Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of glanders and melioidosis and bioterrorism-related glanders and melioidosis.

Glanders and melioidosis are two infectious diseases that are caused by Burkholderia mallei and Burkholderia pseudomallei respectively. Infection may be acquired through direct skin contact with contaminated soil or water. Ingestion of such contaminated water or dust is another way of contamination. Glanders and melioidosis have both been studied for weaponisation in several countries in the past. They produce similar clinical syndromes. The symptoms depend upon the route of infection but one form of the disease may progress to another, or the disease might run a chronic relapsing course. Four clinical forms are generally described: localised infection, pulmonary infection, septicaemia and chronic suppurative infections of the skin. All treatment recommendations should be adapted according to the susceptibility reports from any isolates obtained. Post-exposure prophylaxis with trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole is recommended in case of a biological attack. There is no vaccine available for humans.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of brucellosis and bioterrorism-related brucellosis.

Interest in Brucella species as a biological weapon stems from the fact that airborne transmission of the agent is possible. It is highly contagious and enters through mucous membranes such as the conjunctiva, oropharynx, respiratory tract and skin abrasions. It has been estimated that 10-100 organisms only are sufficient to constitute an infectious aerosol dose for humans. Signs and symptoms are similar in patients whatever the route of transmission and are mostly non-specific. Symptoms of patients infected by aerosol are indistinguishable from those of patients infected by other routes. Regimens containing doxycycline plus streptomycin or doxycycline plus rifampin are effective for most forms of brucellosis. Isolation of patients is not necessary. Trimethoprim-sulfamethoxazole and fluoroquinolones also have good results against Brucella, but are associated with high relapse rates when used as monotherapy. The combination of ofloxacin plus rifampicin is associated with good results. Even if there is little evidence to support its utility for post-exposure prophylaxis, doxycycline plus rifampicin is recommended for 3 to 6 weeks.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of plague and bioterrorism-related plague.

Yersinia pestis appears to be a good candidate agent for a bioterrorist attack. The use of an aerosolised form of this agent could cause an explosive outbreak of primary plague pneumonia. The bacteria could be used also to infect the rodent population and then spread to humans. Most of the therapeutic guidelines suggest using gentamicin or streptomycin as first line therapy with ciprofloxacin as optional treatment. Persons who come in contact with patients with pneumonic plague should receive antibiotic prophylaxis with doxycycline or ciprofloxacin for 7 days. Prevention of human-to-human transmission via patients with plague pneumonia can be achieved by implementing standard isolation procedures until at least 4 days of antibiotic treatment have been administered. For the other clinical types of the disease, patients should be isolated for the first 48 hours after the initiation of treatment.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of haemorrhagic fever viruses and bioterrorism-related haemorrhagic fever viruses.

Haemorrhagic fever viruses (HFVs) are a diverse group of viruses that cause a clinical disease associated with fever and bleeding disorder. HFVs that are associated with a potential biological threat are Ebola and Marburg viruses (Filoviridae), Lassa fever and New World arenaviruses (Machupo, Junin, Guanarito and Sabia viruses) (Arenaviridae), Rift Valley fever (Bunyaviridae) and yellow fever, Omsk haemorrhagic fever, and Kyanasur Forest disease (Flaviviridae). In terms of biological warfare concerning dengue, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever and Hantaviruses, there is not sufficient knowledge to include them as a major biological threat. Dengue virus is the only one of these that cannot be transmitted via aerosol. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever and the agents of haemorrhagic fever with renal syndrome appear difficult to weaponise. Ribavirin is recommended for the treatment and the prophylaxis of the arenaviruses and the bunyaviruses, but is not effective for the other families. All patients must be isolated and receive intensive supportive therapy.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of smallpox and bioterrorism-related smallpox.

