Subject(s)
Bioterrorism/economics , Bioterrorism/prevention & control , Civil Defense/economics , Drug Industry/economics , Research/economics , Biotechnology/methods , Civil Defense/legislation & jurisprudence , Disaster Planning , Probability , Security Measures , United States , United States Dept. of Health and Human Services , Vaccines/supply & distributionABSTRACT
Publicly available influenza modeling tools are of limited use to hospitals and local communities in planning for a severe pandemic. We developed Panalysis, a new tool to estimate the likely healthcare consequences of a pandemic and to aid hospitals in the development of mitigation and response strategies. By way of example, we demonstrate how Panalysis can be used to plan for a 1918-like flu pandemic. We discuss potential future applications of this tool.
Subject(s)
Disaster Planning/methods , Disease Outbreaks , Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. , Disaster Planning/organization & administration , Hospital Administration/methods , Hospitals/statistics & numerical data , Humans , Influenza, Human/epidemiology , Models, Organizational , Regional Health Planning , Software , United States/epidemiologyABSTRACT
In this century a number of events could extinguish humanity. The probability of these events may be very low, but the expected value of preventing them could be high, as it represents the value of all future human lives. We review the challenges to studying human extinction risks and, by way of example, estimate the cost effectiveness of preventing extinction-level asteroid impacts.
Subject(s)
Extinction, Biological , Cost-Benefit Analysis , Disasters/prevention & control , Humans , Minor Planets , Probability , Risk Assessment/statistics & numerical data , UncertaintyABSTRACT
Therapeutics and vaccines are available for only a fraction of biological threats, leaving populations vulnerable to attacks involving biological weapons. Existing U.S. policies to accelerate commercial development of biodefense products have thus far induced insufficient investment by the biopharmaceutical industry. In this article, we examine the technical, regulatory, and market risks associated with countermeasure development and review existing and proposed federal incentives to increase industrial investment. We conclude with several recommendations. To increase industry's engagement in biodefense countermeasure development, Congress should expand BioShield funding, giving HHS the flexibility to fund a portfolio of biodefense countermeasures whose revenues are comparable to those of commercial drugs. Congress should establish tradable priority review vouchers for developers of new countermeasures. A National Academy of Sciences or National Biodefense Science Board should formally evaluate incentive programs and a government-managed "Virtual Pharma," in which HHS contracts separate stages of research, development, and production to individual firms.
Subject(s)
Bioterrorism , Motivation , Research/economics , Drug Industry/economics , Humans , Politics , United StatesSubject(s)
Biomedical Research , Disaster Planning , Group Processes , Humans , Leadership , United StatesABSTRACT
We estimate the financial effects of an influenza pandemic on US hospitals, including the cost of deferring elective admissions and the cost of uncompensated care for uninsured patients. Using US pandemic planning assumptions and national data on health care costs and revenues, a 1918-like pandemic would cause US hospitals to absorb a net loss of $3.9 billion, or an average $784,592 per hospital. Policymakers should consider contingencies to ensure that hospitals do not become insolvent as a result of a severe pandemic.