Interactions of doctors with the pharmaceutical industry.

OBJECTIVE: To assess the opinions and practice patterns of obstetrician-gynaecologists on acceptance and use of free drug samples and other incentive items from pharmaceutical representatives. METHODS: A questionnaire was mailed in March 2003 to 397 members of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists who participate in the Collaborative Ambulatory Research Network. RESULTS: The response rate was 55%. Most respondents thought it proper to accept drug samples (92%), an informational lunch (77%), an anatomical model (75%) or a well-paid consultantship (53%) from pharmaceutical representatives. A third (33%) of the respondents thought that their own decision to prescribe a drug would probably be influenced by accepting drug samples. Respondents were more likely to think the average doctor's prescribing would be influenced by acceptance of the items than theirs would be (p<0.002). Respondents who distributed drug samples to patients indicated doing so because of patients' financial need (94%) and for their convenience (76%) and less so as a result of knowledge of the efficacy of the sample product (63%). A third (34%) of respondents agreed that interactions with industry should be more strictly regulated. CONCLUSION: Obstetrician-gynaecologists largely indicated that they would act in accordance with what they think is proper regarding accepting incentive items from pharmaceutical representatives. Although accepting free drug samples was considered to be appropriate more often than any other item, samples were most commonly judged to be influential on prescribing practices. The widely accepted practice of receiving and distributing free drug samples needs to be examined more carefully.

Do nonpatients underestimate the quality of life associated with chronic health conditions because of a focusing illusion?

BACKGROUND: A number of studies show that the general public often estimates that the quality of life (QOL) associated with various health conditions is worse than patients say it is. These studies raise the possibility that people overestimate the impact that unfamiliar health conditions will have on their quality of life. One possible reason people overestimate this is because they are susceptible to a focusing illusion--when asked to imagine themselves in unfamiliar circumstances, people overestimate the emotional impact of those features of their life that would change. METHODS: The authors surveyed members of the general public to test the hypothesis that their QOL ratings of hypothetical health conditions would be higher (indicating a better quality of life) after thinking about how the health condition would affect a broad range of life domains. Across 3 experiments, the authors varied the health conditions people were asked to consider (either paraplegia, below-the-knee amputation, or partial blindness), the life domains they were asked to consider, the response mode with which they evaluated how each health condition would affect each life domain, whether subjects rated the health condition before and after considering life domains or only after, and whether subjects rated their own current quality of life first. RESULTS: Across 3 experiments, using 10 different questionnaire versions, only 1 instance was found in which subjects' ratings were significantly higher after thinking about the effect of the health condition on life domains than before, and the magnitude of this increase was small. CONCLUSION: It could not be established that a focusing illusion contributes significantly to the discrepancy in QOL ratings of patients and nonpatients. Further research should explore other factors that could contribute to the discrepancy or other ways of testing for the influence of a focusing illusion.

Risk as feelings.

Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.

Egocentric empathy gaps between owners and buyers: misperceptions of the endowment effect.

In 5 studies, the authors examined people's perceptions of the endowment effect, or the tendency to value an object more once one owns it. In the 1st 2 studies, the authors documented egocentric empathy gaps between owners and buyers regarding the endowment effect: Both owners and buyers overestimated the similarity between their own valuation of a commodity and the valuation of people in the other role. The next 2 studies showed that these empathy gaps may lead to reduced earnings in a market setting. The final study showed that egocentric empathy gaps stem partly from people's misprediction of what their own valuation would be if they were in the other role.

When does duration matter in judgment and decision making?

Research on sequences of outcomes shows that people care about features of an experience, such as improvement or deterioration over time, and peak and end levels, which the discounted utility model (DU) assumes they do not care about. In contrast to the finding that some attributes are weighted more than DU predicts, Kahneman and coauthors have proposed that there is one feature of sequences that DU predicts people should care about but that people in fact ignore or underweight: duration. In this article, the authors extend this line of research by investigating the role of conversational norms (H. P. Grice, 1975), and scale-norming (D. Kahneman & T. D. Miller, 1986). The impact of these 2 factors are examined in 4 parallel studies that manipulate these factors orthogonally. The major finding is that response modes that reduce reliance on conversational norms or standard of comparison also increase the attention that participants pay to duration.

Joint comment on "when does duration matter in judgment and decision making?" (Ariely & Loewenstein, 2000).

