ABSTRACT
Many writers in bioethics, science, and medicine contend that embryo selection is a morally better way of avoiding genetic disorders then gene editing, as the latter has risks that the former does not. We argue that one reason to use gene editing is that in many cases it would be better for the person who would develop from the edited embryo, so that not to have done it would have been worse for that person. By contrast, embryo selection is never better for the person who develops from the selected embryo. This reason to use gene editing has, however, been challenged on two grounds: first, that it makes no difference, morally, whether a bad effect is worse for someone, or a good effect better for someone; and, second, that beneficent gene editing would not be unequivocally better for the person who would develop from the edited embryo. We argue that both of these objections can be satisfactorily answered and thus that there is indeed a significant moral reason, at least in some cases, to use gene editing rather than embryo selection.
ABSTRACT
The aim of this essay is to show that there are no easy options for those who are disturbed by the suggestion that infanticide may on occasion be morally permissible. The belief that infanticide is always wrong is doubtfully compatible with a range of widely shared moral beliefs that underlie various commonly accepted practices. Any set of beliefs about the morality of abortion, infanticide and the killing of animals that is internally consistent and even minimally credible will therefore unavoidably contain some beliefs that are counterintuitive.
Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced/ethics , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , Beginning of Human Life , Fetal Viability , Infanticide/ethics , Moral Obligations , Value of Life , Age Factors , Animals , Cognition , Consciousness , Ethical Analysis , Fetus , Germany , Homicide , Human Characteristics , Humans , Infant , Infant, Newborn , Jurisprudence , Morals , Pan troglodytes , Social Responsibility , United StatesSubject(s)
Brain Death , Disabled Persons , Homicide/ethics , Tissue and Organ Harvesting/ethics , Value of Life , HumansABSTRACT
We defend the view that we are not identical to organisms against the objection that it implies that there are two subjects of every conscious state one experiences: oneself and one's organism. We then criticize animalism--the view that each of us is identical to a human organism--by showing that it has unacceptable implications for a range of actual and hypothetical cases of conjoined twinning: dicephalus, craniopagus parasiticus, and cephalopagus.
Subject(s)
Abnormalities, Multiple , Human Body , Human Characteristics , Moral Obligations , Personhood , Twins, Conjoined , Bioethical Issues , Consciousness , Ethical Analysis , HumansSubject(s)
Abortion, Induced/ethics , Ethical Analysis , Fetus , Philosophy , Pregnant Women , Prenatal Injuries , Abortion, Induced/legislation & jurisprudence , Beginning of Human Life/ethics , Child , Choice Behavior/ethics , Chronic Disease , Female , Humans , Liability, Legal , Maternal Welfare , Moral Obligations , Pain , Pregnancy , Value of LifeSubject(s)
Brain Death , Bioethics , Brain Death/diagnosis , Brain Death/physiopathology , Humans , Personhood , PhilosophyABSTRACT
Many people object to preimplantation or prenatal screening for disability on the grounds that it is discriminatory, has pernicious effects on the lives of existing disabled people, expresses a hurtful view of disabled people, and reduces human diversity. I argue that if these objections are held to be strong enough to show that screening is wrong, they must also imply the permissibility of causing oneself to have a disabled rather than a non-disabled child. Indeed, those who object to screening on these grounds and also claim that it is not worse to be disabled than not to be, seem to be committed to accepting the permissibility of deliberately causing disabling prenatal injury, even for frivolous reasons. If we cannot accept these implications, we cannot accept that the objections to screening show that it is wrong.
Subject(s)
Ethics, Clinical , Ethics, Medical , Genetic Diseases, Inborn/prevention & control , Morals , Preimplantation Diagnosis/ethics , Prenatal Diagnosis/ethics , Disabled Persons , Female , Humans , Pregnancy , PrejudiceSubject(s)
Philosophy , Politics , Religion and Medicine , Reproductive Techniques, Assisted/ethics , HumansSubject(s)
Beginning of Human Life , Disabled Persons , Ethical Analysis , Preimplantation Diagnosis/ethics , Prenatal Diagnosis/ethics , Prenatal Injuries , Reproductive Behavior/ethics , Abortion, Eugenic/ethics , Aphrodisiacs/adverse effects , Beginning of Human Life/ethics , Embryo, Mammalian , Female , Fetal Therapies/ethics , Fetus , Genetic Testing/ethics , Humans , Parents , Personhood , Preconception Injuries , Pregnancy , Prejudice , Prenatal Injuries/diagnosis , Value of Life , Wrongful LifeABSTRACT
The dominant conception of brain death as the death of the whole brain constitutes an unstable compromise between the view that a person ceases to exist when she irreversibly loses the capacity for consciousness and the view that a human organism dies only when it ceases to function in an integrated way. I argue that no single criterion of death captures the importance we attribute both to the loss of the capacity for consciousness and to the loss of functioning of the organism as a whole. This is because the person or self is one thing and the human organism is another. We require a separate account of death for each. Only if we systematically distinguish between persons and human organisms will we be able to provide plausible accounts both of the conditions of our ceasing to exist and of when it is that we begin to exist. This paper, in short, argues for a form of mind-body dualism and draws out some of its implications for various practical moral problems.
Subject(s)
Brain Death , Death , Individuality , Personhood , Beginning of Human Life , Brain , Brain Diseases , Brain Injuries , Cognition , Comprehension , Embryo, Mammalian , Euthanasia , Euthanasia, Active , Euthanasia, Passive , Humans , Life , Persistent Vegetative State , Philosophy , Self ConceptSubject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Ethics , Fetus , Homicide , Philosophy , Pregnancy , Pregnant Women , Adoption , Contraception , Cost-Benefit Analysis , Euthanasia, Passive , Human Rights , Humans , Individuality , Maternal-Fetal Relations , Moral Obligations , Personhood , Risk , Risk Assessment , Sexuality , Social Responsibility , Value of LifeABSTRACT
One of the aims of this article is to contribute to the identification of the empirical criteria governing the use of the concepts of killing and letting die. I will not attempt a comprehensive analysis of the concepts but will limit the inquiry to certain problematic cases -- namely, cases involving the removal or withdrawal of life-supporting aid or protection. The analysis of these cases will, however, shed light on the criteria for distinguishing killing and letting die in other cases as well. My overall aims in the article are partly constructive and partly skeptical. I hope to advance our understanding of the nature of the distinction between killing and letting die. This, I believe, will enable us to defend the moral relevance of the distinction against certain objections -- in particular, objections that claim that the distinction fails to coincide with commonsense moral intuitions. Yet I will suggest that, as we get clearer about the nature of the distinction and the sources of its intuitive appeal, it may seem that the intuitions it supports are not so well grounded as one could wish.
Subject(s)
Abortion, Induced , Ethical Analysis , Ethics , Euthanasia, Passive , Homicide , Withholding Treatment , Fetus , Humans , Intention , Morals , Motivation , PhilosophyABSTRACT
KIE: The Epicurean argument that death cannot be a misfortune for the person who dies because, when death occurs, there is no longer a person to whom any misfortune can befall, fails to establish the conclusions which its defenders have sought from it. Beginning with the premise that death can be bad, either for the victim or in quasi-impersonal terms, the author seeks to define that badness through philosophical analysis. The belief that to have more life than is worth living is always better than to have less is reconciled with the notion that the badness of death increases with the degree of psychological connectedness, using the examples of the deaths of an unborn fetus and of a 35-year-old woman. The author contends it can be better for a person to suffer a worse death at 35 than never to have lived at all.^ieng