Systems of spatial reference in human memory.

Seven experiments examined the spatial reference systems used in memory to represent the locations of objects in the environment. Participants learned the locations of common objects in a room and then made judgments of relative direction using their memories of the layout (e.g., "Imagine you are standing at the shoe, facing the lamp; point to the clock"). The experiments manipulated the number of views that observers were allowed to experience, the presence or absence of local and global reference systems (e.g., a rectangular mat on which objects were placed and the walls of the room, respectively), and the congruence of local and global reference systems. Judgments of relative direction were more accurate for imagined headings parallel to study views than for imagined headings parallel to novel views, even with up to three study views. However, study views misaligned with salient reference systems in the environment were not strongly represented if they were experienced in the context of aligned views. Novel views aligned with a local reference system were, under certain conditions, easier to imagine than were novel views misaligned with the local reference system. We propose that learning and remembering the spatial structure of the surrounding environment involves interpreting the layout in terms of a spatial reference system. This reference system is imposed on the environment but defined by egocentric experience.

Visual memories from nonvisual experiences.

Many common activities rely on spatial knowledge acquired from nonvisual modalities. We investigated the nature of this knowledge by having people look at a collection of objects on a desktop and manually reconstruct their arrangement, without vision, as though the display had been rotated by 0 degrees 45 degrees 90 degrees 135 degrees or 180 degrees relative to the view they could see. Performance on several measures of visual-spatial memory showed that participants had better visual memory for the view they had manually reconstructed than for the view they had studied visually for several minutes. These findings provide compelling new evidence that visual-spatial knowledge of very high fidelity can be acquired from nonvisual modalities, and reveal how, visual and nonvisual spatial information may even be confused in the brain.

Transfer-appropriate processing (TAP) and repetition priming.

Transfer-appropriate processing (TAP), as applied to implicit memory, has tended to emphasize general forms of processing (e.g., perceptual or conceptual processing). In the present studies, the TAP principle was employed in a more specific manner in order to more precisely assess the relations between the processing engaged during first exposure and that engaged during second exposure to items. Thirteen experiments used a two-phase, cross-task design in which participants engaged in different combinations of seven specific intentional tasks between Phase 1 and Phase 2. Maximum repetition priming was found when tasks were the same in Phases 1 and 2. When Phase 1 and Phase 2 tasks differed, there were lesser, or no, repetition priming effects, depending on the particular combination of tasks. The results demonstrate the importance of the specific intentional processes engaged during repetition priming and the potential heuristic value of TAP, as a principle and methodology, for exploring the organization of memory and related process models.

Mental representations of large and small spatial layouts are orientation dependent.

Previous research on spatial memory indicated that memories of small layouts were orientation dependent (orientation specific) but that memories of large layouts were orientation independent (orientation free). Two experiments investigated the relation between layout size and orientation dependency. Participants learned a small or a large 4-point path (Experiment 1) or a large display of objects (Experiment 2) and then made judgments of relative direction from imagined headings that were either the same as or different from the single studied orientation. Judgments were faster and more accurate when the imagined heading was the same as the studied orientation (i.e., aligned) than when the imagined heading differed from the studied orientation (i.e., misaligned). This alignment effect was present for both small and large layouts. These results indicate that location is encoded in an orientation-dependent manner regardless of layout size.

Symmetry and asymmetry of human spatial memory.

Six experiments investigated the limiting conditions on and the causes of asymmetries in estimates of euclidean distance. Participants estimated distances between locations on recently learned maps or between buildings on their college campus. Estimates between landmarks and neighboring nonlandmarks were often asymmetric, but estimates between other pairs of locations were typically symmetric. These and other results were inconsistent with the predictions of models that attribute asymmetries to stimulus or to retrieval bias. A contextual scaling model of asymmetry is proposed. According to this model, asymmetries in proximity judgments are caused by general principles of human memory and judgment: (a) Stimuli differ in the contexts they establish in working memory and (b) magnitude estimates are scaled by the context in which they are made.

The representation and integration in memory of spatial and nonspatial information.

A series of experiments investigated whether people could integrate nonspatial information about an object with their knowledge of the object's location in space. In Experiments 1 and 3, subjects learned the locations of cities on a fictitious road map; in Experiments 2, 4, and 5, subjects were already familiar with the locations of buildings on a campus. The subjects then learned facts about the cities on the maps or the buildings on the campus. The question of interest was whether or not these nonspatial facts would be integrated in memory with the spatial knowledge. After learning the facts, subjects were given a location-judgment test in which they had to decide whether an object was in one region of the space or another. Knowledge integration was assessed by comparing levels of performance in two conditions: (a) when a city or a building name was primed by a fact about a neighboring city or building, and (b) when a city or a building name was primed by a fact about a distant city or building. Results showed that responses in Condition a were faster or more accurate, or both faster and more accurate, than responses in Condition b. These results indicate that the spatial and nonspatial information were encoded in a common memory representation.

