The Science is There: Key Considerations for Stabilizing Viral Vector-Based Covid-19 Vaccines.

Once Covid-19 vaccines become available, 5-10 billion vaccine doses should be globally distributed, stored and administered. In this commentary, we discuss how this enormous challenge could be addressed for viral vector-based Covid-19 vaccines by learning from the wealth of formulation development experience gained over the years on stability issues related to live attenuated virus vaccines and viral vector vaccines for other diseases. This experience has led -over time- to major improvements on storage temperature, shelf-life and in-use stability requirements. First, we will cover work on 'classical' live attenuated virus vaccines as well as replication competent viral vector vaccines. Subsequently, we address replication deficient viral vector vaccines. Freeze drying and storage at 2-8 °C with a shelf life of years has become the norm. In the case of pandemics with incredibly high and urgent product demands, however, the desire for rapid and convenient distribution chains combined with short end-user storage times require that liquid formulations with shelf lives of months stored at 2-8 °C be considered. In confronting this "perfect storm" of Covid-19 vaccine stability challenges, understanding the many lessons learned from decades of development and manufacturing of live virus-based vaccines is the shortest path for finding promising and rapid solutions.

Health Canada/BIOTECanada Summit on regulatory and clinical topics related to subsequent entry biologics (biosimilars), Ottawa, Canada, 14 May 2012.

In May 2012, Health Canada and other participants held a National Summit on Subsequent Entry Biologics (SEBs). Health Canada released a guidance document in March 2010 describing policy positions and data requirements for approval of SEBs. While Health Canada and health agencies in other regulatory jurisdictions are aligned on many scientific principles related to biosimilar drugs, Health Canada's specific requirements may not be widely understood by many Canadian stakeholders. The Summit provided an opportunity for education and dialog among physicians who prescribe biologics, provincial payers, and industry on the following topics: preclinical and clinical comparability studies; manufacturing and other product differences; extrapolation of indications; substitution and interchangeability of SEBs with reference biologic drugs in clinical practice; payers' current perspective; pharmacovigilance and naming. It is anticipated that the consensus reached at this meeting will further educate Canadian healthcare professionals, provincial payers, and insurers about the appropriate use of SEBs, and may be of general interest to others internationally.

Evolution of approaches to viral safety issues for biological products.

CONFERENCE PROCEEDING Proceedings of the PDA/FDA Adventitious Viruses in Biologics: Detection and Mitigation Strategies Workshop in Bethesda, MD, USA; December 1-3, 2010 Guest Editors: Arifa Khan (Bethesda, MD), Patricia Hughes (Bethesda, MD) and Michael Wiebe (San Francisco, CA) Approaches to viral safety issues for biological products have evolved during the past 50+ years. The first cell culture products (viral vaccines) relied largely on the use of in vitro and in vivo virus screening assays that were based upon infectivity of adventitious viral agents. The use of Cohn fractionation and pasteurization by manufacturers of plasma derivatives introduced the concepts that purification and treatment with physical and chemical agents could greatly reduce the risk of viral contamination of human albumin and immunoglobulin products. But the limitations of such approaches became clear for thermolabile products that were removed early in fractionation such as antihemophilic factors, which transmitted hepatitis viruses and HIV-1 to some product recipients. These successes and limitations were taken into account by the early developers of recombinant DNA (rDNA)-derived cell culture products and by regulatory agencies, leading to the utilization of cloning technology to reduce/eliminate contamination due to human viruses and purification technologies to physically remove and inactivate adventitious and endogenous viruses, along with cell banking and cell bank characterization for adventitious and endogenous viruses, viral screening of biological raw materials, and testing of cell culture harvests, to ensure virus safety. Later development and incorporation of nanofiltration technology in the manufacturing process provided additional assurance of viral clearance for safety of biotechnology products. These measures have proven very effective at preventing iatrogenic infection of recipients of biotechnology products; however, viral contamination of production cell cultures has occasionally occurred. Screening tests for viral contamination in raw materials have not proven practical by themselves to prevent contamination of cell cultures, but they can be made more effective by coupling with treatment using physical or chemical agents to further reduce the hypothetical viral loads present in cell culture raw materials. Recent advances in polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technology have allowed preharvest testing for specific viral agents to reduce the risk of cell culture contamination by specific viruses in the harvest material. Examples of each of these stages in the evolution of virus detection methods are described and assessed in this paper.

Apparent virus contamination in biopharmaceutical product at centocor.

Out-of-specification (OOS) results were reported by a contract lab in the in vitro adventitious agent assay (AVA) for two products manufactured using mouse myeloma cells in perfusion bioreactors. Cytopathic effect observed for test article-inoculated MRC-5 monolayers resembled foci seen in tissue culture cells infected with transforming viruses. All reasonable known technologies, including highly sensitive, state-of-the-art methodologies and multiple, redundant, and orthogonal methods, were deployed to screen broadly for potential viral and microbial contaminants. Due to the appearance of apparent foci, testing for murine, bovine, and human polyomavirus contamination was heavily represented in the analytical investigation. The results obtained in this extensive screening provided convincing evidence for the lack of an infectious viral or other biological agent. Although the initial investigation produced no reason to invalidate AVA yielding OOS results or to suspect an assay artifact, an extended evaluation revealed several irregularities at the contract test lab reporting the OOS results. The extended investigation also included attempts to reproduce OOS results at alternate contract testing labs and an inter-laboratory study in which methodological differences in the AVA at the three different contract labs were investigated. Only the contract lab initially reporting the OOS results reported foci during this extended evaluation. The results of the inter-laboratory study suggested that the foci artifact might be attributed to the prolonged exposure of the MRC-5 monolayer to cell debris present in the test article. Confocal immunofluorescence microscopy and transmission electron microscopy were subsequently used to provide convincing evidence that the foci observed in test article-inoculated AVA wells were composed of a core of degraded myeloma cell debris covered by one or more layers of MRC-5 cells. The observation that the foci were detected in the AVA at a contract lab where the MRC-5 monolayer is exposed to production cell line debris for a prolonged period strongly suggests that these foci form when MRC-5 grow over the cell debris present in the test article. The cumulative results of the investigation supported the conclusion that the OOS results were artifacts of the AVA test system and not a result of contamination with a virus or other biological agent. Testing was discontinued at the contract lab generating the OOS results and validated at a second contract lab. Manufacturing resumed in consultation with health authorities. The lots were retested following a standard operating procedure (SOP) already in place and ultimately dispositioned for use in normal distribution channels.