Smallpox is a viral infection caused by the variola virus. It was declared eradicated worldwide by the Word Health Organization in 1980 following a smallpox eradication campaign. Smallpox is seen as one of the viruses most likely to be used as a biological weapon. The variola virus exists legitimately in only two laboratories in the world. Any new case of smallpox would have to be the result of human accidental or deliberate release. The aerosol infectivity, high mortality, and stability of the variola virus make it a potential and dangerous threat in biological warfare. Early detection and diagnosis are important to limit the spread of the disease. Patients with smallpox must be isolated and managed, if possible, in a negative-pressure room until death or until all scabs have been shed. There is no established antiviral treatment for smallpox. The most effective prevention is vaccination before exposure.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of tularaemia and bioterrorism-related tularaemia.

Francisella tularensis is one of the most infectious pathogenic bacteria known, requiring inoculation or inhalation of as few as 10 organisms to initiate human infection. Inhalational tularaemia following intentional release of a virulent strain of F. tularensis would have great impact and cause high morbidity and mortality. Another route of contamination in a deliberate release could be contamination of water. Seven clinical forms, according to route of inoculation (skin, mucous membranes, gastrointestinal tract, eyes, respiratory tract), dose of the inoculum and virulence of the organism (types A or B) are identified. The pneumonic form of the disease is the most likely form of the disease should this bacterium be used as a bioterrorism agent. Streptomycin and gentamicin are currently considered the treatment of choice for tularemia. Quinolone is an effective alternative drug. No isolation measures for patients with pneumonia are necessary. Streptomycin, gentamicin, doxycycline or ciprofloxacin are recommended for post-exposure prophylaxis.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of botulism and bioterrorism-related botulism.

Botulism is a rare but serious paralytic illness caused by botulinum toxin, which is produced by the Clostridium botulinum. This toxin is the most poisonous substance known. It 100 000 times more toxic than sarin gas. Eating or breathing this toxin causes illness in humans. Four distinct clinical forms are described: foodborne, wound, infant and intestinal botulism. The fifth form, inhalational botulism, is caused by aerosolised botulinum toxin that could be used as a biological weapon. A deliberate release may also involve contamination of food or water supplies with toxin or C. botulinum bacteria. By inhalation, the dose that would kill 50% of exposed persons (LD50) is 0.003 microgrammes/kg of body weight. Patients with respiratory failure must be admitted to an intensive care unit and require long-term mechanical ventilation. Trivalent equine antitoxins (A,B,E) must be given to patients as soon as possible after clinical diagnosis. Heptavalent human antitoxins (A-G) are available in certain countries.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of anthrax and bioterrorism-related anthrax.

The spore-forming Bacillus anthracis must be considered as one of the most serious potential biological weapons. The recent cases of anthrax caused by a deliberate release reported in 2001 in the United States point to the necessity of early recognition of this disease. Infection in humans most often involves the skin, and more rarely the lungs and the gastrointestinal tract. Inhalational anthrax is of particular interest for possible deliberate release: it is a life-threatening disease and early diagnosis and treatment can significantly decrease the mortality rate. Treatment consists of massive doses of antibiotics and supportive care. Isolation is not necessary. Antibiotics such as ciprofloxacin are recommended for post-exposure prophylaxis during 60 days.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of Q fever and bioterrorism-related Q fever.

Q fever is a zoonotic disease caused by Coxiella burnetii. Its interest as a potential biological weapon stems from the fact that an aerosol of very few organisms could infect humans. Another route of transmission of C. burnetii could be through adding it to the food supply. Nevertheless, C. burnetii is considered to be one of the less suitable candidate agents for use in a bioterrorist attack; the incubation is long, many infections are inapparent and the mortality is low. In the case of an intentional release of C. burnetii by a terrorist, clinical presentation would be similar to naturally occurring disease. It may be asymptomatic, acute, normally accompanied by pneumonia or hepatitis, or chronic, usually manifested as endocarditis. Most cases of acute Q fever are asymptomatic and resolve spontaneously without specific treatment. Nevertheless, treatment can shorten the duration of illness and decrease the risk of complications such as endocarditis. Post-exposure prophylaxis is recommended after the exposure in the case of a bioterrorist attack.