Recent research has demonstrated that people care about the temporal relationships within a sequence of experiences. There is considerable evidence that people pay particular attention to the way experiences improve or deteriorate over time and to their maximum (peak) and final values. D. Kahneman and coauthors suggested in earlier articles that people ignore or severely underweight duration (which they referred to as duration neglect). In the preceding article, D. Ariely and G. Loewenstein (2000) challenged the generalizability of these findings and their normative implications. In the current commentary, D. Ariely, D. Kahneman, and G. Loewenstein jointly examine the issue to provide a better understanding of what they feel they have learned from this literature and to discuss the remaining open questions.

Anticipated versus actual reaction to HIV test results.

The accuracy of predictions of how people will react to a medical test result is important because it may influence the decision to be tested. We hypothesized that people would overpredict their own long-term reactions to HIV test results (i.e., that they would feel better in response to seropositive results and worse in response to negative results than they expected to). In the first study phase, anticipations of reactions to positive and negative HIV test results were obtained from 50 subjects. In the second phase, postresult reactions were obtained about 5 weeks after subjects learned the results of their tests. The results suggest that people anticipate more distress given a positive result and anticipate less distress given a negative result than they experience. Cautions about the comparability of the 2 samples and recommendations for further research are discussed.

Value measurement in cost-utility analysis: explaining the discrepancy between rating scale and person trade-off elicitations.

Previous studies have shown a discrepancy between common utility elicitation methods, such as rating scale (RS) elicitations, and person trade-off (PTO) elicitations. This discrepancy has generally been felt to be due to the fact that RS elicitations ask people to compare conditions to each other in terms of numbers on a visual rating scale, while PTO elicitations ask people to think in terms of numbers of people needing to be treated. However, there are three other cognitive differences between PTO and RS elicitations that might contribute to the discrepancy: In PTO elicitations, as opposed to RS elicitations: (1) people are asked to think about how conditions affect people other than themselves; (2) people are asked to think about the benefit of treating conditions; and (3) people are asked to chose who to treat among patients with different conditions. In this study, we attempt to determine whether any of three cognitive differences contribute to the discrepancy between RS and PTO utility elicitations. We randomized prospective jurors to receive one of several survey versions in which we manipulated the RS and PTO elicitations to reduce the differences between them, while preserving their underlying structure. In the RS-self survey, we asked subjects to rate a health condition on a scale from 0 to 100 as if they had the condition. In the RS-other survey, we asked people to rate the health condition as if someone else had it. In the RS-cure survey, we asked subjects to rate the benefits of curing someone else of the health condition. In the PTO-comparison survey, we asked people to determine equivalent numbers of people needing to be cured of two conditions in order to produce equal benefits. In the PTO-choice survey, we presented people with a budget constraint and asked them to determine equivalent numbers of people needing to be cured of two conditions to help decide which group should be treated within the budget constraint. Two hundred and twenty two subjects completed surveys. Median utilities for health conditions were higher in the two PTO elicitations than in the three RS elicitations. There were no differences in utilities across the two PTO surveys, nor across the three RS surveys. In addition, the PTO elicitations allowed people to make finer distinctions among non-life threatening conditions than did the RS elicitations. The discrepancy between RS and PTO elicitations cannot be explained by shifting subjects attentions from themselves to others, nor from conditions to the benefit of treating conditions. Instead, the discrepancy occurs because of the general format of RS and PTO elicitations.

The role of decision analysis in informed consent: choosing between intuition and systematicity.

An important goal of informed consent is to present information to patients so that they can decide which medical option is best for them, according to their values. Research in cognitive psychology has shown that people are rapidly overwhelmed by having to consider more than a few options in making choices. Decision analysis provides a quantifiable way to assess patients' values, and it eliminates the burden of integrating these values with probabilistic information. In this paper we evaluate the relative importance of intuition and systematicity in informed consent. We point out that there is no gold standard for optimal decision making in decisions that hinge on patient values. We also point out that in some such situations it is too early to assume that the benefits of systematicity outweigh the benefits of intuition. Research is needed to address the question of which situations favor the use of intuitive approaches of decision making and which call for a more systematic approach.

Public perceptions of the importance of prognosis in allocating transplantable livers to children.

