Dissociating sub-processes of aftereffects of completed intentions and costs to the ongoing task in prospective memory: A mouse-tracking approach.

In the present study, we used mouse tracking to investigate two processes underlying prospective memory (PM) retrieval: First, we aimed to explore to what extent spontaneous retrieval of already completed PM intentions is supported by reflexive-associative and discrepancy-plus-search processes. Second, we aimed to disentangle whether costs to an ongoing task during the pursuit of a PM intention are associated with presumably resource-demanding monitoring processes or with a presumably resource-sparing strategic delay of ongoing-task responses. Our third aim was to explore the interaction of processes underlying costs to the ongoing task and processes of spontaneous retrieval. Our analyses replicated response-time patterns from previous studies indicating aftereffects of completed intentions and costs to ongoing-task performance, as well as increased aftereffects while pursuing a PM intention. Notably, based on our mouse-tracking analyses, we argue that aftereffects of completed intentions are best explained by a reflexive initiation of an already completed intention. If the completed intention is not performed in its entirety (i.e., no commission error), the reflexive initiation of the completed intention is followed by a subsequent movement correction that most likely represents a time-consuming response-verification process. Regarding performance costs in the ongoing task, our analyses suggest that actively pursuing a PM intention most likely leads to a strategic delay of ongoing activities. Lastly, we found that pursuing a novel PM task after intention completion exacerbated orienting responses to all deviant stimuli, exacerbated the readiness to initiate the completed intention reflexively, and substantially prolonged the response-verification process following this reflexive intention retrieval.

Chronic stress and executive functioning: A specification-curve analysis.

To investigate the association between chronic stress and executive functioning (EF), we assessed 514 young to middle-aged adults in three EF tasks (i.e., Number-Letter, 2-Back, Go/Nogo) that assessed shifting, updating, and inhibition. Chronic stress was assessed by various self-report measures and hair cortisol concentrations as indicators of subjective and objective chronic stress, respectively. In order to test the association between chronic stress and EF, we fit a structural equation model with a latent common EF factor predicted by subjective and objective chronic stress on Kaplan-Meier estimates of response times. Controlling for participants' sex, age household income and the delay between cognitive testing and hair sample collection, neither subjective nor objective chronic stress showed a meaningful association with common EF. Exploratory analyses suggested a moderation effect of income on the association between subjective chronic stress and common EF, with a smaller association for high-income participants. Additionally, we conducted a specification-curve analysis on the association between chronic stress and EF to assess the influence of different analysis choices on results in our dataset. This analysis confirmed the absence of a coherent association between chronic stress and EF by showing that the majority of analytical choices produced null effects and only a small number of analytical choices produced meaningful associations (negative or positive). Taken together, our findings suggest that common EF likely remains preserved under the influence of chronic stress. Our specification-curve analysis, however, also shows that chronic stress may also have either a positive or a negative effect on EF, depending on the choice of covariates and measures of chronic stress and EF. Consequently, more research on the role of these factors for the association between chronic stress and EF is needed to avoid the interpretation of non-replicable stress-EF associations caused by analytical choices or selection bias.

Temporal stability and effect dynamics between executive functions, perceived chronic stress, and hair cortisol concentrations.

Accidents caused by human errors illustrate the fragility of cognitive processing and its coordination by executive functions against stress. To better understand how core executive functions change over time, influence each other, and are affected by chronic stress exposure, a prospective cohort study was conducted from 2016 to 2019. Five hundred sixteen German adults aged 25-55 years (mean age/education age: 38.0/11.3 years, 67% females, 94% occupied, 20% smokers) completed at least one internet-based biannual assessment of response inhibition, updating, and set shifting using a Go/NoGo, spatial 2-Back, and Number-Letter task, respectively. Chronic stress exposure was indicated by self-reports on the Perceived Stress Scale (PSS) and hair cortisol concentrations (HCC). Statistical analyses were performed by multivariate stochastic differential equation modeling. All indicators of executive functions (task-specific RTs in target trials or their contrast to nontarget trials) and chronic stress showed intraindividual stability over time (12% to 63% of their variance was attributable to trait influences). With respect to lagged mutual associations, faster Go/NoGo target RTs predicted faster Number-Letter target RTs later in time, while faster Number-Letter target RTs predicted higher HCC later in time (both with maximum effect sizes of d ≈ 0.1 standard deviations). However, PSS was not predictive of later HCC and vice versa. None of the chronic stress indicators significantly predicted indicators of executive functions at subsequent time points. These findings suggest that set shifting is capable of modulating the body's physiological response to chronic stress exposure, whereas executive functions appear comparably robust against chronic stress exposure. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Aftereffects and deactivation of completed prospective memory intentions: A systematic review.

