In Vitro Fertilization, State Wrongful Death Statutes and State Fetal Homicide Statutes: The Reaction to LePage v. Center for Reproductive Medicine.

The Alabama Supreme Court recently held, in LePage v. Center for Reproductive Medicine, that the parents of human embryos that were negligently destroyed at a fertility clinic could bring an action for damages under the State's wrongful death statute. Although the Alabama legislature promptly enacted a law essentially overturning the state supreme court's decision, concerns have been raised that the court's decision might influence courts in other States to interpret their wrongful death statutes, or possibly even their fetal homicide statutes, to apply in similar circumstances, thereby threatening the availability of in vitro fertilization (IVF) technology. This article addresses those concerns.With respect to wrongful death statutes, only fourteen States (excluding Alabama) have interpreted their statutes to apply to unborn children without regard to their stage of gestation or development. The majority of States impose a gestational requirement (typically, viability) which would preclude their application to the destruction of human embryos. Even with respect to the minority of States that impose no limitation on the cause of action, those statutes, either by their express language or by fair interpretation, would not apply to unimplanted human embryos.With respect to the fetal homicide statutes in thirty-one States that do not have any gestational or developmental limitation, the statutes in twenty-six of those States apply only to acts causing the death of an unborn child in utero. As to the statutes in the other five States, the structure of the statute, considered in light of the applicable case law, strongly suggests that there would be no liability for causing the death of an unborn child before implantation. In sum, the Alabama Supreme Court's decision in LePage is not likely to be followed as a precedent in interpreting either the wrongful death statutes or the fetal homicide statutes of any other State.

Deep neural networks are not a single hypothesis but a language for expressing computational hypotheses.

An ideal vision model accounts for behavior and neurophysiology in both naturalistic conditions and designed lab experiments. Unlike psychological theories, artificial neural networks (ANNs) actually perform visual tasks and generate testable predictions for arbitrary inputs. These advantages enable ANNs to engage the entire spectrum of the evidence. Failures of particular models drive progress in a vibrant ANN research program of human vision.

Minimal theory of 3D vision: new approach to visual scale and visual shape.

Since Kepler and Descartes in the early-1600s, vision science has been committed to a triangulation model of stereo vision. But in the early-1800s, we realized that disparities are responsible for stereo vision. And we have spent the past 200 years trying to shoe-horn disparities back into the triangulation account. The first part of this article argues that this is a mistake, and that stereo vision is a solution to a different problem: the eradication of rivalry between the two retinal images, rather than the triangulation of objects in space. This leads to a 'minimal theory of 3D vision', where 3D vision is no longer tied to estimating the scale, shape, and direction of objects in the world. The second part of this article then asks whether the other aspects of 3D vision, which go beyond stereo vision, really operate at the same level of visual experience as stereo vision? I argue they do not. Whilst we want a theory of real-world 3D vision, the literature risks giving us a theory of picture perception instead. And I argue for a two-stage theory, where our purely internal 'minimal' 3D percept (from stereo vision) is linked to the world through cognition. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'New approaches to 3D vision'.

New Approaches to 3D Vision.

New approaches to 3D vision are enabling new advances in artificial intelligence and autonomous vehicles, a better understanding of how animals navigate the 3D world, and new insights into human perception in virtual and augmented reality. Whilst traditional approaches to 3D vision in computer vision (SLAM: simultaneous localization and mapping), animal navigation (cognitive maps), and human vision (optimal cue integration) start from the assumption that the aim of 3D vision is to provide an accurate 3D model of the world, the new approaches to 3D vision explored in this issue challenge this assumption. Instead, they investigate the possibility that computer vision, animal navigation, and human vision can rely on partial or distorted models or no model at all. This issue also highlights the implications for artificial intelligence, autonomous vehicles, human perception in virtual and augmented reality, and the treatment of visual disorders, all of which are explored by individual articles. This article is part of a discussion meeting issue 'New approaches to 3D vision'.

V1 as an egocentric cognitive map.

We typically distinguish between V1 as an egocentric perceptual map and the hippocampus as an allocentric cognitive map. In this article, we argue that V1 also functions as a post-perceptual egocentric cognitive map. We argue that three well-documented functions of V1, namely (i) the estimation of distance, (ii) the estimation of size, and (iii) multisensory integration, are better understood as post-perceptual cognitive inferences. This argument has two important implications. First, we argue that V1 must function as the neural correlates of the visual perception/cognition distinction and suggest how this can be accommodated by V1's laminar structure. Second, we use this insight to propose a low-level account of visual consciousness in contrast to mid-level accounts (recurrent processing theory; integrated information theory) and higher-level accounts (higher-order thought; global workspace theory). Detection thresholds have been traditionally used to rule out such an approach, but we explain why it is a mistake to equate visibility (and therefore the presence/absence of visual experience) with detection thresholds.

Does Vergence Affect Perceived Size?

Since Kepler (1604) and Descartes (1637), it has been suggested that 'vergence' (the angular rotation of the eyes) plays a key role in size constancy. However, this has never been tested divorced from confounding cues such as changes in the retinal image. In our experiment, participants viewed a target which grew or shrank in size over 5 s. At the same time, the fixation distance specified by vergence was reduced from 50 to 25 cm. The question was whether this change in vergence affected the participants' judgements of whether the target grew or shrank in size? We found no evidence of any effect, and therefore no evidence that eye movements affect perceived size. If this is correct, then our finding has three implications. First, perceived size is much more reliant on cognitive influences than previously thought. This is consistent with the argument that visual scale is purely cognitive in nature (Linton, 2017; 2018). Second, it leads us to question whether the vergence modulation of V1 contributes to size constancy. Third, given the interaction between vergence, proprioception, and the retinal image in the Taylor illusion, it leads us to ask whether this cognitive approach could also be applied to multisensory integration.

