ABSTRACT
East Asians and Asian-Americans tend to allocate relatively greater attention to background context compared to European Americans across a variety of cognitive and neural measures. We sought to extend these findings of cultural differences to affective stimuli using the N400, which has been shown to be sensitive to deep processing of affective information. The degree to which Asian-Americans and European Americans responded to semantic incongruity between emotionally expressive faces (i.e., smiling or frowning) and background affective scenes was measured. As predicted, Asian-Americans showed a greater N400 to incongruent trials than to congruent trials. In contrast, European Americans showed no difference in amplitude across the two conditions. Furthermore, greater affective N400 incongruity was associated with higher interdependent self-construals. These data suggest that Asian-Americans and those with interdependent self-construals process the relationship between perceived facial emotion and affective background context to a greater degree than European Americans and those with independent self-construals. Implications for neural and cognitive differences in everyday social interactions, and cultural differences in analytic and holistic thinking are discussed.
Subject(s)
Attention/physiology , Cross-Cultural Comparison , Emotions/physiology , Interpersonal Relations , Social Environment , Adolescent , Adult , Asian/psychology , Brain Mapping , Culture , Electroencephalography , Evoked Potentials/physiology , Female , Humans , Male , White People/psychology , Young AdultABSTRACT
In some cases people judge it morally acceptable to sacrifice one person's life in order to save several other lives, while in other similar cases they make the opposite judgment. Researchers have identified two general factors that may explain this phenomenon at the stimulus level: (1) the agent's intention (i.e. whether the harmful event is intended as a means or merely foreseen as a side-effect) and (2) whether the agent harms the victim in a manner that is relatively "direct" or "personal". Here we integrate these two classes of findings. Two experiments examine a novel personalness/directness factor that we call personal force, present when the force that directly impacts the victim is generated by the agent's muscles (e.g., in pushing). Experiments 1a and b demonstrate the influence of personal force on moral judgment, distinguishing it from physical contact and spatial proximity. Experiments 2a and b demonstrate an interaction between personal force and intention, whereby the effect of personal force depends entirely on intention. These studies also introduce a method for controlling for people's real-world expectations in decisions involving potentially unrealistic hypothetical dilemmas.
Subject(s)
Retrospective Moral Judgment , Adult , Cognition/physiology , Crime Victims , Female , Generalization, Psychological , Humans , Male , Physical StimulationABSTRACT
Traditional theories of moral development emphasize the role of controlled cognition in mature moral judgment, while a more recent trend emphasizes intuitive and emotional processes. Here we test a dual-process theory synthesizing these perspectives. More specifically, our theory associates utilitarian moral judgment (approving of harmful actions that maximize good consequences) with controlled cognitive processes and associates non-utilitarian moral judgment with automatic emotional responses. Consistent with this theory, we find that a cognitive load manipulation selectively interferes with utilitarian judgment. This interference effect provides direct evidence for the influence of controlled cognitive processes in moral judgment, and utilitarian moral judgment more specifically.
