Three legs of the missing heritability problem.

The so-called 'missing heritability problem' is often characterized by behavior geneticists as a numerical discrepancy between alternative kinds of heritability. For example, while 'traditional heritability' derived from twin and family studies indicates that approximately ∼50% of variation in intelligence is attributable to genetics, 'SNP heritability' derived from genome-wide association studies indicates that only ∼10% of variation in intelligence is attributable to genetics. This 40% gap in variance accounted for by alternative kinds of heritability is frequently referred to as what's "missing." Philosophers have picked up on this reading, suggesting that "dissolving" the missing heritability problem is merely a matter of closing the numerical gap between traditional and molecular kinds of heritability. We argue that this framing of the problem undervalues the severity of the many challenges to scientific understanding of the "heritability" of human behavior. On our view, resolving the numerical discrepancies between alternative kinds of heritability will do little to advance scientific explanation and understanding of behavior genetics. Thus, we propose a new conceptual framework of the missing heritability problem that comprises three independent methodological and explanatory challenges: the numerical gap, the prediction gap, and the mechanism gap.

Half a century later and we're back where we started: How the problem of locality turned in to the problem of portability.

In the 1970s, Lewontin sparked a debate about a problem of locality, by making the case that any given heritability estimate is local to the original population and environment studied, and could not be generalized to other populations and environments. Nearly 50 years later, a new problem of portability has emerged: the predictive accuracy of polygenic scores diminishes when applied to populations whose characteristics are different from the original population sample. This paper briefly reviews the nature of each problem and analyzes their similarities and differences in three areas: 1) conceptual underpinnings, 2) causal explanations, and 3) practical, social, and political implications. Although conceptually and methodologically different from the problem of locality in important respects, the problem of portability facing contemporary genomics today should come as no surprise, as it is an inevitable outcome of the kinds of problematic inferences detailed by Lewontin nearly half a century ago.

On closing the gap between philosophical concepts and their usage in scientific practice: A lesson from the debate about natural selection as mechanism.

In addition to theorizing about the role and value of mechanisms in scientific explanation or the causal structure of the world, there is a fundamental task of getting straight what a 'mechanism' is in the first place. Broadly, this paper is about the challenge of application: the challenge of aligning one's philosophical account of a scientific concept with the manner in which that concept is actually used in scientific practice. This paper considers a case study of the challenge of application as it pertains to the concept of a mechanism: the debate about whether natural selection is a mechanism. By making clear what is and is not at stake in this debate, this paper considers various strategies for dealing with the challenge of application and makes a case for definitional pluralism about mechanism concepts.