Bichat guidelines for the clinical management of viral encephalitis and bioterrorism-related viral encephalitis.

Most of the viruses involved in causing encephalitis are arthropod-borne viruses, with the exception of arenaviruses that are rodent-borne. Even if little information is available, there are indications that, most of these encephalitis-associated viruses could be used by aerosolisation during a bioterrorist attack. Viral transfer from blood to the CNS through the olfactory tract has been suggested. Another possible route of contamination is by vector-borne transmission such as infected mosquitoes or ticks. Alphaviruses are the most likely candidates for weaponisation. The clinical course of the diseases caused by these viruses is usually not specific, but differentiation is possible by using an adequate diagnostic tool. There is no effective drug therapy for the treatment of these diseases and treatment is mainly supportive, but vaccines protecting against some of these viruses do exist.

Staphylococcal cell wall: morphogenesis and fatal variations in the presence of penicillin.

The primary goal of this review is to provide a compilation of the complex architectural features of staphylococcal cell walls and of some of their unusual morphogenetic traits including the utilization of murosomes and two different mechanisms of cell separation. Knowledge of these electron microscopic findings may serve as a prerequisite for a better understanding of the sophisticated events which lead to penicillin-induced death. For more than 50 years there have been controversial disputes about the mechanisms by which penicillin kills bacteria. Many hypotheses have tried to explain this fatal event biochemically and mainly via bacteriolysis. However, indications that penicillin-induced death of staphylococci results from overall biochemical defects or from a fatal attack of bacterial cell walls by bacteriolytic murein hydrolases were not been found. Rather, penicillin, claimed to trigger the activity of murein hydrolases, impaired autolytic wall enzymes of staphylococci. Electron microscopic investigations have meanwhile shown that penicillin-mediated induction of seemingly minute cross wall mistakes is the very reason for this killing. Such "morphogenetic death" taking place at predictable cross wall sites and at a predictable time is based on the initiation of normal cell separations in those staphylococci in which the completion of cross walls had been prevented by local penicillin-mediated impairment of the distribution of newly synthesized peptidoglycan; this death occurs because the high internal pressure of the protoplast abruptly kills such cells via ejection of some cytoplasm during attempted cell separation. An analogous fatal onset of cell partition is considered to take place without involvement of a detectable quantity of autolytic wall enzymes ("mechanical cell separation"). The most prominent feature of penicillin, the disintegration of bacterial cells via bacteriolysis, is shown to represent only a postmortem process resulting from shrinkage of dead cells and perturbation of the cytoplasmic membrane. Several schematic drawings have been included in this review to facilitate an understanding of the complex morphogenetic events.

Two alternative mechanisms of cell separation in staphylococci: one lytic and one mechanical.

Electron microscopy studies revealed two different mechanisms of cell separation in Staphylococcus aureus. Both mechanisms were initiated by the centrifugal lytic action (directed outward from the center) of murosomes, which perforated the peripheral cell wall. Thereafter, during the first type of cell separation, murosomes also lysed large parts of the cross wall proper in the opposite, i.e., centripetal direction, forming spokelike lytic lesions ("separation scars") next to the most prominent structure of the cross wall, the splitting system. This bidirectional lytic action of murosomes revealed that the staphylococcal cross wall is composed of permanent and transitory parts; transitory parts constituted about one-third of the volume of the total cross wall and seemed to be digested during cell separation. The second mechanism of cell separation was encountered within the splitting system, which has been regarded as the main control unit for lytic cell separation for more than 25 years. The splitting system, however, represents mainly a mechanical aid for cell separation and becomes effective when cell-wall autolytic activities are insufficient.