Spatial and temporal contributions to the structure of spatial memory.

Three experiments investigated the effects of spatial and temporal contiguity in item recognition, location judgment, and distance estimation tasks. Ss learned the locations of object names in spatial arrays, which were divided into 2 regions. The names of locations were presented during map learning so that critical pairs appeared close in space and close in time, close in space but far in time, far in space but close in time, and far in space and far in time. Names primed each other in recognition only when they were neighbors in both space and time. In contrast, the effects of spatial and temporal contiguity in priming in location judgments were additive. Finally, temporal contiguity affected estimates of Euclidean distance when locations were close together, but not when they were far apart.

Constraints on priming in spatial memory: naturally learned versus experimentally learned environments.

In four experiments, we explored constraints on priming in spatial memory. In Experiments 1 and 2, subjects who were familiar with the locations of buildings on the Vanderbilt campus participated in a recognition test. The subjects' task was to decide whether or not named buildings were on the campus. Foils in this recognition test were realistic but fictional names of buildings. In principle, the subjects could have performed this task without using spatial knowledge; in fact, they must not have used spatial knowledge, because there was no evidence of priming in recognition as a function of the spatial relations between buildings on the campus. This result differs from those obtained in earlier experiments that have examined memory of spatial layouts learned in laboratory settings. In Experiment 3, the fictional foils were replaced by names of buildings in an area of the campus separated geographically from the main campus. Evidently, this change induced subjects to retrieve spatial knowledge, because the spatial priming effect materialized. A fourth experiment replicated the above findings in a single experiment and demonstrated that spatial priming could be obtained when the configuration of buildings was learned experimentally. These results are explained by appealing to the "decontextualization" that takes place in memory over time.

Subjective hierarchies in spatial memory.

Two experiments investigated the structure of spatial memories. Subjects learned locations of objects in spatial layouts (Experiment 1) or locations of object names on maps (Experiment 2). Physical and perceptual boundaries were absent in these spatial arrays. Subjects then participated in three tasks: item recognition, in which the variable of interest was spatial priming; free and cued recall; and Euclidean distance estimation. Ordered-tree analysis of individual subjects' recall protocols produced hierarchical trees consistent with regularities in output order. Spatial priming and distance estimations depended on whether pairs of objects appeared in the same subtree or in different subtrees. These findings indicate that spatial memories have a hierarchical component, even when physical and perceptual boundaries are nonexistent. Priming also increased with depth of clustering in ordered trees. This result supports spreading-activation theories of retrieval but provides evidence against several "non-spreading-activation" theories.

Semantic, phonological, and mediated priming in reading and lexical decisions.

Four experiments were conducted to investigate whether semantic activation of a concept spreads to phonologically and graphemically related concepts. In lexical decision or self-paced reading tasks, subjects responded to pairs of words that were semantically related (e.g., light-lamp), that rhymed (e.g., lamp-damp), or that combined both of these relations through a mediating word (e.g., light-damp). In one version of each task, test lists contained word-word pairs (e.g., light-lamp) as well as nonword-word (e.g., pown-table) and word-nonword pairs (e.g., month-poad); in another version, test lists contained only word-word pairs. The lexical decision and self-paced reading tasks were facilitated by semantic and rhyming relations regardless of the presence or absence of nonwords on the test lists. The effect of the mediated relation, however, depended on the presence of nonwords among the stimuli. When only words were included, there was no effect of the mediated relation, but when nonwords were included, lexical decision and self-paced reading responses were inhibited by the mediated relation. These inhibitory effects are attributed to processes occurring after lexical access, and the relative advantages of the self-paced reading task are discussed.

Detecting letters in continuous text: effects of display size.

In three letter detection experiments, subjects responded to each instance of the letter t in continuous text typed in a standard paragraph, typed with one to four words per line, or shown for a fixed duration on a computer screen either one or four words at a time. In the multiword and the standard paragraph conditions, errors were greatest and latencies longest on the word the when it was correctly spelled. This effect was diminished or reversed in the one-word conditions. These findings support a set of unitization hypotheses about the reading process, according to which subjects do not process the constituent letters of a word once that word has been identified unless no other word is in view.

The mental representation of knowledge acquired from maps.

Recognition priming and distance estimation were used to investigate the mental representation of knowledge acquired from maps. In Experiment 1, recognition priming showed that cities close in route distance primed each other more than cities far in route distance, even when Euclidean distance was equated. Experiment 2 showed that this finding was robust and not an artifact of the way subjects learned the maps. Distance estimations in Experiment 1 supported the priming results. These results indicated that psychological distance in cognitive maps is primarily dependent on route distance rather than Euclidean distance.