Subject(s)
Brain Injuries , Family , Living Donors , Nephrectomy/ethics , Organ Transplantation/ethics , Public Opinion , Respiration, Artificial , Terminal Care/ethics , Third-Party Consent , Tissue and Organ Harvesting/ethics , Tissue and Organ Procurement/ethics , Trust , Withholding Treatment/ethics , Humans , MaleABSTRACT
According to Carson Strong, the future of value account of the wrongness of killing is subject to counterexamples. Ezio Di Nucci has disagreed. Their disagreement turns on whether the concepts of a future of value and a future like ours are equivalent. Unfortunately, both concepts are fuzzy, which explains, at least in part, the disagreement. I suggest that both concepts can be clarified in ways that seem plausible and that makes them equivalent. Strong claims that better accounts of the wrongness of killing exist. I show that those alternative accounts are unsatisfactory.
Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced/ethics , Beginning of Human Life/ethics , Homicide/ethics , Personhood , Value of Life , Female , Humans , Male , PregnancySubject(s)
Abortion, Legal/ethics , Abortion, Legal/legislation & jurisprudence , Choice Behavior , Moral Obligations , Beginning of Human Life/ethics , Choice Behavior/ethics , Ethical Theory , Female , Feminism , Humans , Personal Autonomy , Personhood , Pregnancy , Supreme Court Decisions , United States , Value of LifeABSTRACT
Donation after cardiac death protocols are subject to two constraints. The first is that organ removal must occur as soon as possible after cardiac arrest. The second is that it must not occur so soon that the donor is not yet dead. Can both constraints be satisfied at once? DCD protocols are widely accepted, so arguments for them have apparently been persuasive. But this does not mean they are sound.