ABSTRACT
Deke Caiñas Gould (2021) argues that the possibility of future non-human-like minds who are not harmed by coming into existence poses a challenge to David Benatar's well-known Asymmetry Argument for anti-natalism. Since the good of these future minds has the potential to outweigh the current harms of human existence, they can be appealed to in order to justify procreation. I argue that Gould's argument rests on a fundamental misunderstanding of Benatar's argument. According to the Asymmetry Argument, if a person experiences any harm at all, then bringing them into existence is unjustified. It does not depend upon on-balance judgments about the relative harms and benefits of existence. It therefore remains impermissible to procreate right now in our world, regardless of the prospect of future humans contributing to the successful development of beings who are not harmed by existence. I conclude by addressing two alternate readings of Gould, which, for the sake of argument, permit such on-balance judgments, and show why they fail to rescue his case. Benatar's Asymmetry Argument might be unsound, but not for any reason identified by Gould.
