The Neural Basis of Metaphor Comprehension: Evidence from Left Hemisphere Degeneration.

Despite the ubiquity of metaphor in cognition and communication, it is absent from standard clinical assessments of language, and the neural systems that support metaphor processing are debated. Previous research shows that patients with focal brain lesions can display selective impairments in processing metaphor, suggesting that figurative language abilities may be disproportionately vulnerable to brain injury. We hypothesized that metaphor processing is especially vulnerable to neurodegenerative disease, and that the left hemisphere is critical for normal metaphor processing. To evaluate these hypotheses, we tested metaphor comprehension in patients with left-hemisphere neurodegeneration, and in demographically matched healthy comparison participants. Stimuli consisted of moderately familiar metaphors and closely matched literal sentences sharing the same source term (e.g., The interview was a painful crawl / The infant's motion was a crawl). Written sentences were presented, followed by four modifier-noun answer choices (one target and three foils). Healthy controls, though reliably better at literal than metaphor trials, comprehended both sentence conditions well. By contrast, participants with left-hemisphere neurodegeneration performed disproportionately poorly on metaphor comprehension. Anatomical analyses show relationships between metaphor accuracy and patient atrophy in the left middle and superior temporal gyri, and the left inferior frontal gyrus, areas that have been implicated in supporting metaphor comprehension in previous imaging research. The behavioral results also suggest deficits of metaphor comprehension may be a sensitive measure of cognitive dysfunction in some forms of neurodegenerative disease.

Selective Metaphor Impairments After Left, Not Right, Hemisphere Injury.

The relative contributions of the left and right hemispheres to the processing of metaphoric language remains unresolved. Neuropsychological studies of brain-injured patients have motivated the hypothesis that the right hemisphere plays a critical role in understanding metaphors. However, the data are inconsistent and the hypothesis is not well-supported by neuroimaging research. To address this ambiguity about the right hemisphere's role, we administered a metaphor sentence comprehension task to 20 left-hemisphere injured patients, 20 right hemisphere injured patients, and 20 healthy controls. Stimuli consisted of metaphors of three different types: predicate metaphors based on action verbs, nominal metaphors based on event nouns, and nominal metaphors based on entity nouns. For each metaphor (n = 60), a closely matched literal sentence with the same source term was also generated. Each sentence was followed by four adjective-noun answer choices (target + three foil types) and participants were instructed to select the phrase that best matched the meaning of the sentence. As a group, both left and right hemisphere patients performed worse on metaphoric than literal sentences, and the degree of this difficulty varied for the different types of metaphor - but there was no difference between the two patient groups. Tests for literal-metaphor dissociations at the level of single cases revealed two types of impairments: general comprehension deficits affecting metaphors and literal sentences equally, and selective metaphor impairments that were specific to different types of metaphor. All cases with selective metaphor deficits had injury to the left hemisphere, and no known comprehension difficulties with literal language. Our results argue against the hypothesis of a specific or necessary contribution of the right hemisphere for understanding metaphoric language. Further, they reveal deficits in metaphoric language comprehension not captured by traditional language assessments, suggesting overlooked communication difficulties in left hemisphere patients.

Metaphor: Bridging embodiment to abstraction.

Embodied cognition accounts posit that concepts are grounded in our sensory and motor systems. An important challenge for these accounts is explaining how abstract concepts, which do not directly call upon sensory or motor information, can be informed by experience. We propose that metaphor is one important vehicle guiding the development and use of abstract concepts. Metaphors allow us to draw on concrete, familiar domains to acquire and reason about abstract concepts. Additionally, repeated metaphoric use drawing on particular aspects of concrete experience can result in the development of new abstract representations. These abstractions, which are derived from embodied experience but lack much of the sensorimotor information associated with it, can then be flexibly applied to understand new situations.

Flying under the radar: figurative language impairments in focal lesion patients.

Despite the prevalent and natural use of metaphor in everyday language, the neural basis of this powerful communication device remains poorly understood. Early studies of brain-injured patients suggested the right hemisphere plays a critical role in metaphor comprehension, but more recent patient and neuroimaging studies do not consistently support this hypothesis. One explanation for this discrepancy is the challenge in designing optimal tasks for brain-injured populations. As traditional aphasia assessments do not assess figurative language comprehension, we designed a new metaphor comprehension task to consider whether impaired metaphor processing is missed by standard clinical assessments. Stimuli consisted of 60 pairs of moderately familiar metaphors and closely matched literal sentences. Sentences were presented visually in a randomized order, followed by four adjective-noun answer choices (target + three foil types). Participants were instructed to select the phrase that best matched the meaning of the sentence. We report the performance of three focal lesion patients and a group of 12 healthy, older controls. Controls performed near ceiling in both conditions, with slightly more accurate performance on literal than metaphoric sentences. While the Western Aphasia Battery (Kertesz, 1982) and the objects and actions naming battery (Druks and Masterson, 2000) indicated minimal to no language difficulty, our metaphor comprehension task indicated three different profiles of metaphor comprehension impairment in the patients' performance. Single case statistics revealed comparable impairment on metaphoric and literal sentences, disproportionately greater impairment on metaphors than literal sentences, and selective impairment on metaphors. We conclude our task reveals that patients can have selective metaphor comprehension deficits. These deficits are not captured by traditional neuropsychological language assessments, suggesting overlooked communication difficulties.

Enhanced mental rotation ability in time-space synesthesia.

Time-space synesthesia is a variant of sequence-space synesthesia and involves the involuntary association of months of the year with 2D and 3D spatial forms, such as arcs, circles, and ellipses. Previous studies have revealed conflicting results regarding the association between time-space synesthesia and enhanced spatial processing ability. Here, we tested 15 time-space synesthetes, and 15 non-synesthetic controls matched for age, education, and gender on standard tests of mental rotation ability, spatial working memory, and verbal working memory. Synesthetes performed better than controls on our test of mental rotation, but similarly to controls on tests of spatial and verbal working memory. Results support a dissociation between visuo-spatial imagery and spatial working memory capacity, and suggest time-space synesthesia is associated only with enhanced visuo-spatial imagery. These data are consistent with the time-space connectivity thesis that time-space synesthesia results from enhanced connectivity in the parietal lobe between regions supporting the representation of temporal sequences and those underlying visuo-spatial imagery.

Congruity Effects in Time and Space: Behavioral and ERP Measures.

Two experiments investigated whether motion metaphors for time affected the perception of spatial motion. Participants read sentences either about literal motion through space or metaphorical motion through time written from either the ego-moving or object-moving perspective. Each sentence was followed by a cartoon clip. Smiley-moving clips showed an iconic happy face moving toward a polygon, and shape-moving clips showed a polygon moving toward a happy face. In Experiment 1, using an explicit judgment task, participants judged smiley-moving cartoons as related to ego-moving sentences about space and about time, and shape-moving cartoons as related to object-moving sentences. In Experiment 2, participants viewed the same stimuli, but the cartoons were task-irrelevant. Event-related brain potentials revealed an early attentional effect of congruity on cartoons following sentences about space, and a later semantic effect on cartoons following sentences about time. Results are most consistent with accounts that posit differences in the processing of novel and conventional metaphors.