Climatic Factors Influencing the Anthrax Outbreak of 2016 in Siberia, Russia.

In 2016, an outbreak of anthrax killing thousands of reindeer and affecting dozens of humans occurred on the Yamal peninsula, Northwest Siberia, after 70 years of epidemiological situation without outbreaks. The trigger of the outbreak has been ascribed to the activation of spores due to permafrost thaw that was accelerated during the summer heat wave. The focus of our study is on the dynamics of local environmental factors in connection with the observed anthrax revival. We show that permafrost was thawing rapidly for already 6 years before the outbreak. During 2011-2016, relatively warm years were followed by cold years with a thick snow cover, preventing freezing of the soil. Furthermore, the spread of anthrax was likely intensified by an extremely dry summer of 2016. Concurrent with the long-term decreasing trend in the regional annual precipitation, the rainfall in July 2016 was less than 10% of its 30-year mean value. We conclude that epidemiological situation of anthrax in the previously contaminated Arctic regions requires monitoring of climatic factors such as warming and precipitation extremes.

Indoor Model Simulation for COVID-19 Transport and Exposure.

Transmission of respiratory viruses is a complex process involving emission, deposition in the airways, and infection. Inhalation is often the most relevant transmission mode in indoor environments. For severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the risk of inhalation transmission is not yet fully understood. Here, we used an indoor aerosol model combined with a regional inhaled deposited dose model to examine the indoor transport of aerosols from an infected person with novel coronavirus disease (COVID-19) to a susceptible person and assess the potential inhaled dose rate of particles. Two scenarios with different ventilation rates were compared, as well as adult female versus male recipients. Assuming a source strength of 10 viruses/s, in a tightly closed room with poor ventilation (0.5 h-1), the respiratory tract deposited dose rate was 140-350 and 100-260 inhaled viruses/hour for males and females; respectively. With ventilation at 3 h-1 the dose rate was only 30-90 viruses/hour. Correcting for the half-life of SARS-CoV-2 in air, these numbers are reduced by a factor of 1.2-2.2 for poorly ventilated rooms and 1.1-1.4 for well-ventilated rooms. Combined with future determinations of virus emission rates, the size distribution of aerosols containing the virus, and the infectious dose, these results could play an important role in understanding the full picture of potential inhalation transmission in indoor environments.

Probabilistic risk assessment for long-range atmospheric transport of radionuclides.

A simplified means of probabilistic risk assessment (PRA) for long-range atmospheric transport based on a K-diffusion model is presented. In a case study, model parameters are estimated by comparing with the results of long-range atmospheric dispersion model calculations using one-year numerical weather prediction model data. It is found that the estimated ensemble mean provides a reasonable first approximation to the total dry and wet deposition from the one-year continuous release.

Probabilistic indicators of atmospheric transport for regional monitoring and emergency preparedness systems.

In this paper, following a methodology developed within the "Arctic Risk" Project of the Nordic Arctic Research Programme, several probabilistic indicators to evaluate the risk site possible impact on the geographical regions, territories, countries, counties, cities, etc., due to atmospheric transport from the risk site region were suggested. These indicators-maximum possible impact zone, maximum reaching distance, and typical transport time-were constructed by applying statistical methods and using a dataset of isentropic trajectories originated over the selected nuclear risk site (Ignalina nuclear power plant, Lithuania) during 1991-1996. For this site, the areas enclosed by isolines of the maximum possible impact zone and maximum reaching distance indicators are equal to 42 x 10(4) and 703 x 10(4) km(2), respectively. The maximum possible impact zone's boundaries are more extended in the southeast sector from the site and include, in particular, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, and several western regions of Russia. The maximum reaching distance's boundaries are twice more extended in the eastern direction from the site (reaching the Caspian Sea) compared with the western direction. The typical transport time to reach the southern territories of Sweden and Finland, northern regions of Ukraine, and northeast of Poland is 1 day. During this time, the atmospheric transport could typically occur over the Baltic States, Belarus, and western border regions of Russia, and central aquatoria of the Baltic Sea. Detailed analysis of temporal patterns for these indicators showed importance of the seasonal variability.