A novel, "hidden" penicillin-induced death of staphylococci at high drug concentration, occurring earlier than murosome-mediated killing processes.

In log-phase cells of staphylococci, cultivated under high, "non-lytic" concentrations of penicillin G, there occurred a novel killing process hitherto hidden behind seemingly bacteriostatic effects. Two events are essential for the appearance of this "hidden death": (i) the failure of the dividing cell to deposit enough fibrillar cross-wall material to be welded together, and (ii) a premature ripping up of incomplete cross walls along their splitting system. "Hidden death" started as early as 10-15 min after drug addition, already during the first division cycle. It was the consequence of a loss of cytoplasmic constituents which erupted through peripheral slit-like openings in the incomplete cross walls. The loss resulted either in more or less empty cells or in cell shrinkage. These destructions could be prevented by raising the external osmotic pressure. In contrast, the conventional "non-hidden death" occurred only much later and exclusively during the second division cycle and mainly in those dividing cells, whose nascent cross walls of the first division plane had been welded together. These welding processes at nascent cross walls, resulting in tough connecting bridges between presumptive individual cells, were considered as a morphogenetic tool which protects the cells, so that they can resist the otherwise fatal penicillin-induced damages for at least an additional generation time ("morphogenetic resistance system"). Such welded cells, in the virtual absence of underlying cross-wall material, lost cytoplasm and were killed via ejection through pore-like wall openings or via explosions in the second division plane and after liberation of their murosomes, as it was the case in the presence of low, "lytic" concentrations of penicillin. Bacteriolysis did not cause any of the hitherto known penicillin-induced killing processes.

femA, which encodes a factor essential for expression of methicillin resistance, affects glycine content of peptidoglycan in methicillin-resistant and methicillin-susceptible Staphylococcus aureus strains.

femA is a chromosomally encoded factor, occurring naturally in Staphylococcus aureus, which is essential for the expression of high-level methicillin resistance in this organism. The production of a low-affinity penicillin-binding protein, PBP2a or PBP2', which is intimately involved with methicillin resistance in S. aureus, is not influenced by femA. To elucidate a possible physiological function of the 48-kDa protein encoded by femA, several related methicillin-resistant, methicillin-susceptible, and Tn551 insertionally inactivated femA mutants were analyzed for possible changes in cell wall structure and metabolism. Independent of the presence of mec, the methicillin resistance determinant, all femA mutants had a reduced peptidoglycan (PG) glycine content (up to 60% in the molar ratio of glycine/glutamic acid) compared to that of related femA+ parent strains. Additional effects of femA inactivation and the subsequent decrease in PG-associated glycine were (i) reduced digestion of PG by recombinant lysostaphin, (ii) unaltered digestion of PG by Chalaropsis B-muramidase, (iii) reduced cell wall turnover, (iv) reduced whole-cell autolysis, and (v) increased sensitivity towards beta-lactam antibiotics. Also, the PG-associated glycine content of a femA::Tn551 methicillin-susceptible strain was restored concomitantly with the methicillin resistance to a level almost equal to that of its femA+ methicillin-resistant parent strain by introduction of plasmid pBBB31, encoding femA.

Onset of penicillin-induced bacteriolysis in staphylococci is cell cycle dependent.

Synchronously growing staphylococci were treated with "lytic" concentrations of penicillin at different stages of their division cycle. Coulter Counter measurements and light microscopy were used to determine the onset of bacteriolysis. Independent of the stage of the division cycle at which penicillin was added, (i) the cells were always able to perform the next cell division; (ii) the following division, however, did not take place; and (iii) instead, at this time, when the onset of the subsequent cell separation was observed in control cultures, lysis of the penicillin-treated cells occurred. These results support a recent model (P. Giesbrecht, H. Labischinski, and J. Wecke, Arch. Microbiol. 141:315-324, 1985) explaining penicillin-induced bacteriolysis of staphylococci as the result of a special morphogenetic mistake during cross wall formation.