Asymmetric Information in Iranian's Health Insurance Market: Testing of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard.

BACKGROUND: Asymmetric information is one of the most important issues in insurance market which occurred due to inherent characteristics of one of the agents involved in insurance contracts; hence its management requires designing appropriate policies. This phenomenon can lead to the failure of insurance market via its two consequences, namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. OBJECTIVE: This study was aimed to evaluate the status of asymmetric information in Iran's health insurance market with respect to the demand for outpatient services. MATERIALS/PATIENTS AND METHODS: This research is a cross sectional study conducted on households living in Iran. The data of the research was extracted from the information on household's budget survey collected by the Statistical Center of Iran in 2012. In this study, the Generalized Method of Moment model was used and the status of adverse selection and moral hazard was evaluated through calculating the latent health status of individuals in each insurance category. To analyze the data, Excel, Eviews and stata11 software were used. RESULTS: The estimation of parameters of the utility function of the demand for outpatient services (visit, medicine, and Para-clinical services) showed that households were more risk averse in the use of outpatient care than other goods and services. After estimating the health status of households based on their health insurance categories, the results showed that rural-insured people had the best health status and people with supplementary insurance had the worst health status. In addition, the comparison of the conditional distribution of latent health status approved the phenomenon of adverse selection in all insurance groups, with the exception of rural insurance. Moreover, calculation of the elasticity of medical expenses to reimbursement rate confirmed the existence of moral hazard phenomenon. CONCLUSIONS: Due to the existence of the phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard in most of health insurances categories, policymakers need to adjust contracts so that to reduce these phenomena. Given the importance of financing, the presence of such problems can lead to less coverage of health insurance provided by insurers, loss of contracts with health care institutions and service providers, and lower quality of health services.

Main Determinants of Supplementary Health Insurance Demand: (Case of Iran).

INTRODUCTION: In the majority of developing countries, the volume of medical insurance services, provided by social insurance organizations is inadequate. Thus, supplementary medical insurance is proposed as a means to address inadequacy of medical insurance. Accordingly, in this article, we attempted to provide the context for expansion of this important branch of insurance through identification of essential factors affecting demand for supplementary medical insurance. METHOD: In this study, two methods were used to identify essential factors affecting choice of supplementary medical insurance including Classification and Regression Trees (CART) and Bayesian logit. To this end, Excel® software was used to refine data and R® software for estimation. The present study was conducted during 2012, covering all provinces in Iran. Sample size included 18,541 urban households, selected by Statistical Center of Iran using 3-stage cluster sampling approach. In this study, all data required were collected from the Statistical Center of Iran. RESULTS: In 2012, an overall 8.04% of the Iranian population benefited from supplementary medical insurance. Demand for supplementary insurance is a concave function of age of the household head, and peaks in middle-age when savings and income are highest. The present study results showed greater likelihood of demand for supplementary medical insurance in households with better economic status, higher educated heads, female heads, and smaller households with greater expected medical expenses, and household income is the most important factor affecting demand for supplementary medical insurance. CONCLUSION: Since demand for supplementary medical insurance is hugely influenced by households' economic status, policy-makers in the health sector should devise measures to improve households' economic or financial access to supplementary insurance services, by identifying households in the lower economic deciles, and increasing their financial ability to pay. Moreover, insurance companies should adjust their insurance policy according to clients' needs, household characteristics, and their incomes.

Willingness to pay for the social health insurance in Iran.

OBJECTIVE: The substantial level of out-of-pocket expenditure for health care by the population causes policy makers to draw particular attention to the proposal of a social health insurance for uninsured members of the community. Hence, it is essential to gather reliable information about the amount of Willingness To Pay (WTP) for health insurance. We assessed the WTP for health insurance in Iran in order to suggest an affordable social health insurance. METHODS: The study sample included 300 household heads in all Iranian provinces. The double bounded dichotomous choice approach was used to elicit the WTP. RESULTS: The average WTP for social health insurance per person per month was 137 000 Rial (5.5 $US). Household heads with higher levels of education, income and those who worked had more WTP for the health insurance. Besides, the WTP increased in direct proportion to the number of insured members of each household and in inverse proportion to the family size. CONCLUSIONS: From a policy point of view, the WTP value can be used as a premium in a society. An important finding of this study is that although households' Willingness To Pay is not more than the total insurance premium, households are willing to pay more than the premium they ought to pay for health insurance coverage. That is, total insurance premium is 150 000 Rials and households ought to pay approximately half of this sum. This can afford policy makers the ideal opportunity to provide good insurance coverage for medical services according to the need of society.