARS in Vietnam, February-May 2003.

We investigated the clinical manifestations and course of all probable severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) patients in the Vietnam outbreak. Probable SARS cases were defined by using the revised World Health Organization criteria. We systematically reviewed medical records and undertook descriptive statistical analyses. All 62 patients were hospitalized. On admission, the most prominent symptoms were malaise (82.3%) and fever (79.0%). Cough, chest pain, and shortness of breath were present in approximately one quarter of the patients; 79.0% had lymphopenia; 40.3% had thrombocytopenia; 19.4% had leukopenia; and 75.8% showed changes on chest radiograph. Fever developed on the first day of illness onset, and both respiratory symptoms and radiographic changes occurred on day 4. On average, maximal radiographic changes were observed on day 10, and fevers subsided by day 13. Symptoms on admission were nonspecific, although fever, malaise, and lymphopenia were common. The complications of SARS included invasive intubation and ventilation (11.3%) and death (9.7%).