BACKGROUND: The system to allocate scarce transplantable livers has been criticized for not giving enough weight to the prognoses of the patients receiving the transplants, but little research has been done looking at how the public weights the relative importances of efficacy and equity in distributing the organs. METHODS: This study was an experimental survey of prospective jurors asked to distribute transplantable livers among transplant candidates grouped according to their prognoses. The relative prognoses of the transplant candidates were varied across survey versions. RESULTS: As the prognostic difference between transplant groups increased, the subjects became less likely to distribute the organs equally between them (p < 0.005). However, the subjects' willingness to base allocation on prognosis was moderated by a number of factors, including their understanding of how to use prognostic information and their attitudes toward using prognostic information for individuals versus groups. Thus, even when the relative prognoses of transplant groups differed by 60%, less than a fourth of the subjects were willing to give all the organs to the better-prognosis group. CONCLUSION: Many subjects feel that prognosis is an important consideration in allocating scarce livers. However, few are willing to base allocation purely on maximizing survival. Policies that base allocations purely on outcomes will violate the values of a significant portion of the public.

Individual utilities are inconsistent with rationing choices: A partial explanation of why Oregon's cost-effectiveness list failed.

OBJECTIVE: To test whether cost-effectiveness analysis and present methods of eliciting health condition "utilities" capture the public's values for health care rationing. DESIGN: Two surveys of economics students. The first survey measured their utilities for three states of health, using either analog scale, standard gamble, or time tradeoff. The second survey measured their preferences, in paired rationing choices of the health states from the first survey and also compared with treatment of acutely fatal appendicitis. The rationing choices each subject faced were individualized according to his or her utility responses, so that the subject should have been indifferent between the two conditions in each rationing choice. RESULTS: The analog-scale elicitation method produced significantly lower utilities than the time-tradeoff and standard-gamble methods for two of the three conditions (p < 0.001). Compared with the rationing choices, all three utility-elicitation methods placed less value on the importance of saving lives and treating more severely ill people compared with less severely ill ones (p < 0.0001). The subjects' rationing choices indicated that they placed values on treating severely ill people that were tenfold to one-hundred-thousand-fold greater than would have been predicted by their utility responses. However, the subjects' rationing choices showed internal inconsistency, as, for example, treatments that were indicated to be ten times more beneficial in one scenario were valued as one hundred times more beneficial in other scenarios. CONCLUSIONS: The subjects soundly rejected the rationing choices derived from their utility responses. This suggests that people's answers to utility elicitations cannot be easily translated into social policy. However, person-tradeoff elicitations, like those given in our rationing survey, cannot be substituted for established methods of utility elicitation until they can be performed in ways that yield acceptable internal consistency.

Distributing scarce livers: the moral reasoning of the general public.

The transplant system has been criticized for not paying enough attention to efficiency in distributing scarce organs. But little research has been done to see how the general public views tradeoffs between efficiency and equity. We surveyed members of the general public to see how they would distribute organs among patients with varying chances of benefiting from them. In addition, we asked subjects to explain their decisions and to tell us about any other information they would have liked in order to make the decisions. We found that the public places a very high value on giving everyone a chance at receiving scarce resources, even if that means a significant decrease in the chance that available organs will save people's lives. Our results raise important questions about whether the aims of outcomes research and cost-effective studies agree with the values of the general public.

The efficacy and equity of retransplantation: an experimental survey of public attitudes.

PURPOSE: To measure the relative importance people place on prognosis and retransplantation status in allocating scarce transplantable livers. METHODS: 138 subjects were asked to distribute scarce livers amongst transplant candidates with either a 70% chance or a 30% chance of surviving if transplanted. In one group of subjects, the prognostic difference was based on the presence or absence of a 'blood marker.' In the other group, the prognostic difference was based on whether candidates had been previously transplanted or not, with retransplant candidates having a 30% chance of surviving if transplanted. RESULTS: Subjects answering the retransplantation survey gave a higher percentage of organs to the better prognostic group than subjects answering the blood marker survey, with a mean of 71.6% versus 65.0%, although this difference fell just short of statistical significance (P = 0.0581). Retransplantation survey respondents were significantly less likely to want to ignore prognostic information than were blood marker respondents (P = 0.026). Subjects in both survey groups were equally unwilling to abandon the poor prognostic group, with only 18% in each group choosing to give all the available organs to the better prognostic group. CONCLUSIONS: Respondents reacted more strongly to prognostic differences when they were due to retransplant status than to the results of a blood test. However, most people were not solely interested in the aggregate medical benefit brought by different allocation systems, but were also interested in the amount of benefit brought to the worst off.