Prospective memory, the ability to perform an intended action in the future, is an essential aspect of goal-directed behavior. Intentions influence our behavior and shape the way we process and interact with our environment. One important question for research on prospective memory and goal-directed behavior is whether this influence stops after the intention has been completed successfully. Are intention representations deactivated from memory after their completion, and if so, how? Here, we systematically review 20 years of research on intention deactivation and so-called aftereffects of completed intentions across different research fields to offer an integrative perspective on this topic. We first introduce the currently dominant accounts of aftereffects (inhibition vs. retrieval) and illustrate the paradigms, findings, and interpretations that these accounts developed from. We then review the evidence for each account based on the extant research in these paradigms. While early studies proposed a rapid deactivation or even inhibition of completed intentions, more recent studies mostly suggested that intentions continue to be retrieved even after completion and interfere with subsequent performance. Although these accounts of aftereffects seem mutually exclusive, we will show that they might be two sides of the same coin. That is, intention deactivation and the occurrence of aftereffects are modulated by a multitude of factors that either foster a rapid deactivation or lead to continued retrieval of completed intentions. Lastly, we outline future directions and novel experimental procedures for research on mechanisms and modulators of intention deactivation and discuss practical implications of our findings. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Prospective memory under acute stress: The role of (output) monitoring and ongoing-task demands.

Prospective memory (PM) refers to the ability to postpone retrieval and execution of intended actions until the appropriate situation (PM cue) has come, while engaging in other ongoing activities or tasks. In everyday live we often perform PM tasks in stressful situations. While it has been shown that acute stress does not impair PM-cue identification and intention retrieval, little is known about acute stress effects on PM performance and memory for having performed an action (output monitoring) under varying ongoing-task demands. Here we investigated this in eighty healthy participants who performed event-based PM tasks during low- and high-demanding ongoing working memory tasks after having undergone either a standardized stress induction (Maastricht Acute Stress Test) or a standardized control protocol. Successful stress induction in the stress group compared to the no-stress group was confirmed by increased salivary cortisol, an indicator of stress-related hypothalamus-pituitaryadrenal axis activity, throughout the event-based PM tasks. Nevertheless, not-only PM-cue identification but also output monitoring remained fully intact after stress induction. The absence of these effects was independent of ongoing-task demands. Nonetheless, we replicated recent findings of a stress-induced reduction in performance cost of monitoring for PM-cue occurrences. Taken together our findings suggest that acute stress alters PM monitoring by enhancing selective attention, decreasing PM response thresholds or by shifting performance towards more automatic processes in PM, while not affecting PM-cue identification and output monitoring.

Acute stress shifts the balance between controlled and automatic processes in prospective memory.

In everyday life we frequently rely on our abilities to postpone intentions until later occasions (prospective memory; PM) and to deactivate completed intentions even in stressful situations. Yet, little is known about the effects of acute stress on these abilities. In the present work we investigated the impact of acute stress on PM functioning under high task demands. (1) Different from previous studies, in which intention deactivation required mostly low processing demands, we used salient focal PM cues to induce high processing demands during intention-deactivation phases. (2) We systematically manipulated PM-monitoring demands in a nonfocal PM task that required participants to monitor for either one or six specific syllables that could occur in ongoing-task words. Eighty participants underwent the Trier Social Stress Test, a standardized stress induction protocol, or a standardized control situation, before performing a computerized PM task. Our primary interests were whether PM performance, PM-monitoring costs, aftereffects of completed intentions and/or commission-error risk would differ between stressed and non-stressed individuals and whether these effects would differ under varying task demands. Results revealed that PM performance and aftereffects of completed intentions during subsequent performance were not affected by acute stress induction, replicating previous findings. Under high demands on intention deactivation (focal condition), however, acute stress produced a nominal increase in erroneous PM responses after intention completion (commission errors). Most importantly, under high demands on PM monitoring (nonfocal condition), acute stress led to a substantial reduction in PM-monitoring costs. These findings support ideas of selective and demand-dependent effects of acute stress on cognitive functioning. Under high task demands, acute stress might induce a shift in processing strategy towards resource-saving behavior, which seems to increase the efficiency of PM performance (reduced monitoring costs), but might increase initial susceptibility to automatic response activation after intention completion.

Intention deactivation: effects of prospective memory task similarity on aftereffects of completed intentions.

Recent prospective memory (PM) studies indicate that intentions are not always directly deactivated after completion, but that they entail aftereffects in terms of slower ongoing-task performance and/or commission errors on repeated (no-longer relevant) PM trials. In four experiments, we investigated whether aftereffects depend on the similarity between completed and currently performed PM-tasks. Aftereffects were reduced when PM-cues differed between the two PM-tasks (symbols vs. words) compared to when PM-cues belonged to the same category (symbols vs. symbols). This could be explained by the new dissimilar PM-task shifting spatial attention away from repeated PM-cues and, thus, attenuating processing of these cues. Moreover, a switch of the PM-response (to or within the manual modality) did not result in erroneous retrieval of the no-more-relevant PM-response (i.e., commission errors) but in erroneous retrieval of the currently relevant PM-response (i.e., false alarms). In addition, aftereffects vanished in conditions, in which participants did not perform a new PM-task. This finding indicates that forming a new PM-task set might be a prerequisite for aftereffects when the ongoing task changes between the two subsequent PM-tasks. Finally, we did not find evidence that forming a new, dissimilar PM-task representation led to overwriting of the completed intention representation, and thus to a change of the content or destabilization of its activation level.