Do the policy burdens of state-owned enterprises affect the efficiency of resource allocation of tax incentives?

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) bear a significant policy burden in promoting economic development and enjoy preferential government resources such as tax breaks. This study investigates the effect of the policy burden of China's SOEs on tax incentive resources and allocation efficiency using ordinary least squares regressions for state-owned listed companies from 2007 to 2021. This study found that the heavier the policy burden borne by the SOEs, the more tax incentives they receive. Moreover, SOEs become more likely to invest inefficiently after receiving tax incentives. These negative effects are more significant for local SOEs, those in poor business environments, and those with low information transparency. This study not only expands the research framework of the resource allocation efficiency of tax incentives but also provides direct empirical evidence to reduce the policy burden of SOEs. Therefore, our findings can be used to promote SOE reforms.

Governance of non-state-owned shareholders and corporate capital structure decision: A mechanism test from the opportunistic behavior of management.

It is an important measure in the reform of state-owned enterprises to improve the efficiency of capital operation by introducing non-state-owned shareholders. This paper explores the impact of non-state shareholder governance on capital structure decision-making by using the data of 2008-2021 A-share state-owned listed companies from the perspective of the speed and deviation of capital structure adjustment. The results reveal that only non-state shareholding has no significant impact on the capital structure adjustment of a company. However, the appointment of senior management by non-state shareholders can speed up the capital structure adjustment and lower the degree of capital structure deviation. Moreover, when the capital structure goes down, the appointment of non-state-owned shareholders plays a larger role in accelerating the capital structure adjustment, which makes the deviation from the actual capital structure and the target capital structure smaller. Further research shows that the above relationship between non-state shareholder governance and the optimization and adjustment of the capital structure only exists in local SOEs and competitive SOEs. In addition, the path test found that non-state shareholder governance affects the dynamic adjustment of capital structure by reducing opportunism behavior of management rather than by financing constraints.