The irrationality of human confidence that an ageless existence would be better.

Transhumanists and their fellow travelers urge humanity to prioritize the development of biotechnologies that would eliminate aging, delivering 'an endless summer of literally perpetual youth.' Aspiring not to age instantiates what philosopher Martha Nussbaum calls the yearning for 'external transcendence,' or the fundamental surpassing of human bounds due to confidence that life without them would be better. Based on Immanuel Kant's account of the parameters of human understanding, I argue that engineering agelessness could not be a rational priority for humanity on the level of public policy. This stance is complemented by an argument focused on individual decision-making in liberal-democratic milieus, where no governing conception of the good is presumed and the first-personal level matters greatly. Here, drawing on philosopher and cognitive scientist Laurie Ann Paul's concept of 'transformative experience,' I maintain that individuals could not 'rationally,' meaning, here, 'prudentially,' say 'yes' to agelessness. Absorbing the irrationality of human zeal to eliminate aging, based on assurance that an ageless existence would be better, should spur a redoubled dedication to human flourishing.

A world of difference: The fundamental opposition between transhumanist "welfarism" and disability advocacy.

From the standpoint of disability advocacy, further exploration of the concept of well-being stands to be availing. The notion that "welfarism" about disability, which Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane debuted, qualifies as helpful is encouraged by their claim that welfarism shares important commitments with that advocacy. As becomes clear when they apply their welfarist frame to procreative decisions, endorsing welfarism would, in fact, sharply undermine it. Savulescu and Kahane's Principle of Procreative Beneficence-which reflects transhumanism, or advocacy of radical bioenhancement-morally requires parents to choose the child who will, in all probability, have "the best life." Assuming the emergence of potent biotechnologies, procreative decision-making would be highly standardized, for prospective parents would be morally obliged to maximize select capacities, including intelligence, self-control, and hedonic set-point, in their children. Welfarism, applied to reproduction, is staunchly objectivist about what course is incumbent on decision-makers, giving no credence to first-personal values, aspirations, and experiences. Though this dismissal of individual perspectives applies to everyone, its implications for disability advocacy are especially severe. With that advocacy in view, greater attention to "well-being" should, therefore, be severed from the welfarism of Savulescu and Kahane.

Contributions of Hippocratic medicine and Plato to today's debate over health, social determinants and the authority of biomedicine.

By exploring a competition for authority on health and human nature between Plato and Hippocratic medicine, this paper offers a fresh perspective on an overarching debate today involving health and the role of healthcare in its safeguarding. Economically and politically, healthcare continues to dominate the USA's handling of health, construed biophysically as the absence of disease. Yet, notoriously, in major health outcomes, the USA fares worse than other countries in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Clearly, in giving pre-eminence to healthcare, the USA is doing far less than it could to protect and improve health. Meanwhile, mounting evidence supports the view that health impacts of social determinants besides healthcare (eg, education) surpass healthcare in heft. Circumscribed shifts in the USA's current frame will not suffice: what's needed is a change in its overall template for addressing health. Unless this is widely seen, the sway of biomedicine will likely be reduced slowly, if at all. That biomedicine's role in relation to health is raised increasingly as a question is a sign that its ongoing supremacy is not a forgone conclusion. But making the most of this opportunity requires appreciating that 'How should health's relationship to medicine be conceptualised?' is not the most fundamental query that we need to pose. Through consideration of Hippocratic medicine and Plato, I argue that the most availing answer to this particular question can come only after exploration of three larger questions involving health's status as a human good and its relationship to human flourishing. Exploration of the Greeks is, thus, valuable methodologically. What's more, it supports today's advocacy of 'health promotion', a perspective tying health closely to well-being that has yet to achieve the overall prominence that it warrants.

Antiquity's Missive to Transhumanism1.

To reassure those concerned about wholesale discontinuity between human existence and posthumanity, transhumanists assert shared ground with antiquity on vital challenges and aspirations. Because their claims reflect key misconceptions, there is no shared vision for transhumanists to invoke. Having exposed their misuses of Prometheus, Plato, and Aristotle, I show that not only do transhumanists and antiquity crucially diverge on our relation to ideals, contrast-dependent aspiration, and worthy endeavors but that illumining this divide exposes central weaknesses in transhumanist argumentation. What is more, antiquity's handling of these topics suggests a way through the impasse in current enhancement debates about human "nature" and helps to resolve a tension within transhumanists' accounts of what our best moments signify about the ontological requirements for real flourishing.

The doctor-patient tie in Plato's Laws: a backdrop for reflection.

The merit of Plato's Laws remains largely untapped by those seeking genuinely collaborative models of the doctor-patient tie as alternatives to paternalism and autonomy. A persistent difficulty confronting proposed alternatives has been surpassing the notion of pronounced intellectual and values asymmetry favoring the doctor. Having discussed two prominent proposals, both of which evince marked paternalism, I argue that reflection on Plato yields four criteria that a genuinely collaborative model must meet and suggest how the Laws addresses them. In the process, the Laws' doctor-patient tie is shown to be far more nuanced than interpreters have previously observed. Although Plato's account will not solve our own quandaries, it illustrates how one might retain asymmetry of a kind without capitulating to familiar oppositional modalities. Through this account, I hope to show that the Laws merits fuller inclusion in contemporary discussions than it has heretofore received.