The importance of sustained compliance with physical distancing during COVID-19 vaccination rollout

Mass vaccination campaigns against SARS-CoV-2 are ongoing in many countries with increasing vaccination coverage enabling relaxation of lockdowns. Vaccination rollout is frequently supplemented with advisory from public health authorities for continuation of physical distancing measures. Compliance with these measures is waning while more transmissible virus variants such as Alpha (B.1.1.7) and Delta (B.1.617.2) have emerged. In this work, we considered a population where the waning of compliance depends on vaccine coverage. We used a SARS-CoV-2 transmission model which captures the feedback between compliance, infection incidence, and vaccination coverage to investigate factors that contribute to the increase of the prevalence of infection during the initial stages of the vaccination rollout as compared to no vaccination scenario. We analysed how the vaccine uptake rate affects cumulative numbers of new infections three and six months after the start of vaccination. Our results suggest that the combination of fast waning compliance in non-vaccinated population, low compliance in vaccinated population and more transmissible virus variants may result in a higher cumulative number of new infections than in a situation without vaccination. These adverse effects can be alleviated if vaccinated individuals do not revert to pre-pandemic contact rates, and if non-vaccinated individuals remain compliant with physical distancing measures. Both require convincing, clear and appropriately targeted communication strategies by public health authorities. Significance StatementSARS-CoV-2 vaccination campaigns are in progress in many countries around the world. As the vaccination coverage increases, the compliance with physical distancing measures aimed at reducing virus transmission may decline. Using a socio-epidemiological model we identify factors that are the drivers of increased transmission when SARS-CoV-2 prevalence is higher than the projected prevalence without vaccination. To maximize the benefits of vaccination campaigns, compliance in vaccinated and non-vaccinated groups should be targeted prioritizing one group over the other depending on the vaccination rate, the efficacy of vaccine in blocking the infection, and the circulating variant.

On discrete time epidemic models in Kermack-McKendrick form

Surprisingly, the discrete-time version of the general 1927 Kermack-McKendrick epidemic model has, to our knowledge, not been formulated in the literature, and we rectify this omission here. The discrete time version is as general and flexible as its continuous-time counterpart, and contains numerous compartmental models as special cases. In contrast to the continuous time version, the discrete time version of the model is very easy to implement computationally, and thus promises to become a powerful tool for exploring control scenarios for specific infectious diseases. To demonstrate the potential, we investigate numerically how the incidence-peak size depends on model ingredients. We find that, with the same reproduction number and initial speed of epidemic spread, compartmental models systematically predict lower peak sizes than models that use a fixed duration for the latent and infectious periods.

Interventions to control nosocomial transmission of SARS-CoV-2: a modelling study

BackgroundEmergence of more transmissible SARS-CoV-2 variants requires more efficient control measures to limit nosocomial transmission and maintain healthcare capacities during pandemic waves. Yet, the relative importance of different strategies is unknown. MethodsWe developed an agent-based model and compared the impact of personal protective equipment (PPE), screening of healthcare workers (HCWs), contact tracing of symptomatic HCWs, and restricting HCWs from working in multiple units (HCW cohorting) on nosocomial SARS-CoV-2 transmission. The model was fit on hospital data from the first wave in the Netherlands (February until August 2020) and assumed that HCWs used 90% effective PPE in COVID-19 wards and self-isolated at home for seven days immediately upon symptom onset. Intervention effects on the effective reproduction number (RE), HCW absenteeism and the proportion of infected individuals among tested individuals (positivity rate) were estimated for a more transmissible variant. ResultsIntroduction of a variant with 56% higher transmissibility increased - all other variables kept constant - RE from 0.4 to 0.65 (+63%) and nosocomial transmissions by 303%, mainly because of more transmissions caused by pre-symptomatic patients and HCWs. Compared to baseline, PPE use in all hospital wards (assuming 90% effectiveness) reduced RE by 85% and absenteeism by 57%. Screening HCWs every three days with perfect test sensitivity reduced RE by 67%, yielding a maximum test positivity rate of 5%. Screening HCWs every three or seven days assuming time-varying test sensitivities reduced RE by 9% and 3%, respectively. Contact tracing reduced RE by at least 32% and achieved higher test positivity rates than screening interventions. HCW cohorting reduced RE by 5%. Sensitivity analyses for 50% and 70% effectiveness of PPE use did not change interpretation. ConclusionsIn response to the emergence of more transmissible SARS-CoV-2 variants, PPE use in all hospital wards might still be most effective in preventing nosocomial transmission. Regular screening and contact tracing of HCWs are also effective interventions, but critically depend on the sensitivity of the diagnostic test used.

Regular universal screening for SARS-CoV-2 infection may not allow reopening of society after controlling a pandemic wave

BackgroundTo limit societal and economic costs of lockdown measures, public health strategies are needed that control the spread of SARS-CoV-2 and simultaneously allow lifting of disruptive measures. Regular universal random screening of large proportions of the population regardless of symptoms has been proposed as a possible control strategy. MethodsWe developed a mathematical model that includes test sensitivity depending on infectiousness for PCR-based and antigen-based tests, and different levels of onward transmission for testing and non-testing parts of the population. Only testing individuals participate in high-risk transmission events, allowing more transmission in case of unnoticed infection. We calculated the required testing interval and coverage to bring the effective reproduction number due to universal random testing (Rrt) below 1, for different scenarios of risk behavior of testing and non-testing individuals. FindingsWith R0 = 2.5, lifting all control measures for tested subjects with negative test results would require 100% of the population being tested every three days with a rapid test method with similar sensitivity as PCR-based tests. With remaining measures in place reflecting Re = 1.3, 80% of the population would need to be tested once a week to bring Rrt below 1. With lower proportions tested and with lower test sensitivity, testing frequency should increase further to bring Rrt below 1. With similar Re values for tested and non-tested subjects, and with tested subjects not allowed to engage in higher risk events, at least 80% of the populations needs to test every five days to bring Rrt below. The impact of the test-sensitivity on the reproduction number is far less than the frequency of testing. InterpretationRegular universal random screening followed by isolation of infectious individuals is not a viable strategy to reopen society after controlling a pandemic wave of SARS-CoV-2. More targeted screening approaches are needed to better use rapid testing such that it can effectively complement other control measures. FundingRECOVER (H2020-101003589) (MJMB), ZonMw project 10430022010001 (MK, HH), FCT project 131_596787873 (GR). ZonMw project 91216062 (MK)