CSEC+ framework assessment dataset: Expert evaluations of cybersecurity skills for job profiles in Europe.

This dataset contains expert assessments of the cybersecurity skills required for six job profiles in Europe, as determined via surveys responded by cybersecurity experts from academia and industry. The data can be used to identify educational needs in the cybersecurity sector and compare against other frameworks. The six cybersecurity-oriented job profiles used in the surveys are: General cybersec auditor; Technical cybersec auditor; Threat modelling engineer; Security engineer; Enterprise cybersecurity practitioner; Cybersecurity analyst. Data-i.e. expert assessments-was collected via surveys, targeted at European experts in cybersecurity from academia and industry. Respondents characterised the skills needed to perform in six job profiles using the CSEC+ framework: a cybersecurity skills framework prepared as a spreadsheet where cybersecurity skills must be ranked in a Likert scale from 0 (irrelevant) to 4 (advance knowledge needed). Metadata requested included the type of organisation of the respondent (Large company, SME, Academic/Research, Public administration, Other) and the country of origin. There were three data-collection phases: (1) an initial phase, used also to refine later larger-scale processes, carried out in Oct 2021-Jan 2022 and resulting in 13 expert assessments from four EU countries; (2) a second phase implemented as an online service broadcast to a larger audience, carried out in Mar-Apr 2022 and resulting in 15 assessments from eight European countries; (3) and a third phase, allowing direct online input and distributed in PC and mobile form, carried out in Sep-Oct 2022 and resulting in 32 assessments from ten European countries. The raw data gathered was stored and processed via spreadsheets, computing statistical information (mean, stdev) on how much each cybersecurity skill and area was deemed necessary to perform in each job profile. This is visualised as a heatmap where colour intensity symbolises value, and circle diffusion symbolises spread. Processed data further includes visualisations on how the area of origin of the respondent (academia, as in "producer of education", vs. industry, as in "consumer of education") influences the responses. This is shown as bar plots, where whiskers represent confidence intervals used for statistical-significance tests. This data can serve as basis to understand the educational needs for the cybersecurity sector in Europe. It can be reused for comparison against frameworks, other than CSEC+, to assess the need of education in specific cybersecurity sectors such as human security. Furthermore, the Qualtrics survey template (included) is a ready-made solution for replication studies.

The Work-Averse Cyberattacker Model: Theory and Evidence from Two Million Attack Signatures.

The assumption that a cyberattacker will potentially exploit all present vulnerabilities drives most modern cyber risk management practices and the corresponding security investments. We propose a new attacker model, based on dynamic optimization, where we demonstrate that large, initial, fixed costs of exploit development induce attackers to delay implementation and deployment of exploits of vulnerabilities. The theoretical model predicts that mass attackers will preferably (i) exploit only one vulnerability per software version, (ii) largely include only vulnerabilities requiring low attack complexity, and (iii) be slow at trying to weaponize new vulnerabilities . These predictions are empirically validated on a large data set of observed massed attacks launched against a large collection of information systems. Findings in this article allow cyber risk managers to better concentrate their efforts for vulnerability management, and set a new theoretical and empirical basis for further research defining attacker (offensive) processes.

Who Should Pay for Interdependent Risk? Policy Implications for Security Interdependence Among Airports.

We study interdependent risks in security, and shed light on the economic and policy implications of increasing security interdependence in presence of reactive attackers. We investigate the impact of potential public policy arrangements on the security of a group of interdependent organizations, namely, airports. Focusing on security expenditures and costs to society, as assessed by a social planner, to individual airports and to attackers, we first develop a game-theoretic framework, and derive explicit Nash equilibrium and socially optimal solutions in the airports network. We then conduct numerical experiments mirroring real-world cyber scenarios, to assess how a change in interdependence impact the airports' security expenditures, the overall expected costs to society, and the fairness of security financing. Our study provides insights on the economic and policy implications for the United States, Europe, and Asia.

IoT Security Configurability with Security-by-Contract.

Cybersecurity is one of the biggest challenges in the Internet of Things (IoT) domain, as well as one of its most embarrassing failures. As a matter of fact, nowadays IoT devices still exhibit various shortcomings. For example, they lack secure default configurations and sufficient security configurability. They also lack rich behavioural descriptions, failing to list provided and required services. To answer this problem, we envision a future where IoT devices carry behavioural contracts and Fog nodes store network policies. One requirement is that contract consistency must be easy to prove. Moreover, contracts must be easy to verify against network policies. In this paper, we propose to combine the security-by-contract (S × C) paradigm with Fog computing to secure IoT devices. Following our previous work, first we formally define the pillars of our proposal. Then, by means of a running case study, we show that we can model communication flows and prevent information leaks. Last, we show that our contribution enables a holistic approach to IoT security, and that it can also prevent unexpected chains of events.

Security Events and Vulnerability Data for Cybersecurity Risk Estimation.

Current industry standards for estimating cybersecurity risk are based on qualitative risk matrices as opposed to quantitative risk estimates. In contrast, risk assessment in most other industry sectors aims at deriving quantitative risk estimations (e.g., Basel II in Finance). This article presents a model and methodology to leverage on the large amount of data available from the IT infrastructure of an organization's security operation center to quantitatively estimate the probability of attack. Our methodology specifically addresses untargeted attacks delivered by automatic tools that make up the vast majority of attacks in the wild against users and organizations. We consider two-stage attacks whereby the attacker first breaches an Internet-facing system, and then escalates the attack to internal systems by exploiting local vulnerabilities in the target. Our methodology factors in the power of the attacker as the number of "weaponized" vulnerabilities he/she can exploit, and can be adjusted to match the risk appetite of the organization. We illustrate our methodology by using data from a large financial institution, and discuss the significant mismatch between traditional qualitative risk assessments and our quantitative approach.

Agency Problems and Airport Security: Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence on the Impact of Security Training.

We analyze the issue of agency costs in aviation security by combining results from a quantitative economic model with a qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews. Our model extends previous principal-agent models by combining the traditional fixed and varying monetary responses to physical and cognitive effort with nonmonetary welfare and potentially transferable value of employees' own human capital. To provide empirical evidence for the tradeoffs identified in the quantitative model, we have undertaken an extensive interview process with regulators, airport managers, security personnel, and those tasked with training security personnel from an airport operating in a relatively high-risk state, Turkey. Our results indicate that the effectiveness of additional training depends on the mix of "transferable skills" and "emotional" buy-in of the security agents. Principals need to identify on which side of a critical tipping point their agents are to ensure that additional training, with attached expectations of the burden of work, aligns the incentives of employees with the principals' own objectives.