Neuromyths and knowledge about intellectual giftedness in a highly educated multilingual country.

Introduction: Understanding brain functioning and intellectual giftedness can be challenging and give rise to various misconceptions. Nonetheless, there seems to be a widespread fascination and appetite for these subjects among the lay public and diverse professionals. The present study is the first to investigate general knowledge about the brain, neuromyths and knowledge about giftedness in a highly multilingual and educated country. Methods: Starting from and extending two seminal studies on neuromyths, several novel statements on intellectual giftedness have been included in order to explore knowledge and misconceptions concerning giftedness. Our sample (N = 200) was composed of Luxembourgish education professionals, including students in educational science and cognitive psychology, thus allowing to analyze responses in general and according to training and professional profiles. Specifically, Group 1 consisted of teachers and futures teachers (n = 152). Group 2 consisted of other education professionals and psychology students (n = 48). Results: Despite the size and the unbalanced distribution of the sample, our findings indicate a good level of general knowledge about the brain and learning (71.3% of correct responses in average) which does, however, not preclude the presence of the typically observed original neuromyths. Thus, we replicate the classical finding that misconceptions on Learning Styles (70% of error rate) and the Multiple Intelligence Theory (71.5% of error rate) are the most represented, both in (future and in-service) teachers and other education professionals. Moreover, the present sample also revealed a high presence of misconceptions on intellectual giftedness. Discussion: Limitations and future directions are discussed.

Effects of reading contextualized physics problems among men and women: A psychophysiological approach.

To counteract declining interest in science, contextualizing course material has been suggested, despite little evidence supporting this strategy. We assessed how reading physics problems in different contexts-none, technical, or humanistic-impacted performance and implicit cognitive and affective situational interest (SI) among undergraduate men and women (n = 60). We hypothesized that contextualized problems would increase cognitive SI, boosting performance. We also investigated existing hypotheses that this influence would be stronger when contexts matched stereotypical gender interests. Pupillometric and electroencephalographic data served to indicate cognitive SI, while electrodermal activity (EDA) and valence were measures of affective SI. Significantly higher valence was observed in decontextualized than humanistic problems (p = 0.003) specifically among men (p < 0.001). Greater EDA (p = 0.019) and decontextualized problems (p < 0.001) yielded greater performance than contextualized problems for all participants. Results emphasize the importance of affective SI and of avoiding gender biases in curricular development. This study encourages caution if implementing contextualization.

Persistence of the "Moving Things Are Alive" Heuristic into Adulthood: Evidence from EEG.

Although a growing number of studies indicate that simple strategies, intuitions, or cognitive shortcuts called heuristics can persistently interfere with scientific reasoning in physics and chemistry, the persistence of heuristics related to learning biology is less known. In this study, we investigate the persistence of the "moving things are alive" heuristic into adulthood with 28 undergraduate students who were asked to select between two images, one of which one represented a living thing, while their electroencephalographic signals were recorded. Results show that N2 and LPP event-related potential components, often associated with tasks requiring inhibitory control, are higher in counterintuitive trials (i.e., in trials including moving things not alive or nonmoving things alive) compared with intuitive ones. To our knowledge, these findings represent the first neurocognitive evidence that the "moving things are alive" heuristic persists into adulthood and that overcoming this heuristic might require inhibitory control. Potential implications for life science education are discussed.

An fMRI study of scientists with a Ph.D. in physics confronted with naive ideas in science.

A central challenge in developing conceptual understanding in science is overcoming naive ideas that contradict the content of science curricula. Neuroimaging studies reveal that high school and university students activate frontal brain areas associated with inhibitory control to overcome naive ideas in science, probably because they persist despite scientific training. However, no neuroimaging study has yet explored how persistent naive ideas in science are. Here, we report brain activations of 25 scientists with a Ph.D. in physics assessing the scientific value of naive ideas in science. Results show that scientists are slower and have lower accuracy when judging the scientific value of naive ideas compared to matched control ideas. fMRI data reveals that a network of frontal brain regions is more activated when judging naive ideas. Results suggest that naive ideas are likely to persist, even after completing a Ph.D. Advanced experts may still rely on high order executive functions like inhibitory control to overcome naive ideas when the context requires it.

Inhibitory control and the understanding of buoyancy from childhood to adulthood.

Intuitive conceptions represent common obstacles to conceptual learning in science. A growing number of studies demonstrate that when learning occurs, these intuitive conceptions are not replaced by scientific conceptions but rather coexist with them and thus need to be inhibited to prevent systematic errors. However, to date no study has demonstrated that the increasing ability to mobilize a given scientific conception is rooted in the increasing ability to inhibit the intuitive conception that interferes with it. In the current study, we investigated whether the increasing ability from childhood to adulthood to solve a scientific problem regarding the buoyancy of marbles of different sizes and densities is rooted in the increasing ability to inhibit the "bigger objects sink more" intuitive conception. To do so, we designed a negative priming paradigm in which 11-year-old children, 17-year-old adolescents, and 24-year-old adults were asked to choose which of two marbles of various sizes and densities sinks more. Negative priming effects reported in children and adolescents suggest that, unlike adults, they must inhibit the "bigger objects sink more" intuitive conception to determine, for instance, that a small marble with high density (e.g., small lead marble) will sink more than a bigger marble with a lower density (e.g., big wooden marble). We also found that the amplitude of negative priming effects decreased with age, suggesting that the level of exposition to the scientific knowledge of buoyancy (increasing with age) may decrease the need to inhibit the "bigger objects sink more" intuitive conception.