Does vision extract absolute distance from vergence?

Since Kepler (1604) and Descartes (1637), 'vergence' (the angular rotation of the eyes) has been thought of as one of our most important absolute distance cues. But vergence has never been tested as an absolute distance cue divorced from obvious confounding cues such as binocular disparity. In this article, we control for these confounding cues for the first time by gradually manipulating vergence and find that observers fail to accurately judge distance from vergence. We consider several different interpretations of these results and argue that the most principled response to these results is to question the general effectiveness of vergence as an absolute distance cue. Given that other absolute distance cues (such as motion parallax and vertical disparities) are limited in application, this poses a real challenge to our contemporary understanding of visual scale.

Preventing diabetes after pregnancy with gestational diabetes in a Cree community: an inductive thematic analysis.

INTRODUCTION: Historical and political factors underpin the disproportional burden of type 2 diabetes mellitus (T2DM) and gestational diabetes mellitus (GDM) in women, a harbinger of future T2DM, in Indigenous populations. There is a need for T2DM prevention strategies driven by the voices of Indigenous women. In this study, we aimed to understand the perspectives of Cree women with prior GDM living in northern Quebec, where over a quarter of pregnancies are complicated by GDM. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS: A local healthcare worker invited women with GDM in the prior 5 years to participate in semistructured interviews. A Cree-origin research partner and a researcher jointly conducted interviews in-person or by teleconference. Open-ended questions addressed GDM experience, maintaining a healthy lifestyle, and needs/preferences pertinent to designing a T2DM prevention program aimed at women affected by GDM. We adopted an inductive thematic analysis framework to categorize experiences and opinions. RESULTS: Among the 13 mothers interviewed, some success with health behavior changes during pregnancy was reported but there were difficulties postpartum resulting from time constraints, costs of healthy foods, discomfort at the gym related to not being perceived as athletic, and safety concerns. They acknowledged the existence of programs addressing T2DM prevention in their community but did not participate. They endorsed preferences for group sessions, with family collaboration and childcare, that addressed healthy cooking and physical activity and incorporated traditional elements. CONCLUSION: Cree mothers with a history of GDM highlighted several barriers to diabetes prevention. We are working to address these barriers through the creation of a Cree-facilitator-led community-based intervention.

Medical Emergency Exceptions in State Abortion Statutes: The Statistical Record.

This article attempts to determine, first, whether emergency exceptions in statutes regulating abortion have been abused and, second, whether the standard used in such an exception--subjective or objective--makes a difference in the reported incidence of such emergencies. A review of the statistical data supports two conclusions. First, physicians who perform abortions and have complied with state reporting requirements have not relied upon the medical emergency exceptions in state abortion statutes to evade the requirements of those statutes. Second, the use of an objective standard for evaluating medical emergencies ("reasonable medical judgment") has not been associated with fewer reported emergencies (per number of abortions performed) than the use of a subjective standard ("good faith clinical judgment"). Both of these conclusions may be relevant in drafting other abortion statutes including prohibitions (e.g., post-viability abortions).

The legal status of abortion in the States if Roe v. Wade is overruled.

This article explores the legal status of abortion in the States if the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Although an overruling decision eventually could have a significant effect on the legal status of abortion, the immediate impact of such a decision would be far more modest than most commentators on both sides of the issue believe. More than two-thirds of the States have expressly repealed their pre-Roe laws or have amended those laws to conform to the trimester scheme of Roe v. Wade, which allows abortions for any reason before viability and for virtually any reason after viability. Those laws would not be revived by the overruling of Roe. Only a few of those States have enacted post-Roe laws that would prohibit most abortions if Roe were overruled. Slightly less than one-third of the States have not expressly repealed their pre-Roe laws. Many of those laws would notbe effective to prohibit abortion if Roe were overruled either because they allow abortion on demand, for undefined reasons of health or for mental health reasons; because enforcement would be precluded on state constitutional grounds; or because the pre-Roe laws prohibiting abortion have been repealed by implication with the enactment of post-Roe laws regulating abortion. In sum, no more than eleven States, and very possibly as few as eight, would have laws on the books that would prohibit most abortions if Roe were overruled.

The legal status of abortion in the states if Roe v. Wade is overruled.

This article explores the legal status of abortion in the States if the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), as modified by Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). Although an overruling decision eventually could have a significant effect on the legal status of abortion, the immediate impact of such a decision would be far more modest than most commentators-on both sides of the issue-believe. More than two-thirds of the States have repealed their pre-Roe laws or have amended those laws to conform to Roe v. Wade, which allows abortion for any reason before viability and for virtually any reason after viability. Pre-Roe laws that have been expressly repealed would not be revived by the overruling of Roe. Only three States that repealed their pre-Roe laws (or amended them to conform to Roe) have enacted post-Roe laws attempting to prohibit some or most abortions throughout pregnancy. Those laws have been declared unconstitutional by the federal courts and are not now enforceable. Of the less than one-third of the States that have retained their pre-Roe laws, most would be ineffective in prohibiting abortions. This is (1) because the laws, by their express terms or as interpreted, allow abortion on demand, for undefined health reasons or for a broad range of reasons (including mental health), or (2) because of state constitutional limitations. In yet other States, the pre-Roe laws prohibiting abortion may have been repealed by implication, due to the enactment of comprehensive post-Roe laws regulating abortion. In sum, no more than twelve States, and possibly as few as eight, would have enforceable laws on the books that would prohibit most abortions in the event Roe, Doe and Casey are overruled. In the other States (and the District of Columbia) abortion would be legal for most or all reasons throughout pregnancy. Although the long-term impact of reversing Roe could be quite dramatic, the author concludes that the immediate impact of such a decision would be very limited. This article is current through May 1st, 2007.