Individual differences in science competence among students are associated with ventrolateral prefrontal cortex activation.

Functional neuroimaging studies have revealed that, compared with novices, science experts show increased activation in dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal brain areas associated with inhibitory control mechanisms when providing scientifically valid responses in tasks related to electricity and mechanics. However, no study thus far has explored the relationship between activation of the key brain regions involved in inhibitory control mechanisms, namely the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPC) and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPC), and individual differences in conceptual science competence, while controlling for scientific training. In the present study, 24 secondary school students (11 female participants, 13 male participants) were selected from a larger pool based on their performance on a conceptual science questionnaire and were divided into groups with low and high conceptual science competence. In an fMRI block design, participants had to verify the correctness (true or false) of congruent and incongruent statements. In congruent statements, both spontaneous and scientific conceptions about given natural phenomena lead to a scientifically appropriate judgment. However, in incongruent statements, commonly held spontaneous conceptions about natural phenomena lead to a scientifically inappropriate judgment. The interaction effect reveals that students with higher conceptual science competence display stronger activation of the left VLPC and DLPC in incongruent trials than in congruent trials. These findings show that activation of the VLPC and DLPC when reasoning in incongruent situations underlies individual differences in conceptual science competence, and suggests stronger recruitment of inhibitory control mechanisms in more competent individuals.

Brain activations associated with scientific reasoning: a literature review.

Scientifically literate individuals are defined as individuals who are able to apply scientific knowledge and use scientific reasoning skills to solve problems. In recent years, cognitive neuroscience has turned its attention to understanding the brain activation patterns associated with scientific reasoning skills, but this work has not been systematically reviewed for more than a decade. The present study reviews neuroimaging studies related to three types of scientific reasoning tasks: overcoming misconceptions, causal reasoning, and hypothesis generation. These studies indicate converging evidence for the involvement of (1) lateral prefrontal areas, reinforcing the idea of an association between scientific reasoning and executive functions, and (2) middle temporal areas, suggesting an association between scientific reasoning and declarative memory. Potential educational implications and leads for future research are discussed.

Is inhibitory control involved in discriminating pseudowords that contain the reversible letters b and d?

Children tend to confuse reversible letters such as b and d when they start learning to read. According to some authors, mirror errors are a consequence of the mirror generalization (MG) process that allows one to recognize objects independently of their left-right orientation. Although MG is advantageous for the visual recognition of objects, it is detrimental for the visual recognition of reversible letters. Previous studies comparing novice and expert readers demonstrated that MG must be inhibited to discriminate reversible single letters. In this study, we investigated whether MG must also be inhibited by novice readers to discriminate between two pseudowords containing reversible letters. Readable pseudowords, rather than words, were used to mimic early non-automatic stages of reading when reading is achieved by decoding words through grapheme-phoneme pairing and combination. We designed a negative priming paradigm in which school-aged children (10-year-olds) were asked to judge whether two pseudowords were identical on the prime and whether two animals were identical on the probe. Children required more time to determine that two animals were mirror images of each other when preceded by pseudowords containing the reversible letter b or d than when preceded by different pseudowords containing the control letter f or t (Experiment 1) or by different pseudowords that differed only by the target letter f or k (Experiment 2). These results suggest that MG must be inhibited to discriminate between pseudowords containing reversible letters, generalizing the findings regarding single letters to a context more representative of the early stages of reading.

Linking neuroscientific research on decision making to the educational context of novice students assigned to a multiple-choice scientific task involving common misconceptions about electrical circuits.

Functional magnetic resonance imaging was used to identify the brain-based mechanisms of uncertainty and certainty associated with answers to multiple-choice questions involving common misconceptions about electric circuits. Twenty-two scientifically novice participants (humanities and arts college students) were asked, in an fMRI study, whether or not they thought the light bulbs in images presenting electric circuits were lighted up correctly, and if they were certain or uncertain of their answers. When participants reported that they were unsure of their responses, analyses revealed significant activations in brain areas typically involved in uncertainty (anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula cortex, and superior/dorsomedial frontal cortex) and in the left middle/superior temporal lobe. Certainty was associated with large bilateral activations in the occipital and parietal regions usually involved in visuospatial processing. Correct-and-certain answers were associated with activations that suggest a stronger mobilization of visual attention resources when compared to incorrect-and-certain answers. These findings provide insights into brain-based mechanisms of uncertainty that are activated when common misconceptions, identified as such by science education research literature, interfere in decision making in a school-like task. We also discuss the implications of these results from an educational perspective.